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7Stephen Gill
Preface:
Political Protest in the Age of Neoliberal Austerity
The publication of »Prevent and Tame« comes at a crucial moment or turning point
in world order. It reveals some of the essential governing features that are associa-
ted with the contradictions of contemporary capitalism – a system that I call disci-
plinary neoliberalism. This system involves the individualization of society allied
to the extended surveillance, regulation and criminalization of dissent and protest
in order to sustain a social order premised on the social reproduction of the affluent
strata and the securitization of extended capital accumulation over time.
At the same time what seems to be under construction is a dystopian life-
world—what Karl Polanyi called a ›stark utopia‹—in which social problems and
questions of deviance (as well as problems of public health) are reduced to indivi-
dual pathologies, and where collective action—even for purposes of legitimate
protest—is construed by important elements of the ruling authorities as an attack
not only on the state but also on society. To use Margaret Thatcher’s phrase, what
is being constructed is a self-help society of atomized individuals, placing the res-
ponsibility on the shoulders of the individual for his or her fate, downgrading the
importance of social or collective institutions to solve social problems. If this dis-
cursive shift towards individualization is successful, it would constitute a decisive
victory for the neoliberal ruling classes, which, in Europe, include New Labour
and many Social Democrats who believe, perhaps paradoxically, in the deep regu-
lation of society, whilst reserving for capital, particularly financial capital, its
capacity for self-regulation.
However many in society are concerned not only with the crises and disloca-
tions associated with contemporary capitalism but also with the way in which
neoliberal reforms not only discipline and render insecure the traditional working
classes, but also the way in which they undermine the security of many of the pro-
fessional middle classes.  As such disciplinary neoliberalism is resisted. One form
of resistance is political protest, and, particularly when protest is informed by not
only a critique but also by the imagining of an alternative form of society, then the
authorities will seek to prevent such protest, or indeed to tame it. What the au-
thorities seem to also wish to prevent when tackling such protest or dissent, is the
possibility of a more democratic, public and socially accountable surveillance of
the activities, forms of regulation, and indeed the social and political links
between ruling classes and the upper echelons of capital—as has been illustrated
in the cascading financial and economic crises that have erupted across the globe
since 2007.  This then is some of the contemporary terrain of this book.
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8With such issues in mind, this collection analyzes the new doctrines and ideo-
logies of ›preventionism‹, and assesses the degree to which it is able to prevent or
to tame protest, and indeed to isolate political dissent—in the context of the
intersecting crises of contemporary capitalist development, society and ecology.
This book is a necessary read for all of us who are interested in questions of civil
liberty, in the freedom to express one’s political views, and in the basic right to to-
lerance of dissent and freedom of association and expression, all of which must be
fully guaranteed rights in any democratic society. What is at issue is the degree to
which formal constitutional rights are being subverted and supervened by ideo-
logies of ›the emergency‹, or of ›the exception‹, justifying the deeper policing of
social order, for example associating left wing political activism with terrorism,
and by criminalizing such behavior. 
Indeed, ›preventionism‹ involves far more than the simple surveillance of im-
mediate protest since it is a concept that engages the idea of a deeper regulation of
society—one that seeks to cast a shadow of the present deep into the future. One
case in point, discussed in this collection, is New Labour’s Britain, where youth
deviance and dissent is associated with ›anti-social behavior‹. In Britain ›zero
tolerance policies‹ are part of a moral panic which is used as a justification for
policies that constitute minor offences as criminal activity. Social legislation,
moral panics and new technologies of surveillance and panopticism (the UK’s
National Children’s Database can also serve as a tool of policing) are therefore
used to deeply regulate the present and to ›order‹ the future. In Britain, the sur-
veillance of public space and society has gone much further than in most parts of
the capitalist world: surveillance/video cameras are found on many public hous-
ing estates as well as in innumerable locations in British cities.
It is perhaps no accident that the birthplace of Foucault’s dystopian vision of
the Panopticon and the surveillance society was in Britain, with Jeremy Bentham
as its architect. Bentham sought to construct the perfect prison which would not
only incarcerate but also transform the behavior of its inmates so that they became
more integrated members of the functioning and productive capitalist society. His
design was also intended as an all-purpose institutional and architectural model
for factories, schools, mental health institutions and hospitals. The Panopticon
was never built. Bentham tried unsuccessfully to float his idea on the English
stock exchange to raise the capital to construct a national system of Industry
Houses, each of which would have put 250,000 idle workers and prisoners to
productive work, thereby solving not only the problem of unemployment but also
avoiding the need for the forced transportation of political prisoners and Irish dis-
senters to the penal colonies of Australia, whilst making a profit for his share-
holders in the process.
In a similar manner, the ideologies of ›preventionism‹ that are explored in this
volume seem to tolerate little in the form of deviance or make few distinctions
between dissent, protest and terrorism. Moreover the governing technique of the
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9›anti-social‹ involves not only the public face of power but also its private dimen-
sions: surveillance not only in the prison, but also in the family, in the home and
in the workplace. These elements of capitalist ruling strategy were identified by
Antonio Gramsci in his notes on »Americanism and Fordism« in the 1930s. To
put this theoretically it means that strategies of preventionism are not simply
productive of a certain type of society; they form important aspects of capital
accumulation. Henry Ford’s strategy was not only to create a mass production/
mass consumption form of capitalism so that all workers would be able to own a
model T Ford but also to discipline the workers so they became effective append-
ages of the mass production assembly-line. Expanded consumerism was parado-
xically dependent on the moral regulation of workers and their families. The Ford
Motor company tended to recruit its employees from the ranks of new immigrants
to prevent them from communicating with each other (they spoke many different
languages and thus in a sense were atomized and less likely to engage in collective
action). It was also partly to encourage them to observe sobriety and sexual
abstinence at home. These forms of ›preventionism‹ were buttressed by the scien-
tific management of the production process along the lines of Taylorism (the
rhythms of the assembly-line were tuned to the body rhythms of the workers so
that they always tended to work at the maximum speed possible at different times
of day) as well as through batteries of industrial and social psychologists, all of
which were intended to produce the compliant, productive and morally regulated
worker-families. Such dystopian efforts continue and, as in the time of Henry
Ford, they are intended to stifle worker organization and protest, to maximize pro-
ductivity, as well as to indirectly limit worker rights.
Nevertheless, when organized protest does occur, as it did at the recent G8/
G20 economic summits in Toronto, it seems consistently to be met by paramili-
tary policing strategies, in which innocent onlookers as well as protesters are inc-
arcerated, often without charge, denied their political and legal rights, and clearly
in many cases with no apparent reason and in an arbitrary and often brutal man-
ner. These policing strategies, which caused considerable public disquiet in
Canada in June 2010, however are not new since they have been consistently de-
ployed at many G8 summits over the past decade, and in many different national
locations, such as Gothenburg, Genoa, Edinburgh and Heiligendamm. Indeed at
the 2001 summit in Genoa, even cultural protest was not tolerated: a theatre com-
pany involved in the demonstrations was subjected to harsh treatment and detain-
ment by the Italian police. In the public representation of these moments, which
normally show shop windows and other property being damaged and sometimes
police cars bursting into flames, protest is associated in the eyes of the onlooker,
mediated through the gaze of television, with acts of violence and is thereby de-
legitimized. It may be that these strategies of representation could themselves
help to tame the nature of protest by causing factions within political movements
to self regulate, so that some factions or groups ›tame‹ the others.
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This volume is therefore very timely and important. It addresses—from a va-
riety of different critical perspectives—some of the governmentalities, strategies
of representation and forms of action that mutually constitute the relations be-
tween rulers and ruled, or the forces of order and the forces of dissent. It addresses
a moment when global capitalism, and the political systems that govern it, have
entered into a period of deep and intersecting crises, all of which are provoking
questions about not only the stability of capitalist societies, but also their legitima-
tion. Capitalism is premised upon an extrapolation of present values and activities
into future flows of profit and revenue, refracted through the prices of stocks and
bonds in the financial markets. For such a calculus of the future to take place, con-
temporary capitalism, in the vein of Bentham, has developed a series of mecha-
nisms to define, assess, contain and if possible to eliminate risks. For capital, risk
means an opportunity for higher profits, but it also means danger of loss. Indeed
the calculus of risk, reflected for example in the activities of the credit rating
agencies, is itself an activity that generates profits. The credit rating agencies as-
sess the likelihood that individuals, firms, local governments and sovereign states
will continue to be able to service their debts over time and repay what is owed,
with interest, to creditors. Of course, given the vast and complex scale of indus-
trial production and its interface with society and the environment, societies are
always open to catastrophic risk, such as those risks associated with the meltdown
of nuclear reactors, the collapse of deep sea oil wells beneath the oceans, and the
growing and cumulative risks associated with ever-increasing levels of consump-
tion premised upon fossil fuels, and thus with the threat of climate change and
other forms of ecological catastrophe. These examples, however, as well as the
specific G8/G20 macroeconomic responses to the financial implosion of global
capitalism since 2007 show that the crisis management structures of contemporary
government are principally premised upon socializing the risks of the most
powerful corporations. At the same time, capitalist restructuring under disci-
plinary neoliberalism has involved consistent efforts to create more flexible labor
markets and greater workplace surveillance—different aspects of the individua-
tion of subjects, the privatization of their social risks, and increasing insecurity.  
This is why many of the protest movements are asking the question: »who pays
for the crisis?« The dominant neoliberal response is that the people will pay for
the crisis. In order to pay for the gigantic bailouts of wealthy banks and powerful
corporations this will mean higher taxes, the privatization of public services, re-
duced pensions and lower public sector salaries. This indicates that the present
moment is one of supremacy rather than of hegemony, and it is a moment when
we can expect protest and contestation to intensify. The question is can it be pre-
empted and contained, and if so by whom and with what results? This volume
provides some invaluable clues and guides us as we look at this question in the
immediate future.
Toronto, August 31, 2010.
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Introduction: Prevent and Tame. Ideas for a New Perspective
on Social Movements and Protest
This book is a product of a conference on »Shaping Europe in a Globalized
World. Protest Movements and the Rise of a Transnational Civil Society« which
took place in Zurich in the summer of 2009. It brings together some of the empirical
and theoretical papers presented in two panels, entitled »Preventionism and
Obstacles for Protest in the Era of Neoliberalism—Linking Protest Research and
Governmentality Studies« (organized by Peter Ullrich) and »Taming Protest: The
Rituals of Violence« (organized by Andrea Pabst). The scope of these panels and
the interconnectedness of the addressed issues are expressed in the book’s title.
This book can also be seen as a result of our attempts to find new perspectives
for researching social movements and protest in light of recent developments in
social theory. No matter how different these perspectives and their subjects are in
detail, they follow a similar analytical intuition that is spelled out in Foucault’s
concepts of ›governmentality‹ and ›subjectivation‹. They aim to overcome the com-
mon dualistic approach that predominantly sees movements and power (the state,
government and others) as independent antagonists and thereby often ignores
their entanglement. This assumption leads to an approach to understanding protest
that departs from the usual questions of »Who are they?«, »What do they want?«,
and most importantly »What are the most successful movement strategies?«. To
these, we would like to add »To what degree can aspects of power, the state, and
the structures of government also be found within movements themselves?« This
perspective, we think, enables us to see movements more as part of the societal
whole than as the ›other‹ or ›outside‹.
With this book we do not claim to offer a comprehensive overview of all of the
implications which governmentality and subjectivation studies may have for pro-
test research, but all of the papers collected here do, in one way or another, try to
establish and conceptualize such a link. Given that commonality, however, one
can distinguish among these contributions quite a range of different starting points
and foci of analysis.
Of course the state still is a core actor. On this level, the demarcation between
legal/illegal is still the primary mode shaping basic forms of conduct. Criminali-
zation is a basic tactic for dealing with unwanted behavior like protest. This strongly
affects activists’ opportunities, behavior, and thinking, thereby fundamentally
changing the interrelatedness of activism and power. The paper by Andrej Holm and
Anne Roth describes a case of the criminalization of protest by constructing asso-
ciations between left wing activists and terrorism. The allegations in this case
could not be sustained, but gave authorities the chance to conduct extensive inves-
tigations into the left wing scene, generating intelligence to be used for the further
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policing of protest. As Holm/Roth make remarkably clear, what the alleged ›ter-
rorist‹ activists had to go through while being subjected to massive police surveil-
lance, imprisonment, and interrogation is hard to overestimate and will leave a
lasting imprint in their minds. Besides the repressive aspects one must also ask
what preventive effects such practices may have. To what degree will this constant
threat of ›special treatment‹ inhibit activists from engaging in protest and activism
in the future?
Michael Shane Boyle analyzes the criminalization of the VolxTheaterKarawane
following their participation in the demonstrations against the 2001 G8 summit in
Genoa, Italy. As part of a carnivalesque activist tour for migrant rights, the group
had been performing in Europe for a month prior to being arrested just outside of
Genoa. Similar to the case described by Holm and Roth the group was charged
with forming a criminal organization and subjected to indefinite detainment,
harsh interrogation, and even torture by Italian authorities.
While criminalization is clearly a very authoritative act of governmental insti-
tutions, there are ›softer‹ or more subtle techniques, especially different forms of
surveillance, the use and effects of which are important to recognize. Compared to
open criminalization, practices of surveillance work not only on the state level but
by spreading pandemically throughout the social body, into public space, work-
places, the media, and our homes. Based on this diagnosis, Florian Heßdörfer’s
paper sketches a fundamental link between the process of subjectivation and ex-
periences of visibility. While visibility plays an increasingly important role in the
social field—from media technologies to public security efforts—protest actions
and strategies also transform themselves according to the changing conditions of
visual culture. But on this spectacular field protest/movements tend to conceptua-
lize themselves as a mediatized public event and are in danger of forgetting about
their work of negation and its articulation.
While this can be read as an unintended consequence of taming the potential
powers of protest, the book also deals with more specific forms of subtly hinder-
ing resistance. This is the focus of Marco Tullney’s contribution. He shows that
surveillance technology in the workplace is not only a means of effectively orga-
nizing production and optimizing the workforce. It can also be used to hinder em-
ployee protest, and it is intended to have this effect. Most importantly, workplace
surveillance is perceived by employees as a means of suppressing their labor
rights and thereby limits their opportunities to organize.
The preventionist aspects of protest policing have a social background that
goes far beyond the field of political activism. Prevention, Peter Ullrich explains
in his initial paper, has become an issue in all areas of life, especially in the health
care sector. Gaining legitimacy from this field, preventive thinking (e.g. »Have I
gotten enough exercise this week?«), supported by extensive apparatuses of sur-
veillance and control, has a tendency to infect all areas of life with an instrumental
rationality aimed at optimizing the personal self. One major effect of this rationa-
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lity is that it makes people think that their grievances result from individual mis-
behavior rather than social structures. This, Ullrich argues, may have the effect of
delegitimizing protest by undermining one of its basic preconditions: the legiti-
macy of social critique.
The preventionist perspective can also be incorporated by social movements
themselves. Darcy K. Leach and Sebastian Haunss trace the implicit impact of
criminalization in the context of two multi-day protests in Germany, specifically
actions against a nuclear waste transport to Gorleben in March 2001 and against
the G8 meetings in Heiligendamm in 2007. In their two case studies they analyze
how the »violence question« affects the capacity for cooperation among diverse
movement groups. The spotlight is thus not on criminalization strategies by state
officials or journalists but on the question how activists, in navigating complex
debates about the (il)legitimate use of violence, activists themselves often attempt
to tame other factions/groups within their own movement. In examining these
processes, Leach/Haunss demonstrate the effects of intra-movement taming
rituals and highlight conditions that facilitate sustainable cooperation among
diverse activist groups, despite the state’s efforts at criminalization. 
Against the background of these developments, the aims and means of protest
seem to change. But perhaps the whole logic of acting against something should
be called into question? This at least is the concern of Nick Montgomery’s contri-
bution. He focuses on the recent actions and discourses around the 2010 Anti-
Olympics Movement in Canada and analyzes two major approaches taken in this
oppositional field: the ›classic‹ one of civil disobedience and the one of counter-
hegemony following the work of Gramsci and Laclau/Mouffe. In analyzing the
Anti-Olympics movement, the author recognizes the emergence of new forms of
protest that cannot adequately be conceptualized within the framework of these
two logics of protest, and suggests that we transcend them. Building on the con-
cept of ›minoritarian politics‹ proposed by Deleuze and Guattari and Richard
Day’s notion of a ›politics of the act‹, Montgomery asks if the framework and
focus of »prevent and tame« simply ignores modes of resistance that exist outside
of this governmentality, such as that which Foucault terms  »counter-conduct«.
Last but not least, we wish to thank the organizers of the Zurich conference and
all those who took part in the discussions. Without them this book would not have
been possible. We are also indebted to those who helped the non-native speakers
with some language issues, especially Michael Shane Boyle, Petra Knorr, Darcy
K. Leach and Nick Montgomery.
Peter Ullrich, Andrea Pabst, and Florian Heßdörfer
Leipzig/Hamburg, June 2010
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Peter Ullrich
Preventionism and Obstacles for Protest in Neoliberalism.
Linking Governmentality Studies and Protest Research
Introduction1
In a recent article in the »Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines«,
Smith and Fetner (2007, 15) differentiate on a general level between structural
and cultural approaches to social movement research. While the former showed
interest in material resources, organizations and institutions (what Smith/Fetner
consider in a somewhat narrow sense as structure), the latter shared an interest in
processes of reception and interpretation of these (what they consider as culture).
So in their view social movement research’s interest is restricted to the move-
ments’ strategic, organizational and interpretational questions. This is typical for a
research sector whose standard repertoire of theories (resource mobilization, poli-
tical opportunities, framing) prefers micro- and meso-perspectives while virtually
ignoring (new developments in) social theory and conceptions of social change. 
It might be fruitful to confront protest research2 with such relatively new ideas
and insights. This especially applies to theories that explicitly deal with core
questions social movements are also concerned with, like questions of power and
the struggle for persistence and/or change in society, which is by definition the
criterion per se for social movements (Raschke 1991). The mainstream of social
movement research understandably focused on the movement side of the move-
ment-power-coin. Being interested in movements’ identities, action repertoires,
resources and communicative (framing) strategies and especially in their success
or resonance, scholars of protest did not shed much light on the power side. Within
protest research only the theory of ›political opportunity structures‹ (POS) syste-
matically deals with the political system, which is the main societal subsystem
associated with power. But these theories that »analyze the environment of social
movements as a set of conditions which facilitate or restrict mobilization and
movement success« (Rucht/Neidhardt 2002, 9) are deadlocked in a basically
›situational‹ concept of contextual conditions. This situational restriction is partly
transgressed by the so-called ›European current‹ of POS-theory, which focuses on
long-term conditions of the political system (Kitschelt 1986). Another aspect in
overcoming this situational restriction was added by the POS offshoot-concepts
›cultural opportunity structures‹ and ›discursive opportunity structures‹. While
1 I am indebted to Anja Lê, Florian Heßdörfer and Andrea Pabst for their helpful comments on the paper.
2 The terms ›protest research‹ and ›social movement research‹ will be used synonymously here. 
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they can also be conceptualized as situational factors, they have had their strong-
est impact in explaining deeply rooted long term causes of movement ideas and
frames. This, for example, applies to the fact that (independent of the protest issue
they are concerned with) social movements in Germany are culturally bound to
frames which have to take the German Nazi past into consideration, as it has been
shown by Ferree et al. (2002) and Ullrich (2008). Similarly, Koopmans/Kriesi
(1997) explained the success of extreme right wing parties in several European
countries by the varying degree of inclusiveness of the respective concept of na-
tionality, which can be seen as a cultural opportunity structure for the resonance
of right wing radicals.
Besides these deep-rooted and long lasting cultural issues and their institu-
tional manifestations, social movement research has to take into account the
effects of societal change. And it has to focus on the issue, which Görg (1999, 17)
calls the central problem of critical theory: the question of the mediation of social
structure and subjectivity. Protest research’s concentration on the contester side of
the interdependent protest-power relation could be overcome, for example, by
introducing aspects of governmentality studies into protest research.
Which subjectivities and systems of movement knowledge are being formed in
relation to changing forms of the regulation of power—be they conventional and
affirmative or resistant or hybrid—has been a guiding question of Michel Fou-
cault’s work and is still in governmentality studies (Bröckling et al. 2000). This
field of research has been deeply inspired by Foucault’s books »Discipline and
Punish« (Foucault 1995) and especially by the »Lectures at the Collège de
France« (Foucault 2008, 2009). They strongly focus on the formation of subject-
ivities under ›neoliberal discursive dominance‹ or ›economization‹ or ›commodi-
fication‹ of the social and the politics of responsibilization and activation of the
citizen-subjects (Lessenich 2008).
This paper shall explore one specific facet of neoliberal governmentality and
its possible impact on protest research: the question of the preventionist politics of
self-activation. This approach is conducted by mutual enrichment of two virtually
unconnected fields of research under the common focus of the formation of sub-
jectivities, i.e. political sociology (especially social movement and protest re-
search) and the field of medical prevention and public health. The first chapter
will explore medical prevention and its problems and aporias and ask for their im-
pact on the formation of neoliberal activation-subjectivities. The second chapter
outlines theoretical considerations, while the third and final part is to sketch
perspectives for social movement research resulting from the ideas considered
before.
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Prevention and Preventionism3
Prevention is one of the key words of contemporary zeitgeist. Ubiquitous are the
attempts to prevent crime, diseases, crises, wars, obesity, cancer, drug addiction
and even running amok. And of course one is likely to appreciate prevention be-
cause everybody knows: it is better to prevent than to cure. But the matter is a bit
more complicated. Prevention also has something of a religious promise. It prom-
ises a good future that must be taken care of in the present. The wish for more and
more prevention can also be seen as the desire to master an uncertain future. 
And as the discourse of prevention suggests that there really is the opportunity
to control future events this can quickly turn into an obsession. Whoever wants to
control the future must know everything about the present, which is likely to have
an impact on the future. So prevention necessarily means data collection, surveil-
lance, and control.
There have been preventionist developments of that kind especially in the
security sector and in criminology. They have come in the shape of the broken-
windows-theory, preventive CCTV, data retention (the preventive law allowing
the governments to store personal telecommunication data), and all the other new
security laws and restrictions of personal freedoms and basic rights western so-
cieties had to face after 9/11—all contributing to what Garland (2001) called the
»culture of control«. I use the term preventionism, which I borrowed from Ulrich
Bröckling’s (2008) »preventionists«, to mark the paradigm shift to unlimited pre-
vention, the infinite desire to subordinate everything under the idea of prevention.
The core area of prevention becoming an uncontrollable growing preventionism
is—besides security—the health sector. 
Especially the dismantling of the welfare state in the health sector, which could
be seen in many western countries, has very often come in the shape of disease
prevention. Two examples of many from Germany shall illustrate that. Firstly,
laws oblige people to make additional financial contributions for dental prostheses
if they have not regularly taken part in screenings and medical checkups. Having
once missed the annual check-up can easily result in some hundred Euros extra
for a necessary prosthesis. Secondly, chronically ill patients in Germany normally
have to contribute only up to 1 % of their annual income for health care—unless
they have missed regular screenings. In that unfortunate case the percentage to be
paid increases to 2 %.
That development is problematic for many reasons. Prevention is used as an
indirect means to dismantle the welfare state in ways that seem highly legitimate,
because it is so easy to argue that those who do not care should be taken care of;
that those who do not obey the preventive demands should be held responsible.
3 For a more detailed version of the ideas presented in this section, see Ullrich (2009; cf. Bröckling 2008,
Bartens 2008).
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Mediated through class and education related inequalities, inequality in the health
sector is thereby also increased. The better educated are less likely to fail in that
system, which forces people to take part in medical examinations or, in some
cases, to at least get counsel on preventive measures and seriously consider what
kind of behavior is expected from them or is economically and medically most
efficient. The people’s freedom to decide concerning their own bodies is signifi-
cantly restricted.
And there is much criticism of the often compulsory prevention programs even
from a medical point of view. Without going too much into medical details, two
examples shall illustrate the general problem of this uncertainty and the basic am-
biguity of many preventive measures.
The intestinal coloscopy is suggested for the prevention of intestinal cancer. On
the one hand the number of deaths from cancer is minimized. Unfortunately, it has
been shown that, on the other hand, the risk of this screening injuring the bowel is
high. The examination may result in mental or physical distress. There may be
hygienic problems. And sometimes there are unintended side effects of the neces-
sary pre-examination zero-diet and anesthesia, which may result in serious in-
juries, accidents and even deaths. The death toll of these side effects equals the
number of those benefitting from the screening (Mühlhäuser 2007).
There is a bit more common knowledge about the problems of mammography,
the cancer screening of the female breast. This is—like the coloscopy—an often
painful procedure. It might even be the source of cancer due to the radiation expo-
sure. The biggest problem is the low specificity and the low sensitivity of the scre-
ening methods used. This results in serious problems. A recent systematic
Cochrane Review of several randomized clinical trails showed that screening
leads to a reduction in breast cancer mortality of 15 % and at the same time to
30 % over-diagnosis and overtreatment. In other words (or numbers): »This
means that for every 2000 women invited for screening throughout 10 years, one
will have her life prolonged. In addition, 10 healthy women, who would not have
been diagnosed if there had not been screening, will be diagnosed as breast cancer
patients and will be treated unnecessarily. Furthermore, more than 200 women
will experience important psychological distress for many months because of
false positive findings.« (Gøtzsche/Nielsen 2009)
So the screening is useful only for a few women; for many it is mental and phy-
sical distress. The authors of the Cochrane review see this as a clear ambiguity,
which can only lead to the need to give extensive information to women who con-
sider taking part in the screening or are invited to. But no scientific result can ease
the burden of the decision they have to take. 
This leads us to another point. Most of the preventive programs—be they com-
pulsory or not—have ambiguities that cannot be easily overcome. But prevention
is quite often propagated as a magnificent promise and a kind of salvation. In
public discourse and in popular belief many of these ambiguities are not well
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known or even ignored. One of the worst examples is a campaign by German
health insurance providers to convince women to take part in their screening pro-
gram. Their widely distributed leaflet even mentions some ›disadvantages‹ of the
screening. The risks pointed out are in fact the minor ones like radiation exposure
and the possibility of not detecting an existing tumor. The main problem and the
biggest argument against taking part in screening, the (extremely high) risk of
receiving an over-diagnosis and overtreatment, is not even mentioned.
Based on this pro-prevention biased discourse, preventionism has the tendency
to occupy all areas of life, or in Habermasian terms to colonize the lifeworld (Le-
benswelt) with instrumental rationality of the bureaucratic and market system. We
all might know the reflection about »Should I eat that steak or should I rather eat
the healthy salad?«, »Should I take butter or cholesterol-free spread?« A German
TV station provided us with an example of the ominous aspects of the preventive
approach. They reported that »Kissing prevents wrinkles and dental plaque«,
»kissing prolongs life«, »stimulates the immune system« and »makes you slim«.4
These examples should illustrate the potential infinity of preventionism. It can
be applied everywhere. Everything we do can be evaluated in terms of whether it
is healthy or not. As a matter of fact, there is never a definite right answer to the
question, what the best preventive behavior or measure is. What counts more? Is it
the relaxing anti-stress effect of snowboarding (which is seen as something po-
sitive) or the risk of an injury (which is negative)? What about the glass of wine?
The cigarette? In that sense preventionism in the end becomes an enemy of lust
and joy. And all that almost inevitably leads to the necessity of surveillance
systems and data bases to record all the check-ups. So prevention means control
(Decker 2005).
Many of the questions prevention poses cannot be easily answered, many of
the preventive demands cannot be easily met. Whatever one decides, either way
one will often be right and wrong at the same time. There are almost always
advantages and disadvantages of the specific preventive measures. The one right
answer is not available. Seen from that perspective, preventionism is a kind of
general and quite unspecific demand of society towards the people. And it is an
endless demand that cannot ultimately be met. Preventionism makes you think
about society and what society wants from you. It makes you think about how to
behave well by thinking about what might be good for you. In the idea of care for
oneself the social and the individual are mediated, because it is an almost general
individual interest to care for oneself, but this can be thought of only in the con-
cepts and along the criteria of a given social order.
The dispositive of prevention is an omnipresent phenomenon that makes people
think preventionism-like without being forced to do so. Preventionism therefore
can be seen as a means of individualising and subjectifying societal demands.
4 http://www.heute.de/ZDFheute/inhalt/19/0,3672,7262675,00.html [2008-07-06].
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Seen from that perspective, preventionism is a productive way of government, ac-
tivating people to govern themselves through the formation of ›preventive selves‹
(see Mathar 2010).
Foucaultian Perspectives 
Before explaining what all this has got to do with social movements, I would like
to point out some theoretical ideas, mainly based in Michel Foucault’s works, that
might help us understand the developments described.
The first association one may have considering the above mentioned tech-
niques of surveilling and regulating health is Foucault’s (2008, 2009) concept of
biopower. This concept captures modern states’ practices of productively organi-
zing and regulating bodies and populations, which go far beyond the old power of
sovereignty that merely decided who will live and who will not. Foucault and
other theorists had in mind public health practices of optimizing people’s health
by preventive measures. This has to be mentioned to point out that it is neither
natural nor an eternal idea that states decide on how people regulate their physical
and mental well-being. It is an aspect of modern societies and even more so under
the aegis of neoliberal self-activation politics.
The second concept one may think of, and this one is of greater interest here, is
the metaphor of the panopticon and the type of subjectifying processes described
by it. The Panopticon (designed firstly by Jeremy Bentham in the late 18th cent-
ury) was an architectural solution for institutions to control many people. Fou-
cault took up Bentham’s idea, turning it from a normative into an analytical tool,
to better describe the functioning of disciplining institutions of modern societies,
many of which are based on an asymmetric distribution of seeing and being seen,
like Bentham’s panopticon. It is the special feature of the panopticon, that those
under scrutiny (prisoners, pupils, workers, shoppers) can never be quite certain
whether they are being watched or not at a given moment.
The important aspect of the panopticon is the subjectifying process, which
Foucault saw as typical for all modern societies’ institutions and which is linked
to this feature of uncertainty. Any behavior therefore poses questions about its
possible results, depending on the answer to the question: Am I under surveillance
momentarily? And, if so, am I behaving well? What should I do to achieve that
goal or at least to avoid punishment for failure or misbehavior? These kinds of
institutional arrangements that elicit thoughts like the ones described always
imply a productive power of a self-activating kind. These institutional arrange-
ments initiate a process of incorporating the demands of the surveillant by initiat-
ing a specific subjectivation resulting in specific subject positions. 
Processes of this kind and especially their changes under neoliberal conditions
have strongly inspired surveillance studies. But the panopticon is a relatively
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fixed arrangement. It may be helpful to understand the functioning of CCTV
systems. Preventionism, as described above and its control mechanisms (like
e-health cards, medical registers and files), reflect a more subtle, more incoherent,
more complex, more infinite, more productive type of government and related
states of mind or perceptions. These kinds of logic of governing through self
governance are exactly what governmentality studies are concerned with (cf.
Bröckling et al. 2000). Because preventionism, like other activating strategies,
often leaves you in relative uncertainty about the demands5 of power, it makes you
think and act on your own. The ambiguities of the cancer screening, for example,
and the fact that the individual has to face these facts and is forced to make deci-
sions in a situation of uncertainty shows the subtle and activating character of pre-
ventionism. ›Activating‹ does not necessarily mean that it makes you act materially,
but that an atmosphere of uncertainty, unrest, or tension is produced that makes one
think about strategies, at least. That is why it is a productive technique of govern-
ment. It is like a panopticon without a centre, an omnipresent panopticon ›em-
bodied‹ in the individuals’ minds as well as in discourse and social practices.
The term governmentality is often described as having the two constituents
›government‹ and ›mentality‹, which cover two basic aspects of the concept. Go-
vernmentality studies, as inspired by Foucault, strongly emphasize the individual,
subjective aspect of governing. They focus on governing becoming self-control
or, let us say: mentality.
Governmentality studies have been successfully applied to the health care
sector. They are prominent in critical criminology and many other fields of re-
search. Interestingly, they have not yet had any influence on the study of social
movements and protest, although they deal with core areas concerned: they are
interested in processes of power and especially in changes of power relations
under current (neoliberal) conditions.
Preventionism and Protest
Governmentality studies pose new questions, questions protest research has not
yet asked nor answered. One could expect that the neoliberally activated subject
tends not to articulate discontent and unhappiness as a demand towards society.
One might expect that social attribution of problem causes is substituted by indi-
vidual attribution. The preventionist and neoliberally activated subject might pre-
fer to ask »What have I done wrong?« instead of »What’s wrong with society?« In
that sense, preventionism can be seen as a tool to attack the legitimacy of social
critique protest, as a tool to delegitimize demands people have.
5 In that respect, it is worth mentioning the observation of Heßdörfer/Bachmann (2009, cf. Heßdörfer in this
volume) that such demands may be restricted to only signal to the individual that ›society exists‹, that they are
not alone, that they cannot do whatever they want—without clearly telling what they shall do. 
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That development can be compared with the process of delegitimizing social
critique by means of artistic critique as described by Boltanski and Chiapello
(2001).
Considering these ideas, some propositions can be formulated and connected:
Changes in governing and related mentality from more direct ways of control to
preventionist and self-activating governing strategies are massive. Within this
development, new subjectivities are being formed. These subjectivities do not
consider protest to be legitimate, as their predecessors did.
This is a very strong and quite abstract hypothesis. We can also imagine counter-
tendencies. For example, neoliberalism also produces new reasons and may
thereby increase the likelihood of protest. Also, neo-liberal society’s demands
could be seen as unreasonable, as impertinence by the people.
Before we can answer these questions, some more conceptual and empirical re-
search has to be carried out. Social movement theory and protest research has not
yet incorporated governmentality studies at all. Foucault, for example, is hardly
mentioned in the relevant German or international journals. In the references sec-
tions of the international journal Mobilization and the most important German
journal on movements and protest Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen,
Foucault is virtually nonexistent!
One reason might be that the main focus of social movement scholars in the
previous, say, 20 years has always been the above-mentioned strategic one on
factors for movement success. So one analyses resources and framing. Only the
political opportunity structures approach strongly emphasized the role of the other
side, the side of power, and its effects. But POS theory focuses on continuities and
changes in movement’s current environmental conditions. It is not particularly in-
terested in intergenerational changes and its underlying subjectifying processes.
Thus there is wide potential for research. It can be conducted within this general
question on a quite abstract level. The question to be answered would be: Does
preventionism reduce the likelihood of protest by attacking the legitimacy of so-
cial attribution of problems? 
But research can also focus on more specific aspects of that general model. So
one could examine if aspects of the preventionist mode of subjectivity appear in
different currents of the movement sector or in relation to specific questions.
How, one may ask with Marco Tullney (in this volume), does surveillance of the
workplace influence organizing and industrial relations? How does it influence
the subjectivities of workers who are not trusted (generally and preventively)?
The outlined theoretical perspective may also change the views on protest polic-
ing and repression. It is not only interesting to know if repression works and
hinders protest, but also in what specific way this occurs. The governmentality
focus allows for the realization of the more subtle aspects of self-control as self-
management or: the everyday weighing of risks and how it becomes habitual in a
(potential) activist’s life. What is clearly needed is more research into the effects
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of the surveillance of activists like in the anti-terror-investigations in Germany
(Holm/Roth, in this volume). Also, the mass phenomenon of videotaping protest
and protesters needs more investigation concerning its direct and long-term
effects on protest participation, action repertoires and conflict dynamics (Ullrich/
Wollinger 2010). The ubiquitous apparatuses and networks of the surveillant as-
semblage (Haggerty/Ericson 2000) that protesters and social movements get in
touch with (sometimes indirectly, sometimes the hard way) should be taken into
account and related to their behavior and thinking.
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Florian Heßdörfer
Anti-Social or Childish: Protest and Youth
under the Eye of Prevention
»Call us childish or adolescent if you like, 
but this is our starting point: we scream.«
John Holloway
Don’t be childish! Get down-to-earth! Stop that noise! Get a life! Look around
you! We understand your anger, but ... Actions of protest seem to activate a va-
riety of responses and objections, while other forms of opposition fade into the
unnoticed or the sociopathic, because they don’t comply with the usual concept of
protest and its common characteristics. Therefore the following article will sug-
gest that in our so-called ›post-ideological‹ age and within proliferating logics of
prevention protest should be mapped as a new plateau of conflict. I will try to dis-
place the common definition of protest that links it to the state toward a concept of
protest that puts it close to John Holloway’s concept of the »scream« (Holloway
2002). This ›screaming‹ is an act of negativity, it negates something given and
indicates the desire of something that is not (yet). In a stricter sense protest would
be the articulation of the scream that thinks and focuses its social conditions, the
very potential and need to scream that leads out of the private, into the sphere of
the common. Against and within the background of this concept my text will
analyze some connections between current landmarks of protest: between the
topics of youth, protest, prevention and visibility.
I will show how youth is on the one hand a resource of protest, but also a
sphere of multiple governmental measures and legislation. Measures, which aim
to embrace or regulate the critical powers of the cultural institutions we call youth
and protest. This common link between youth and protest is written into the pro-
cess of modern socialization, while the same link also turns up as a problem of
governmentality, as states worry about a rapidly growing group of people outside
and within the traditional institutions of family, school and work. This problem
can be traced back to 1899 with the Juvenile Court Act in Illinois, which for the
first time authorized the institution of a separate juvenile court (Savage 2008, 64),
or to the famous case of the fourteen year old Jesse Pomeroy in 1875 that forced
the public »to recognize that the existing rituals between childhood and adulthood
were obsolete« (Savage 2008, 12).
Since many of us believe we are young and may share the notion of being in
opposition to something, we should take a closer look here.1 Maybe we are al-
1 When this text uses »we« it is not meant to impose the author’s view to the readers, but: »In so far as writing/
reading is a creative act, it is inevitably the act of a ›we‹. To start in the third person is not a neutral starting
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ready old and have become silent friends of the current, while we hide this from
ourselves under the guise of our own youthfulness. I will take this possibility
seriously.
I will start with some remarks concerning the link between youth and protest
and explain how the psychosocial state we call youth can also be understood as
the time in life when one is able to figure out the object we so easily call ›so-
ciety‹—and without being able to think within the horizon of the social, actions of
protest will tend to appear as childish stubbornness. Then I will touch on the
actual practice and discourse of the British Anti-Social Behavior Order (ASBO)
to give an impression of preventive measures and to sketch their relation to the
logic of protest. At the end I will switch to the question of surveillance and visib-
ility and show how they concern all of our previous topics: socialization, protest
and politics of prevention.
Subjects of protest
A child is screaming at the checkout in a supermarket. It is denied some sweets in
reach. Usually we will not call this screaming protest in the full sense of the word.
We are used to the meaning of protest as opposition aiming at a higher level,
somehow aiming at the vague thing named society.
The child however only knows its parents, who embody the order of the social
to him. Only if such immediate power can later be made questionable and be re-
flected upon, we tend to speak of protest, instead of childish disobedience. Right
here multiple potentials of possible protest seem to dry up, by the child’s develop-
ment but also by our own view: we are grown up, we have our own money in our
pockets to buy sweets. The scream ceases, the roles reverse, the play goes on.
This means there is a basic condition of protest that refers to the individual’s
development. We often and implicitly refer to it, when we discard certain forms of
protest by labeling them ›childish‹—seemingly a child is not supposed to be a
possible subject of protest. In other words: a subject of protest must be suf-
ficiently able to take the role of the other, must be sufficiently self-distanced, in-
tegrated in the symbolic order—usually the final process of this decentration is
called adolescence. By the deposition of the parents or other figures of primary
authority we gain distance to our surroundings and, as the flip-side of this process,
we gain distance to something that until now was embedded in these surround-
ings. We find ourselves bumping into something, which is suddenly as outstand-
ing as it is doubtful, into the scene of a question, into ourselves. A place that
knows its limitations as exactly that vague thing, that it is not, as the other—the
point, since it already presupposes the suppression of the ›we‹, of the subject of the writing and reading. ›We‹
are here as a starting point because we cannot start honestly anywhere else« (Holloway 2002, 1/3). The cita-
tion of this book refers to the number of the chapter and the paragraph: chapter/paragraph.
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word that from now on enriches our critical vocabulary and structures our gram-
mar of opposition: society. In our context youth can be understood as the achieve-
ment of the psychosocial ability to reflect ourselves within a social horizon: Don’t
blame us, blame society.
This unhinging experience can be seen as the end of childhood, as the central
cognitive shift of youth. A more or less conscious insight that allows dealing with
society not just as something outside, something you are thrown into, but dealing
with it as a sort of relation, that you can relate to. An unsure, risky, open condi-
tion. 
So youth is not somehow close to protest. Youth has been the name of the risky
but flexible way of socialization western societies deal with, for at least the last
century. While its flexibility extends, it is accompanied and enabled by new ways
of (self-)control, woven into what is perceived as the growth of personal freedom
and choices, working as an ambivalent ingredient in this transformational process. 
You could even say youth is two-headed from its very beginning: at the same
time born as an object of governmental worry and as the twisted psychosocial
state that spreads between the Neverland of »Peter Pan« and »The picture of
Dorian Gray.«2
Two sides of the same coin: seeing like a state you’ll start to call it a moral,
educational, crime-preventional problem—but if someone reclaims this problem
as his or her very own and articulates it, the problem changes its face, it will be
called protest.3
So to widen our perspective on protest and in order to avoid a concept of pro-
test that tends to see like a state,4 placing it on the macroscale »relationship
between the rulers and the ruled« (Andrain/Apter 1995, 2), we will try to connect
it to John Holloway’s concept of the »scream« as he unfolds it in the first chapter
of his book »Change the world, without taking the power«. This scream is a fun-
damental expression of being discontent, of being restricted, of being subjected to
conditions that you haven’t chosen. This screaming in Holloway’s sense is an act
of negativity, it negates something given and indicates the desire for something
that is not (yet). It’s the sign of an antagonistic world, it »implies a two-dimen-
sionality which insists on the conjunction of tension between the two dimensions.
2 These books illustrate the impact of the new ways of growing up. They not only show the problems and
obstacles in this process, they formulate a new attitude: the refusal of growing up as such. Childhood is
defended against something which is experienced as its hostile negation, no more as its destination. 
3 To avoid a simplifying misreading: This practice of articulation should not be understood as the simple pos-
sibility to tell what you feel (which also may not be as easy as it sounds...). I refer to the concept of articula-
tion and discourse as it is developed in chapter 3 of »Hegemony and Socialist Strategy« (pp. 105-122):
Articulating a problem would mean to point into the direction of the antagonism of the given order. »Ant-
agonism as the negation of a given order is, quite simply, the limit of that order [...]. We must consider this
›experience‹ of the limit of the social from two different points of view. On the one hand, as an experience of
failure. [...] But, on the other hand, this experience of failure is not an access to a diverse ontological order, to
a something beyond differences, simply because ... there is no beyond« (Laclau/Mouffe 2002, 126).
4 I explicetely refer to the title of the book of James C. Scott (1998): »Seeing like a state«.
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We are, but we exist in an arc of tension towards that we are not, are not yet«
(Holloway 2002, 1/4).5
Protest, in a stricter sense, therefore would be an articulation of the scream that
thinks and focuses its social conditions, the very potential and need to scream,
that leads out of the private, into the sphere of the common, of the ›we‹.
The negation of youth
Screaming subjects are subjects of desire. And within our current cultural setting
we can experience youth as a phase that unleashes a quite formless potential of
desire. In our context it doesn’t matter so much how we analyze the nature of its
origins: we may read it as a setting of strong interpellations, based on a given so-
cial language and grammar, establishing the language in which youth think about
and relate to themselves—or we may conceptualize it in more psychological
terms, reading it as desire, which had been tied into strong attachments and identi-
fications during the child’s latency phase. Our important point here is the aspect
of failure, the aspect that youth is confronted with desire and idealized hopes,
which, especially under the current conditions, will mostly remain unfulfilled in
the end. But at the same time the common way of interpreting these experiences
of frustration is a mainly individualizing one: Actually the world is alright—If you
haven’t yet found the right place it must be something about you, your choices,
your decisions, your abilities. If one option doesn’t work, it must have been the
wrong one, at least for yourself or for the moment. 
Being young and already self-focused enough, these individualizing modes of
coping with the lack of the good life will be welcome, as they promise fundamental
self-control and flatter your narcissistic drive. As a result discomfort is mainly pri-
vatized, its experience is separated from the social field. Individualized frustration
prevents the frustrated subjects from looking into the direction from which their
frustration came, it prevents them from using it as a negative power of protest.
Looking a bit further, frustration is often seen as nearly pathological, as a kind of
disease—and the search for its causes will lead the patient deep into himself, into
the hidden history of his own or into the incomprehensible weakness of his will.
Failure and frustration hide in the dark and the private, while we find the ›good
life‹ in the very light of the day, crystallized in a multitude of offers and images,
that seem to fit any of the wishes, make them communicable and confirm their
righteousness.
Under such circumstances I want to conceptualize protest as a way of dealing
with unease and frustration that holds on to the fundamental negativity of desire
and therefore doesn’t reconcile it with the offers given. Protest doesn’t privatize
5 So ›one-dimensionality‹ is a constitutive part of the »defeated logic of protest« (Marcuse 2002, 127).
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the absence of fortune but returns it to the sender, back to the common. There re-
mains a persistent and profound NO to the offers. NO, I’m not too dumb to play
the game. NO, I don’t want to sell my human capital, NO, I don’t want to choose
between 27 kinds of this. NO, I don’t have a picture of it, a name for it. NO, thank
you—this ain’t it either.
Protest—in this wide but strict sense—also means to defend the scream that
Holloway puts at the beginning of any commitment, to defend it against its objec-
tifying interpretation by the social sciences.
Now we’ve already come to the strategies that try to reintegrate protest into
that society, which it once wanted to oppose. In one of these strategies we are in-
volved right now: in the work of interpretation. Therefore I would suggest that
collecting and analyzing the different forms of screaming or protest apparently
means having to quit protest as such. The researcher’s protest may cease with the
protest research. So within the social sciences our need to scream may be ex-
plained very well, but if you feel like screaming you may hear its polite echo and
request to go outside. Please.
»And a strange thing happens. The more we study society, the more our nega-
tivity is dissipated or sidelined as being irrelevant. There is no room for the scream
in academic discourse. More than that: academic study provides us with a language
and a way of thinking that makes it very difficult for us to express our scream. The
scream, if it appears at all, appears as something to be explained, not as something
to be articulated. The scream, from being the subject of our questions about society,
becomes the object of analysis. Why is it that we scream? Or rather, since we are
now social scientists, why is it that they scream?« (Holloway 2002, 1/2)
Prevention and the anti-social 
Now we will have to switch perspectives: So far we tried to avoid to »see like a
state«—now we are allowed to step into the logics of governmentality. We will
concentrate on a current preventional measure—the British ASBO—and see how
prevention and protest can be understood as struggles on an overlapping terrain.
In Great Britain the decade of New Labour was and still is accompanied by a
series of governmental programs and legislations, which focus on childhood and
youth. One of these programs—the so-called ›Children’s Plan‹—states its inten-
tions as follows: »The Children’s Plan is about putting children and families at the
centre of everything government does.« This may sound scary, but looks nice, if
you look at the plan’s colorful front page: helicopters building up rainbows for
children playing beneath (Department for children, school and families 2007).
Another program tells us already by its name how concentrated and individualiz-
ing the government’s view on people’s life is meant and executed: the Green
Paper is called »Every child matters« (Green Paper 2003). Though every child
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should matter, the government’s concern and its immediate action mainly con-
centrates on children and youth, who seem to deviate from the official aim of
›happy and healthy lives‹.
And once this deviation »causes harassment, alarm or distress to one or more
people not in the same household as the perpetrator«—this is the official defini-
tion—anti-social behavior is being born. 
It is born as a new kind of offence, which the government, the communities,
the executives will no longer tolerate. The ASBO was established through the
»Crime and disorder act« in 1998 and soon did prosper to one of the nodal points
in the discourse about deviance. The crucial point of its practice is: the breach of a
given ASBO constitutes a criminal offence even though the act that caused the
ASBO may have been only a minor delinquency. By the term »minor delin-
quency« one can imagine everything that may cause anyone feel disturbed or an-
noyed. The long list of given ASBOs seeming like the joke of a mediocre come-
dian is long and expanding. Some examples:
• A Berkshire man who puts up a display of Christmas lights each year to raise
money for a local children’s charity has been threatened with an order by po-
lice because of the anti-social behavior of the large numbers of people who
come to see the spectacle (Schnews, 529).
• A woman was given a four-year ASBO banning her from making excessive
noise during sex anywhere in England (BBC News, 27.04.2009).
• A 13-year-old was served an order banning him from using the word »grass«
anywhere in England and Wales. (19. Memorandum 2005)
• A 23-year-old woman who repeatedly threw herself into the Avon was served
with an ASBO banning her from jumping into rivers or canals. 
• A man with mental health problems was banned from sniffing petrol anywhere
in Teesside. 
• »A woman living on an estate in East Kilbride was given an ASBO ordering
her not to be seen wearing her underwear at her window or in her garden. The
local ASBO unit handed out diaries to her neighbors to record when she was
seen in her underwear, giving a new meaning to neighborhood watch« (The
Guardian, 05.04.2005).
• A two-year-old boy is the youngest Britain to be threatened with an ASBO
after he was accused of kicking his plastic ball too loudly and verbally abusing
adults (Daily Mail, 20.03.2009).
Such examples are like the colorful tip of the iceberg, but their exaggeration tends
to hide the underlying everyday discourse and fear of the anti-social, which made
them possible. 
I think this very popular discourse about the ›anti-social behavior‹ can be linked
to my former definition of protest. The heavy moral panic towards the anti-social
subjects seems to point at the fearful assumption that there are people living in
strange places, somehow beyond the edge of the thing we call society. The com-
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mon boulevard-term »kids from hell« points directly at this phantasmatic place
beyond. People acting against society, but from an outside of the social, from the
anti-social.6 »There is no such thing as society«—says Margret Thatcher’s famous
neoliberal quote. Twenty years later the »kids from hell« seem as if they heard
Thatcher’s bonmot out of the past, believe it and therefore act like it—at least in
the eyes of the public, trembling with fear. 
So, if protest positively reclaims that there must be something beyond the cur-
rent, a beyond sketched in the colors of stubborn hope, the dark image of the anti-
social occupies exactly this space. The protest’s NO is living from its negativity,
while the images of the phantasmic anti-social are putting this NO into a concrete
shape of fear. Ideology at work: beneath the well-known claim that there is no
alternative to the given order of things lies the unspoken, obscene message, that of
course there is something like it, but in a dark and excessive way. Having chopped
off utopia’s head, the promise of heaven has unimpressively fallen into the man-
given present—together with the fear of its opposite, the »kids from hell« figuring
as its messengers.
Looking at the actual practice of the ASBO, we can see that nearly half of them
are given to people under the age of 18 (Home Office 2008). Since most of the be-
havior, which can be regulated and punished by an ASBO, is not criminal in the
common sense of the word, we can also read this phenomenon as an effect of the
neoliberal politics of prevention. And children and the youth are amongst its best
objects. They evolve, their future is uncertain and open, their way into it is to be
guided. In terms of Deleuze’s »Postscript on the Societies of Control« (Deleuze
1992): When education has been one of the central principles within disciplinary
societies, the change towards societies of control seems to put prevention in that
eroding place—both deal with the fact of development. Education worked in
»environments of enclosure«, prevention is a set of techniques of control that
spreads into the whole body of the social, it works in the open. But unlike educa-
tion, which had an inherent aim and ending, prevention is an infinite task—»in the
societies of control one is never finished with anything«. 
Thinking within this perspective of prevention, any sign of deviance in the
present can be read as a symptom of future delinquencies. Zero-tolerance policies
are results of this view and the fear in which it is embedded. In order to be able to
6 This discourse of the anti-social puts a new political perspective to a problem that a little bit earlier had been
described in different terms and images: In 1997 for example Nick Davies published a quite popular book,
revealing »the shocking truth about Great Britain«. There this place of the anti-social was explored and shown
in ways that explicitly reminded one of reports about adventurous colonial expeditions – the book's title was
»Dark Heart«: »It is the place where the poor gather. Unlike any other country, it has no borders nor even any
name, it doesn’t show up on maps or fly a flag, but the more I came to know it, the more I came to see it as a
country in its own right, nestling within the country of the affluent but utterly different in its way of life.«
(Davies 1998, ivv) You can read this book as a lesson on the effects of globalization: as the distinctions and re-
lations between the so called First and Third World start to transform, the Third World doesn’t simply
vanish—it appears in the middle of the First.
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control the future by regulating the present, this present must be read and regis-
tered as closely, as deeply and as completely as possible—by gathering data and
by setting up statistics such as the national children database. The latter registers
every British child and data which is considered as relevant—like school-pro-
blems, contacts to social services and many other data, which could be useful in
the future. The other instrument I want to focus on at the end is more obvious and
more widely discussed—the surveillance of the public space. 
Of course the topic of public space and its control is also related to the ASBO
practice itself. Many of the ASBOs include the prohibition of entering a particular
geographic area like public parks, shopping malls or interdict to meet with certain
people in public. Obviously many constituent parts of protest culture lie in the
target area of ASBOs. Therefore it is no surprise that they are also a direct tool to
deal with protest and protesters. One concluding example: a leading animal rights
activist has been given a five-year anti-social behavior order to keep her away
from animal research laboratories (BBC News, 20.01.2005).
»Nowhere to hide«: Socialize with visibility
The fact and feeling of being watched is one of the primary human experiences. It
seems, that it is only preceded by one other primordial fact, the experience of
being fundamentally exposed to the other, as Judith Butler often puts it: right from
the beginning I am overwhelmed and determined by the existence of the other and
its threatening presence, that I crave to understand—to understand that and who I
am. One well-studied mechanism to gain control of this situation is to identify
with the other. This basically means trying to see with his/her eyes, I start to see
myself as something within the field of the other’s gaze. So from now on, the rela-
tion to myself is fundamentally mediated through the other, its desires, its fears,
its truth. Even if you are alone, you will not get rid of the feeling of being watched,
because it’s yourself that watches you with the other’s eyes. So one of the basic
lessons of socialization is: you are never alone.
With this rough ontogenetic sketch of visibility and subjectivation in mind, the
epidemic of cameras in public space can also be read as a crisis or transformation
of the other’s authority. They seem to be a technical implementation of the other’s
view, which is not sufficiently introjected anymore. 
If this primary lesson of control has not been learned sufficiently in the variety
of educational institutions, it must spread into public space. One of the outstan-
ding examples is the »Operation Leopard« by the Essex Police Department. It
shows what can happen, when even the surveillance by CCVT loses its intended
impact on behavior and self control.7 Jacqui Smith, British Home Secretary praises
7 That the use of cameras and the normal surveillance through CCTV can lose its effect on the surveilled sub-
jects can be understood by the split between knowledge and belief. In Lacanian terms: While knowledge
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method and means of this operation in her speech »Anti-Social Behavior: We’re
Not Having It« in May 2008 : »Operation Leopard is exactly the sort of intensive
policing [...]. It creates an environment where those responsible for anti-social
behavior have no room for maneuver and nowhere to hide.« 
To create this space of total visibility the Essex Police Department created
teams of police officers personally hounding suspicious youth people at home and
following them as soon as they leave their homes, whereas all of their actions are
permanently recorded on video. The Annual Report of the Essex Police sounds
proud and describes the procedure:8
»Officers involved in Operation Leopard knocked on the doors of known
offenders, warned them that their behavior wouldn’t be tolerated and then photo-
graphed them and their associates as they wandered around an estate for the next
four days. [...] As the operation got under way, targeted suspects and their friends
laughed and joked at being photographed and being asked to give their personal
details. But they quickly realised it was no laughing matter as the officers fol-
lowed them, filmed them as they sat in quiet alleyways and continued to ask ques-
tions« (Annual Report 2008, 8).9
The Surveillance Studies invented the right term for the aim of these kinds of
measures: »The disappearance of disappearance« (Hagerty/Ericson 2005, 613).10
The basic aim of surveillance technology is not to control and enforce a specific
set of already given norms and rules—this would be a frequently called ›totalitarian‹
use of it, its critics usually refer to Orwell’s 1984—no, at first it is to put the subject
in a relation to itself. So at a very basic level the effect of these technical eyes is a
form of self-relation which reminds us that society and its demands exist.11 If you
listen closely to the camera, it whispers: NO, dear child of deviance, Margaret That-
cher was not right, society still exists, please believe me, otherwise I will ›help‹ you
with your life and your beliefs—cause I know you need help. Tony Blair put this
more directly than this very polite camera: »Everyone can change: if people, who
need help, will not take it, we will make them« (Home Office 2006, 1).
refers to the real, belief is symbolic and always minimally »reflective«, »belief in the belief of the other«
(Zˇizˇek 2000). So the fact that you know you are being watched, while this knowledge has no effect on your
conduct, because you somehow don't believe in it, points again at the lack of identification with the other, at
its constrained authority.
8 There is a video report from The Guardian that shows this practice in action—you can see by yourself how the
incredible gets hauntingly banal: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/video/2008/may/30/operation.leopard
[2010-01-10].
9 One might think that if the actions of opposition don't use the powers of the absurd—like the Situationist
International project proposed—even local police departments end up taking over this toolbox of the surreal.
10 So invisibility seems to become a governmental problem and a margin of precarious societies. Consequent-
ially disappearence can be experienced and enjoyed as an act of practical deviance. Antonia Melechi analysed
the early British rave-movement in exactly these terms: »Where the ecstasy of disappearence resists the im-
perative to reveal one’s self.« (Melechi 1993, 38).
11 The camera’s gaze could be understood in analogy to Althusser’s concept of interpellation through the voice.
With a fundamental difference: While the authority's call in Althusser’s famous example of the police officer
is a call that can lead to a dialogue, the knowledge of beeing watched is in no way dialogic, one cannot res-
pond to the camera. The awareness of the camera’s gaze can only lead to an enforced self-awareness.
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So we had a look on two measures which govern the public space in contem-
porary Great Britain—two measures, which support each other. The production of
visibility and the preventive discourse and social technique of the anti-social.
Both affect the possibility of protest.
On the one hand, there is the problem of protest which wants to produce itself
as an event; as an event, taking place in a given situation, but wanting to articulate
something, which, in this situation, can’t be heard or seen, because it shapes the
very limits of this situation. Protest, in this sense, must appear as anti-social, must
act improperly—because it reveals the antagonism of the given and the lack of the
proper order. Protest must work with the danger of not being heard or not being
seen—because its intention is to change the field of what can be said and be
shown. Right there we see the twist: not just to appear as a problem—this is
easy—but at one time to be it, to articulate it and to resist it.
The logics of protest and prevention therefore are strictly antagonistic: protest
reminds us of the future’s unwritten-ness in view of a false present—prevention
generates images of threatened futures to fortify the present in and against their
light.
At last protest seems to face an aesthetic problem. It knows about media and
the economies of its attention, it tends to design and think itself as an event of
visibility, it cares about the good picture, into which it will dissolve. But if we say
protest is about articulating the small or big NO of the »Great Refusal« (Marcuse
2002, 66), moving the limits of what can be heard and seen, these strategies of
visibility are at least dangerous—regarding the »dialectic of compliance and op-
position that takes into account the concealed as well as the visible [...]«
(Fox/Starn 1997, 3). To the expression of the fundamental scream the process of
becoming an image is like a wall of cotton wool. »Our anger is constantly fired by
experience, but any attempt to express that anger is met by a wall of absorbent
cotton wool« (Holloway 2002, 1/2). The spectacular, globalized world of images
functions like the hegemonic formation Laclau/Mouffe (2002, 139) describe as
follows: »A hegemonic formation also embraces what opposes it, insofar as the
opposing force accepts the system of basic articulations [...] as something it ne-
gates, but the place of negation is defined by the internal parameters of the forma-
tion itself.« 
Protest may produce successful images of itself, but it should be aware that it
doesn’t have control about the frames. The framing will embrace it, so the protest
will have its place of negation. Sit down please. So the critical challenge for the
life of protest would be if we resist the embrace of a hegemonic formation and do
not share its system of articulation, we will be heard as noise, seen as stains. But
how to embrace the stain and the noise, so we can resist the embrace of the forma-
tion? Embracing the opposition, opposing the embrace. The speech and the noise.
The image and the stain. Choosing nothing, but the struggles of between.
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Marco Tullney1
Organizing Employees Under Surveillance:
My Boss Is Spying on Me, So I Better Keep My Mouth Shut
Introduction
Over the last few months German media has repeatedly reported on various
scandals on workplace surveillance. For years renowned companies had been
spying excessively on their employees in order to expose whistle-blowers or to
discover suspicious connections between employees and business-partners of the
respective employer. Private investigators gathered data on employees’ off-hour
activities and general behavior.2 Unsurprisingly, these measures included and in
some cases particularly targeted employee representatives and union leaders as
well as members of the press.
Obviously, workplace-connected surveillance is an issue. In this paper I would
like to draw attention to how surveillance interferes with labor rights, and especi-
ally affects opportunities to organize and protest. I will show that surveillance
technology can be used to hinder employees’ protest and that it is intended to have
this effect. But most importantly, workplace surveillance is perceived by
employees as a means of affecting their labor rights adversely. In a final chapter I
will discuss the impact of workplace surveillance on society.
Surveillance technology suitable for hindering protest
Technological progress has brought new means of monitoring3 and surveillance to
the workplace, especially to the office workplace: »[A]dvances in science and
technology have facilitated the collection of employees’ personal information and
the monitoring of employees’ performance and behavior. Volumes of valuable
1 Many thanks for helpful comments to Bärbel Reißmann. Most of the arguments and research data in this
paper build upon the work on my PhD project dealing with workplace surveillance. I presented an earlier ver-
sion of this paper at the conference Shaping Europe in a Globalized World? Protest Movements and the Rise
of a Transnational Civil Society (2009). Many thanks to the organizers, the panel chair and the panel particip-
ants for their support and comments.
2 Measures included private investigators listening to employees talking to each other about their private lives
(and commenting on what was being said in written reports), reports on employee clothing and appearance,
the forced search of private cars, monitoring employees going to the lavatory and many cases of covert
camera surveillance (see Boyes 2008, Grill/Arnsperger 2008, mic 2009).
3 The term most widely used in scientific and popular debate to describe the techniques in question is ›monitor-
ing‹. In this paper, I will also use the term ›surveillance‹ in order to emphasize the general and unrestrained
manner in which these measures are employed today. The term ›control‹ is used to describe the actual ma-
nagement or regulation of actions and behavior.
MS 88_PREVENT_K_alles  18.11.2010  11:14 Uhr  Seite 35
36
personal information can be collected and scrutinized by employers through job
interviews, references, background checks, psychological and intelligence tests,
drug, medical and genetic tests, software programs, and workplace surveillance«
(Klein/Gates 2005, 136).
Traditional means
A great range of devices for monitoring workers and employees existed even be-
fore computerization and is still in place in elaborated forms and connected to
other, new devices and techniques (see below). Most visible are those means of
surveillance situated at the boundaries of company premises, like CCTV, which is
often installed for security reasons and for performance monitoring, security staff
controlling access to the perimeter, or time-punch machines. Machines that monitor
their own operations can deliver data on the production process which then can be
combined with other data e.g., from Human Resources, that make it possible to
monitor the performance of the worker who operated that very machine at a given
time. Also, machines can be programmed in a way that workers are bound to a
particular cycle, e.g., at an assembly line.
But a surveillance technique possibly as old as labor itself is also still in use:
the observation of the workforce by a supervisor or other type of observer, either
operating in plain view, e.g., from a supervisor’s office,4 or secretly.5 Even private
investigators are commonly hired (see Tobien 2007, Grill 2008) to gather infor-
mation on employees the employer distrusts, on employees who report in sick, or
on job applicants.
Spatial surveillance
Spatial surveillance, i.e., the tracking of workers and employees, is influenced by
the aforementioned means of video surveillance, security staff and different forms
of access control. Magnetic strip cards are regularly used to identify people re-
questing access to a company’s premises or to particular areas (e.g., a research
lab). Since physical contact is required with this kind of access control, the person
carrying the card knows when the identifying data stored on the card is being
read. In recent years, those cards have been replaced by RFID (radio-frequency
identification) tags that can be read using radio waves. These tags can be placed in
active badges6 that employees put on and can then be read from a distance of up to
a few meters, thus no longer enabling employees to control when their passage is
being registered. Surely they notice that certain doors only open for those whose
RFID tag matches the requirements, but devices that merely monitor the routes
4 The pulpit-like supervisor’s office in early factories bears a remarkable resemblance to Bentham’s design of a
panoptic prison.
5 A drug-store discounter in Germany is reported to have hidden human observers in tiny spaces behind a wall
with spyholes (see Peters/Sirleschtov 2008). Obviously, they had to sneak in before the employees of that
branch arrived and leave after they had all gone.
6 Prior to RFID, active badges used to be equipped with infrared LED.
MS 88_PREVENT_K_alles  18.11.2010  11:14 Uhr  Seite 36
37
taken inside the building or register who is staying where for how long can
operate without the tag carriers noticing. Another method of tracking staff is GPS
(global positioning system). GPS devices are built into hand-held units of any
sort, e.g., the scanners parcel delivery staff are carrying, and into vehicles. They
are useful to schedulers in transportation, making it possible to determine which
driver is in the best geographical position to take on a new job, as well as to cus-
tomers, who can follow their parcels almost in real time via the internet. However,
they also allow employers to monitor every route and every break an employee
takes. Mobile phone tracking that uses different signal strengths to locate a mobile
phone has similar effects (for employees).
Communication surveillance7
Since the end of the 1980s, software described as ›Computer Based Performance
Monitoring‹ or ›Electronic Performance Monitoring‹ has allowed employers to
conduct investigations on individual employees’ performance, e.g., by measuring
how many characters per minute someone types, the duration of telephone calls or
absence from the desk, etc. (see Fairweather 1999, 41; Office of Technology
Assessment 1987).
However, communication surveillance includes much more than just counting
keystrokes. Computerization of the workplace has introduced extensive opportun-
ities for employers to learn about facts that otherwise would probably have gone
unnoticed. Especially in office workplaces, almost every action of the employees
is in some way connected with or dependent on communication facilities like
phones or computers. Since these devices are often connected via communication
networks, e.g., an intranet or the internet, they can be accessed from a distance,
thus allowing for remote monitoring.
With regard to phones, the repertoire of employee monitoring includes lis-
tening in on phone calls, mystery callers (in order to evaluate the employee’s deal-
ing with customers), calculation of number and duration of calls, and—most
important in the scope of this paper—identifying the communication counterparts.
The same holds true for computer network based communication like e-mail or
messaging software, with the additional feature that the content of this kind of
communication can be read and analyzed automatically.
The use of the world wide web is also subjected to employee surveillance: the
websites you go to and the search terms you enter into your search engines can be
monitored. This of course includes employees’ visits to websites of trade unions,
employee representation, lawyers, job offers from other companies, etc. Since
more and more services are transferred to the world wide web (e.g., office soft-
ware, storage of private files, banking), there are more and more pieces of infor-
7 For a more detailed description see Tullney (2009) and Lane (2003).
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mation an employer can possibly get to know, as employees might do their elec-
tronic banking or log into any other personalized service on the web.8
Automated analysis, presentation and control of data gathered by all these
means (and more of the same kind) is what has lately turned traditional observa-
tion into general, preventive surveillance. There is a still emerging market for spe-
cialized software for this purpose. Both fascinating (to employers) and frightening
(to employees), software of this kind delivers management-ready reports on
nearly everything happening in a company’s network. Who talks to whom, who
regularly visits certain kinds of websites, who is looking for a new job, and so on.
Analysis software may look for predefined keywords (e.g., the name of a com-
petitor or a union) or for (according to autonomous calculation done by the soft-
ware) suspicious content and can react accordingly. Options include dropping—
incoming or outgoing—messages without any notice to sender nor recipient,
re-routing messages to a supervisor, or simply blocking access to certain websites
based on general or specific rules9. This kind of spyware can be installed on the
employees’ computers without their knowledge and can then operate completely
without them noticing it. As it is installed on the local computer, it can even inter-
cept key strokes—which allows for recording of data, that never reaches the net-
work, e.g., unsent e-mail, or personal notes only typed into the computer in order
to print it once instead of saving it. If the employer runs such software without the
knowledge of the employees, there is no chance of escaping it, even in breaks.
That means that even if employees are allowed to use the communication fa-
cilities for their own purposes during breaks, their data can still be recorded and
analyzed.
The preventive approach is also supported by the ability to store data that is of
no immediate use, but may later be analyzed, combined with other data, and used
when needed, e.g., in order to provide evidence to legally fire an employee.
Chapter conclusion
The employers’ arsenal of surveillance technology10 is suitable for monitoring all
employee activities. It potentially infringes heavily on employees’ labor and
human rights by eliminating workplace privacy. If your employer knows about
your every action and communication, he/she may also know about an individual
8 A rising number of people seem to do their 1-on-1-communication at social network sites—they would rather
send a personal message from their account at a social network then send an e-mail or SMS. With the em-
ployer observing the web usage of his/her employees, he/she will monitor those messages, too.
9 It is some companies’ business model to rate and classify websites, so that employers can regulate access to
different types of information based on branch or any other criteria. Categories of websites include ›Employ-
ment‹, ›Work Related‹, but also ›Gay/Lesbian Topics‹ and ›Government‹. Preselected blocking preferences
can be combined with manually composed blacklists in order to block internet access to a competitor’s or a
union’s website.
10 It should be noted that surveillance technology and devices are closely bound up with the social constituents
of surveillance. Firstly, every action taken with regard to this technology including decisions on who is going
to be monitored and who will be allowed to violate certain workplace rules is embedded in social power rela-
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employee’s contact to a union, about him/her organizing a protest, about his/her
opinion on working conditions.
Whether the information an employer receives from different forms of surveil-
lance can eventually be used in court or in public, is of secondary importance. The
information itself can be valuable for the business, since those in control of the
monitoring facilities can identify employees they might better get rid of—what-
ever the reason. This may be seen as another advantage (in terms of preventing
›trouble‹) of the preventive approach: Even if the information resulting in the
wish to fire someone was illegally acquired or states no legal reason to discipline
someone, chances are high that one can find some useful data in the enormous
pile of information one has gathered on this employee. A short look at a website
not related to business during work hours or a private e-mail sent after the break
ended could be enough.
The techniques described above form part of a new quality of surveillance:11
not only are there more and better ways of monitoring employees, they also are
employed according to different technological approaches, i.e. that of dragnet in-
vestigations. New technology is creating a new setting including decentralized
surveillance with many observers.12 Driven by a general suspicion of all employees,
every piece of information that is available is collected—even if there seems to be
no use for it at the time. Automatically analyzed by computers, this data could
hint at correlations (e.g., of performance issues, but also regarding networks of
employees) no one would have thought of before. It also could indicate misbe-
havior that would otherwise have gone undetected. Employers no longer have to
trust their own eyes and judgment alone, information gathered by more or less
elaborate types of surveillance add to the picture—or replace it completely (see
below).
Intentionally spying on employees
The employer wants to know
By monitoring their employees, employers try to counter an information deficit:
They want to know what is happing after office doors are shut—are the employees
working well enough, are they using their working hours according to directives
(see Ariss 2002)? By recording time and counting characters typed on a computer
keyboard, employers try to figure out individual performance. And by systemat-
tions in an organization or company (see Edwards 1981, 29 f.). Secondly, social means of monitoring and con-
trolling—the most prominent among which are self-governing and mutual observation of employees—add to
operation and results of surveillance.
11 This new quality constitutes the crucial difference in comparison to the situation a few decades ago. However,
the quantitative development is impressive, too, with most of the workplaces being under surveillance today.
12 See Hoven/Vermaas (2007) for a discussion of how nano-technology, e.g., RFID tags inserted in clothes and
artifacts, is changing privacy issues.
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ically gathering such data on every single employee, they may compare and
calculate the average performance even in service and office jobs, a field in which
it is traditionally difficult to measure output and performance.
Also, the alleged widespread use of communication devices for private pur-
poses by employees, like private phone calls or internet access, is perceived as a
factor that unnecessarily reduces a company’s profits: »employers may simply
want to reduce the amount of work time lost to online shopping, chat, and playing
of online games« (Henderson 2006, 30).13 Extending surveillance measures to the
most comprehensive amount possible is supposed to help increase efficiency and
productivity, both by pushing employees to work harder and by identifying sub-
optimal processes and policies.14
Employees as a risk
Besides looking into performance-related issues, employee surveillance is also
supposed to fight inappropriate or unwanted employee behavior of any other kind.
Allegations of wide spread and massive theft of office supplies, selling of company
data to competitors, misuse of communication facilities, etc. are often repeated.
By monitoring employees, employers seek »a way to reduce theft, embezzlement,
or sabotage by employees« (Henderson 2006, 30). In addition, the employer may
seek to prevent private use of company property in order to safeguard the security
of computers and networks (from computer viruses and other malware, see Erler
2003, 33).
Another reason for having a close eye on office activities is the employers’ fear
that they may be made liable for their employees’ actions. This is especially signi-
ficant concerning sexual harassment (see Townsend et al. 2000, Lane 2003, 16 ff.),
which according to courts includes forwarding e-mails with offensive content or
looking at websites that others object to. Lane (see 2003, 18 ff.) also mentions
several incidents where (former or current) employees started a shooting at their
workplaces and states that US employers could be found liable for hiring
someone who later turns out to be violent. Attempts to keep people out of a com-
pany (see Zugelder et al. 2000) who could someday present a danger may include
psychological testing (that can be very biased), gathering background information
on job applicants, location tracking and monitoring off-hour activities.
13 See Loch et al. (1998, 655 ff.) for a discussion of the ethical questions involved, e.g., weighing up the freedom
of creative employees and the waste of company resources or the claim of employers that communication
devices are used for merely professional reasons and the claim of employees to respect their privacy.
14 Various studies on the impact of employee monitoring on performance and output could not give a clear
answer to the question (see e.g., Belfield/Marsden 2003). There were some indications that simple tasks that
required no special skills were performed faster or better when the participants in the study thought they were
monitored, whereas more complex tasks that demanded creativity or particular skills were not or negatively
influenced by the assumption of monitoring.
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Be proactive: Preventionism
Such measures do more than just monitor forms of pre-defined illegitimate be-
havior. They follow an approach that corresponds to the paradigm of preven-
tionism. Their purpose is not so much to identify the persons responsible for past
breaches of regulations but to prevent future unwanted behavior, including pro-
test. There is no logical end to a task like »let’s collect all information we have
access to«, no domain that needs to be left out. In fact, it would be a violation of
the preventive paradigm to leave anything out since purpose and meaning of data
gatherings are only determined after it has taken place. This preventive approach
works well with the predominant view of ›knowledge management‹ as one of the
most important tasks of modern day business (see Chan/Garrick 2003). Every-
thing is (labeled) information that one day could turn out to be useful.
A control system in the workplace (see Beniger 1986) consists not only of a
command system (e.g., giving orders, setting business objectives) and a review
system (e.g., measuring performance, monitoring staff, comparing actual proces-
ses to given orders, identifying low-performing employees), but, according to
Edwards (see 1981, 27), also comprises some kind of discipline system that en-
sures employees’ submission to the employer’s orders and provides rewards (e.g.,
performance pay) for those complying with the rules. It is a result of the current
detailed nature of employee surveillance and of following the preventive approach
that makes data on employees life and work available in greater detail than ever
before—and every piece of this data can be consulted to discover unwanted be-
havior or circumstances and to justify disciplining measures.
However, the most important aspect of preventive surveillance is that there is
no need to actually do such comprehensive monitoring. It may be sufficient to
have the ability to do it (and to let others know or assume accordingly), since
employees will have to deal with it alike. The employees’ uncertainty and their as-
sumption that the employer might be monitoring work out well enough for the
employer (see below). If it should be necessary to deliver evidence for legal
actions, the company can always switch from random sampling to a complete
monitoring and analysis. The escalating regulation of behavior covers areas that
have little to do with the employer’s running of his or her business, e.g., activities
during breaks, but also off-hour activity. In a growing number of organizations
and companies the employer tries to regulate health (e.g., smoking) or even their
employees’ dating habits (e.g., prohibit relations to co-workers or to employees of
competing companies).
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Employees’ perception15
Distrust and respect
Employees perceive the implementation of workplace surveillance as a sign of
not being respected by their employer: ›they should see/know how well I work
without monitoring‹. Computer based monitoring is regarded as blind to individu-
ality and as delivering only part of the picture of performance and behavior.16
Thus judgment based solely on computer gathered data is considered to be unfair.
Often employees feel they don’t know what is going on. Since employers don’t
communicate their use of surveillance technology (see Chociey 1997), employees
don’t feel well-informed and have adjust to possible scenarios. This is equally true
for trust in the employer’s handling of sensitive data that he/she may obtain by
using surveillance technology (see Karat/Karat 2008).
The attitudes towards employee monitoring depend partly on organizational
culture and on the general perception of the employer’s treatment of employees
and information (see Alder 2001). So, it is not surprising that employees who
think of their employer as someone who does not trust them and who might be
looking for reasons to lay them off consider employee monitoring to be harmful
and hostile towards them.17
Since they do not know what their employer is looking for when analyzing the
data, employees may refrain from any action that they can think of as possibly
unwanted by their employer. Protest and stating a (negative) opinion on work-
place conditions clearly belong in this area, especially because of a tendency to
over-estimate the degree of surveillance when there is no accurate information.18
Employee representation and participation
The role of worker and employee representatives differs from country to country,
in particular regarding whether the consent of such representatives is needed if an
employer wants to implement measures of workplace surveillance (see Fragale
Filho/Jeffery 2002, Thibault Aranda 2002). Under German work law, for example,
workers’ representatives have to be notified and must consent to the installation of
any equipment that might be used for monitoring of behavior and performance.
Employee representation and trade unions are also institutions employees turn to
15 The arguments presented in the following chapter are mostly based on qualitative interviews I conducted with
employees during my research project. Existing studies dealing with the effects of employee monitoring con-
centrate on performance issues, whereas studies on ›good work‹, ›healthy work‹ or ›dignified work‹ often
neglect to include the effects of surveillance.
16 The ›blindness‹ of computer based performance monitoring to any surrounding social setting is a common
reason for objecting to it (see Introna 2003, Ball 2001).
17 Involving employees in the implementation of monitoring systems is regarded as a way of increasing consent
to monitoring and to ensure positive (i.e. profit maximizing) results (see Alder/Tompkins 1997).
18 In fact, employees are doing some sort of risk calculation; they try to figure out at which degree of unwanted
behavior sanctions are to be expected and how their own behavior compares to an ›average of misbehavior‹.
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for support when they feel they are treated unfairly and are put under (too much)
surveillance.19 Also, unions might be the right address to go to.
My research shows that the perception of employee representatives regarding
their determination and their ability to do something about workplace surveillance
is a very pessimistic one. Often employees assume that their representatives are
practicing some kind of co-management. According to this suspicion, they might
identify with business principles and support management20 and may therefore not
be willing to oppose workplace surveillance. But even if the representatives are
willing to defend the employees’ right to privacy or to protect them from increas-
ing workloads as a result of implementation of monitoring, they often lack the
necessary knowledge, do not see all the consequences of some new technology
and often are informed late by the employer.
Work relations and the broader view
When employees try to figure out which consequences to expect from workplace
monitoring, they not only think of privacy concerns and personal attitudes (e.g.,
dignity of work) but they (have to) think of the general development of work rela-
tions. With the unemployment rates high, work relations deregulated and labor
rights diminishing, there is less protection against being laid off, and there are less
chances of finding a new job. And even if they manage to keep their job or find
another, there are still more low wage jobs and a global competition between
enterprises, which employees are expected to react to with understanding and re-
nouncement.
Their employers’ opposition to organizing and giving an opinion on workplace
conditions is something that employees keep in mind and link quite closely to
workplace surveillance.
In uncertain times and without an effective form of collective action or solida-
rity, workers and employees have to deal with competing with each other and with
an ideology that makes them personally responsible for any low performance.
They are supposed to internalize what is expected of them, to not only submit to
any demands of their employer, but also to actively take responsibility for indivi-
dual development. Especially in office jobs this is justified by an alleged increase
in autonomy: ›you are allowed to make your own decisions, now take responsibi-
lity for your actions.‹ This transfer of risks for employees is one important consti-
tuent of the effects of individualization and subjectivation in the workplace.
19 Especially in Germany, with a long tradition of co-determination, this would be some kind of employee re-
presentation, a Betriebsrat or Personalrat.
20 Especially in times of global competition when, for some reason, the company’s profit margin seems to cor-
relate to its further existence, a view is prevalent in which it is in the employees’ own interest to submit to any
plans that promise increasing both company profit and staff workload. This kind of internalization of business
objectives is not only popular in theory but is in fact important in the whole context of workplace surveillance,
especially regarding the combination of technological and social means of control.
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In some jobs, control (and monitoring supporting this control) has become
more indirect and aims at work results, not processes (see Candeias 2007)—
although this is an idealistic picture, since most ›normal‹ means of monitoring and
disciplining stay in place.
Workplace surveillance and inequality
Surveillance and inequality
Since surveillance measures are closely connected to power relations, one has to
keep in mind that employees are not targeted equally by those measures. Accord-
ingly, the perception of surveillance at the workplace depends on the individual
position in the organization. Employees not only have to think about whether it is
possible and likely that they are under surveillance but also about potential conse-
quences of detection or allegation of misbehavior. Especially those employed in
low wage jobs requiring no advanced skills who can be replaced easily have to
take this into account—e.g., in supermarkets or in the security industry.21 This
holds true for job applicants, but also for employees who might have particular
reasons to believe that their employer wants to lay them off: employees who are
known as having a political agenda, who try to organize or to protest at the work-
place (e.g., against working conditions), who are union members or activists. But
also staff who collaborates with the media, e.g., in order to bring to light the illegal
or unethical actions of their employer, can become a victim of omnipresent sur-
veillance.
Subjects with limited autonomy
In recent years, the computerization of the workplace has enabled employers to
measure their employees’ output more detailed than ever before—especially in
office workplaces where it has been traditionally difficult to tell how efficiently
particular employees are working. The downside of counting keystrokes and mea-
suring every action is a worsening of work conditions: Low levels of trust lead to
low performances, to stress and alienation from the job. This is counterproductive
for business (because employees who feel that they are being distrusted may keep
from sharing information and may just stick to standard procedures, since this is
what electronic performance monitoring forces them to do), but is particularly bad
for employees. They have to do the work, but they also have to take care of regu-
lating themselves. Human Resources departments and staff and the external con-
trol that they stand for is more or less substituted by internal control.
21 In Germany there has been an increase in cases of employers trying to fire employees for minimal damage
they might have done to the business, e.g., for eating leftover food that otherwise would have been dumped or
for charging their mobile phone’s batteries. It is in cases like these that dragnet surveillance measures prove
their effectiveness. One may find out some things about everybody.
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This development goes along with other forms of self-governance and of
employees with individual responsibility that management literature and Fou-
cauldian studies building upon this literature alike are fondly interested in. But
employees still struggle, even if they have flexible work hours, work at their
homes or have entrepreneurial elements included in their job description. Regard-
ing work performance and surveillance of their work, they now have to struggle
with themselves instead of with an employer who states more or less clear objec-
tives and who can be made responsible, e.g., for a workload that is too big.
The individualization at the workplace presents a backlash to solidarity. Col-
leagues who might endanger the business or influence the achievement of work
goals are being blamed for standing in the way or being selfish.22 In addition,
employees are constantly told that organizing is not in their best interest.23
The Stakes of society
The ways in which surveillance is carried out give an impression of how the em-
ployers view their employees: as people who do not have the right to free speech
and to cooperate with others who are sharing their views. The part of employees’
lives their employer can control is increasing, both by an expansion of working
hours through home and tele-work and by more and more rules that concern
private living conditions. By distrusting employees and by trying to keep them
from expressing their opinions, employers have a part in the creation of dis-
enfranchised citizens who value smooth functioning over self-determination,
creating a new moral regime of individual responsibility.
Society is also affected by the fear of potential whistle-blowers to be identified.
If there seems to be no way of telling others without being detected and punished
what only insiders can know, there will be fewer people willing to take the risk.24
Since it is often only through whistle-blowing that the public gains knowledge of
certain business crimes (e.g., corruption, breach of hygiene and safety regulati-
ons), this will have an important social effect.25 Workplace surveillance not only
22 One example I came across several times was the acceptance of the employer’s surveillance of communica-
tion facilities, especially internet traffic, in order to prevent others from using the internet for private purposes.
The logic presented in all of these interviews was: people are slowing down my internet connection for
illegitimate reasons and by that they are hindering me to work efficiently.
23 In 2009, the Economic Policy Institute published a study carried out by Kate Bronfenbrenner (2009) on the
intensification of employers’ opposition to organizing. It was stated that surveillance was one of the means
used (besides interrogation, harassment, threats, infiltrating organizing committees) to keep employees from
organizing, both threatening them in order to keep them from doing anything unwanted (self-discipline, chil-
ling effect) and in order to learn about activities—e.g., videotaping employees as they spoke to union re-
presentatives. In addition, one third of the businesses in the sample interrogated workers in one-on-one-
meetings about their support for a union.
24 This is also keeping people from getting into contact with employees from outside the business: whether it is
a journalist trying to get information, a labor activist willing to form an alliance or a competitor offering a new
job, they all have to fear that their communication will be observed and analyzed.
25 Whistle-blowing is becoming more and more risky not only because of increased workplace surveillance but
also because of the surveillance of communication nets by the state, e.g., through data retention.
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has an influence on working conditions and labor rights, but it also influences so-
ciety: by teaching people only to follow but never to question the rules, by getting
them used to constant surveillance and by minimizing the public’s insight of what
is going on in businesses.
Conclusion
To conclude, workplace surveillance is in fact interfering with labor rights: the
various means of monitoring and observing are not only suitable and intended for
extensive employee surveillance including prevention of protest and employee
organization, they are also perceived by employees as such. Increasing workplace
surveillance is both a source and effect of a power shift in favor of employers.
Both the technological potential and the search for information on employees
allow for an almost boundless monitoring that is not necessarily finished at the
end of the workday or does not stop at the gates of the employer’s premises. The
preventive approach makes for a new quality of surveillance.26
It is particularly alarming that this is not only effecting on-duty activities, but
also the private lives of employees who feel that their off-duty activities might
endanger their job. Thus the employer is regulating an increasing part of their
lives.
Work place surveillance aims not only at individual misbehavior, but also at the
very center of labor and human rights: freedom of expression, freedom of infor-
mation, collaborating with others. The mere potential of surveillance can keep
employees from any behavior that might be interpreted as a neglect of duty. Espe-
cially organizing with others, collaborating with unions or employee representa-
tion are activities that they (might) refrain from under such circumstances.
26 For an introduction into the general development of surveillance, its aims and methods, and into the efforts to
analyze todays surveillance, see Lyon (2007).
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Andrej Holm and Anne Roth
Anti-terror Investigations against Social Movements—
A Personal Experience of a Preventive Threat
On the morning of July 31st, 2007, a squad of special police forces raided our
apartment. It was searched for the next 15 hours, and Andrej was arrested and
kept in preliminary detention for the next three weeks. The reason given was an
anti-terror investigation according to §129a of the German Criminal Code. Andrej
and six other men were accused of being members of a terrorist organisation, the
so-called ›militant group (mg)‹.
Days later, when we had access to the case files for the first time, it became
clear that approximately one year of surveillance measures had preceded the
arrests. A terrorism accusation in Germany allows extensive surveillance options:
phones were tapped, emails read, access to websites registered and evaluated.
GPS devices were installed in private cars to exactly monitor their movements.
Video cameras pointed to house entrances, and police teams followed the accused
to observe their daily life. Portable microphones recorded conversations in bars.
The investigation first targeted four men and later extended to include three
more, initially because of alleged »conspiratorial behaviour«. It is conspiratorial,
for example, to turn off mobile phones during meetings or to arrange a date by
phone without explicitly naming time, place and reason to meet. We found out
about this when the three who were later included in the case were arrested after
trying to set fire to several military vehicles in July 2007. One had met with An-
drej twice several months before. Because of this, the houses of the four men initi-
ally accused were also searched, and Andrej was arrested and flown to Germany’s
Federal Court of Justice in Karlsruhe by helicopter. A federal judge signed an
arrest warrant for all four. To understand what we call »guilt by association« one
must look closer at the construction of the accusations:
The background of the massive surveillance operation was and still is some-
what obstructed in the files even today. According to them, the federal investi-
gators, who were investigating the so-called ›militant group (mg)‹, noticed lin-
guistic similarities between their (the mg’s) texts on the one hand and political
and academic texts that were published online on the other. The case is based on
the comparison of search words »via internet« (no details given). This lead to the
initial suspicion directed against Andrej and three of his friends. A linguistic
analysis done by the Federal Police themselves later determined that it is most
unlikely that the compared texts have the same authors—this was months before
the arrests and did not change the investigation. The »conspicuous terms«—
which, according to the police, can also be found in texts by the ›militant group‹
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claiming responsibility for different arson attacks—resulted in a wave of public
protest, which in the end lead to the quick release of Andrej. The reason for the
public outcry was the knowledge about the crude basis of the investigation. Re-
searchers became afraid that the (frequent) use of specific academic terms or even
words from everyday life, such as ›framework‹, ›political practice‹, ›reproduc-
tion‹, ›precarisation‹, and ›gentrification‹, could endanger their thinking, writing
and political freedom.
The points made in the arrest warrant increased this feeling. Focal points in the
construction of the investigation were—next to typical reasons given in such
cases such as conspiratorial behavior and specific political views—»access to
libraries« (to research inconspicuously for the texts used to claim responsibility
for attacks) and the »ability to write complex texts«.
But the idea of critical research being criminalized is only one of the several
possible explanations for the unchained surveillance activities. Having thought
about this investigation for nearly two years, we see two tendencies concerning
social movements and protest: first, the desire to gather comprehensive informa-
tion and, secondly, intimidation. Especially the fact that police investigations
focus on identifying possible moments of suspicion increases the number of pos-
sible suspects. Suspicion, previously the initial moment of investigations, now
becomes the result of police work in the frame of preventive anti-terror investiga-
tions. Surveillance is legitimised not by a clear indication of someone’s participa-
tion in a crime or offence but instead by someone fitting vague patterns such as
being an activist, being educated and/or having no prior police record. Security
policies are oriented increasingly towards prevention, which goes along with the
widening of those circles of the population to be controlled.
Surveillance of protest movements within a framework
of criminal investigations
Andrej’s arrest with the accompanying international protests for his release initia-
ted public debates on the issue of anti-terror investigations against the political
left and social movements. During the different activities supporting the seven ac-
cused men in this case, we learned quickly that this case was not the only investi-
gation against activists from different social movements. To our knowledge, there
were at least four cases, according to the German §129a in the realm of the mobi-
lisations against the G8 summit in Germany in 2007. The impression from the
(still incomplete) files is that one central goal of such investigations is to collect
information about activists. 
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Measures of surveillance used in four cases in numbers
The so-called »G8 case« became known through house searches carried out in
40 places six weeks before the summit targeting 18 people whose only crime was
involvement in different protest activities against the summit. One year later we
organised a press conference protesting the four lingering cases and presented
some numbers extracted from the files known to us at that point. In May of 2008,
in four §129a cases, 41 people were accused (with one exception all men), more
than 70 houses and work places had been searched, about 200 court orders for dif-
ferent surveillance measures had been signed by federal judges, a minimum of
90 phones had been tapped, 20 homes had been monitored by video cameras,
10 GPS devices had been attached to cars, 2000 people’s names were mentioned
and thus monitored by the police. Four men had been arrested and later released.
As of today, three of these four cases have been dismissed altogether for lack of
evidence, and for the fourth no further evidence has been produced. Three men
face up to 5 years of imprisonment after a scandalous court case, and the four
men initially accused, one is Andrej, are still waiting for the Federal Prosecutor’s
evidence against them.
Typical for investigations against terrorist organisations is a drastic dis-
crepancy between the number of investigations started on the one hand and the
number of cases that are actually taken to court and end up in convictions on the
other. According to numbers issued by the Federal government of Germany, only
5-10 % of the investigations in the past years landed in court. In most cases, the
people never know about the extensive surveillance measures applied against
them. If you do find something out, this usually happens years later. Then you
may understand unexpected cancellations of bank accounts, work or rent con-
tracts, etc. from the past. Nobody has ever heard of compensation.
These last four investigations mentioned against political activists (according
to §129a) that became known are related—if only during the time they were car-
ried out—to the mobilizations against the G8 summit in the summer of 2007 in
Heiligendamm (Germany). A significant number of those accused actively partici-
pated in protest preparations. In one of the four cases the police assumed this,
even though those accused clearly indicated they were not interested in the pro-
tests. In the course of the investigations, local, national and sometimes interna-
tional preparatory meetings were monitored. This did not lead to any further proof
of the believed terrorism suspicion. However, the security institutions were able
to obtain a detailed overview of network structures of people and organisations
involved, political debates and planned activities during the summit.
The German constitution indisputably states that police and intelligence ser-
vices be clearly separated. Despite this constitutional norm, terrorism investiga-
tions according to criminal law were carried out in a secret service manner. The
case files make it quite clear that the »Federal Office for the Protection of the
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Constitution« (the German intelligence service for internal affairs) was involved
in all these cases, partly with a leading role. It initiated certain paths of investiga-
tive activities, provided technical and informational assistance and was included
in the evaluation of parts of material confiscated during the house searches (this
especially concerns written material, data on portable drives and hard disks).
Strategy of fear—Intimidation as a result of anti-terror investigations
When surveillance, house searches or even arrests takes place, they always have
an intimidating effect on the people concerned, on their friends, family and the
political organisations they are involved in. Formerly abstract ideas of a big bro-
ther state seem to become real, and many activists wonder who is next. Chanting,
»We are all terrorists« at demonstrations is not only an expression of solidarity,
but also the recognition of the possibility of coming under scrutiny oneself. Cur-
rent knowledge on the extent of surveillance indicates that a greater part of ac-
tivist scenes may be subjected to it. Confrontation with such forms of repression
alters even how simple daily routines are conducted, and it can influence the way
political communication takes place.
In our specific case we realized that we primarily changed forms of communi-
cation after we learned about the investigation against Andrej:
• There is a change in the way phone calls are conducted: to avoid appearing
suspicious or conspiratorial to the authorities, we always named details of
place, time and reason for any meeting, even if only watching a soccer game.
• We were constantly aware of the danger of endangering others, and so were
they. Being in touch with us meant (and still means) being included in the
scope of surveillance measures at least for a while. To our knowledge, avoiding
contacting us hardly occurred with Andrej’s case. We did voluntarily leave it
up to everyone to choose to contact us; we did not initiate contact after An-
drej’s arrest and release.
• For months we discussed any form of written or oral expressions with a lawyer
beforehand (e.g. interviews or public statements).
• We always thought twice about participating in public events (because we anti-
cipated possible perceptions of them by the police).
Even the most ordinary actions in your life can be affected by these experiences.
We even found ourselves thinking that stooping down to tie your shoelaces might
be seen as something suspicious, which we should avoid. Nevertheless, we wanted
to deal with the case and its consequences in the most public and political way
possible. This was facilitated mainly by very broad public solidarity and support
of friends. Yet even today we cannot participate in any political activities without
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thinking twice (or more)—if we have any spare time. Dealing with such an inves-
tigation and leading a somewhat normal family and professional life leaves
almost no time for anything else.
For us as well as for many friends, the case made us drop our former political
interests and activities for activities focusing on the anti-terror investigation.
Political marginalisation through repression
Political movements face the danger of marginalization when anti-terror inves-
tigations against them become known. Collaboration in broader political alliances
can especially be endangered by the stigma of terrorism suspicion. This was dif-
ferent in our case, primarily because of the substantial public criticism of the
construction and execution of the investigation. It sometimes actually had the
opposite effect. For example, public interest in Andrej’s original field of research,
gentrification, increased. This is not a typical effect, though.
The course of the investigation, and especially the initial suspicion supported
by texts from the accused that they published under their own name, can separate
political activism, journalism and academic research increasingly, marginalizing
critical voices in public debates even more.
Thousands of researchers rejected the criminalization of critical academic writ-
ings in the course of the investigation as a categorical criminalization of scientific
work. However, it cannot be overseen that many individual decisions for future
choices of subjects came as a reaction to the investigation in our case, in spite of
the collective reactions by different academic associations. In his department
alone, Andrej noticed several bewildered inquiries by students, whether it might
be advisable to reconsider the subject of their theses.
Conclusion
Security policies are increasingly oriented to prevention, especially in anti-terror
investigations. Similarly, the sources of suspicion as well as the number of people
under suspicion have been broadened. Protest movements suffer from this not
only because of the increasing insecurity for individual activists, but also because
of the threat of political marginalisation.
Public reactions in our case have shown that an open and public handling of
accusations and methods of the investigation can be a useful strategy against the
constant growth of the secu-society. Not only does this uncover the hidden aspects
of investigations. It is also possible to avoid the political stigmatization of a ter-
rorism accusation. In the course of the case, the tightened security laws them-
selves increasingly became the subject of political activities.
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Yet one has to admit that the openly repressive elements and, maybe even more
so, the subtle mechanisms of self control resulting from the all-encompassing
experience one has of being under suspicion and under surveillance are an
absolute threat to the political activist, who is altered as a person in this web of
measures, experiences, expectations, fears, and hopes. Personal strength and
especially political solidarity are required to avoid letting this notion of preven-
tion by control and self-control win. This is necessary to keep your identity
despite all efforts to turn yourself into someone else, someone who is adapted to
society in ›their‹ way.
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Michael Shane Boyle
The Criminalization of Dissent: Protest Violence,
Activist Performance, and the Curious Case
of the VolxTheaterKarawane in Genoa
»...the last time I was in Italy was in June, more than a month before
the protests. At that time, it was already clear that the police were running out
of control, getting their excuses ready for a major civil liberties crackdown
and setting the stage for extreme violence. Before a single activist had taken
to the streets, a preemptive state of emergency had been essentially declared:
airports were closed and much of the city cordoned off.
Yet when I was last in Italy all the public discussions focused not on these
violations of civil liberties but on the alleged threat posed by activists.«
Naomi Klein, »Getting Used to Violence«
»The double violence of organized representation, which consists in the
distortion and shutdown of images by the mass media communication
and in the subjugation and striation of the war machine by the state apparatus
and its traditional organs of the police and justice, this combination
of rigid spectacularization and criminalization overtook
the VolxTheaterKarawane in Genoa with full force...«
Gerald Raunig, »Art and Revolution«
The arrest: Genoa’s discourse of criminality
On the afternoon of July 22, 2001, a small but conspicuous convoy belonging to
the Viennese activist-performance collective the VolxTheaterKarawane departed
the Italian city of Genoa, leaving behind the 2001 G8 summit and the tumultuous
events of the previous days.1 But while parked at a rest stop some twenty kilo-
meters outside Genoa’s city limits, the summit—or more specifically, a large
group of heavily-armed Carabinieri—caught back up to them.
By that sweltering mid-summer Sunday in 2001, members of the VolxTheater-
Karawane were certainly no strangers to police harassment. The tight-knit group
had been touring central Europe for four weeks as part of a migrant rights activist
tour performing actions, organizing demonstrations, and throwing parties on the
1 While not standard German spelling, VolxTheaterKarawane  is often translated into English as PublixTheater
Caravan.
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streets of cities throughout Austria, Slovenia, and Italy. Their slow-moving cara-
van and colorful public spectacles routinely attracted the attention of local autho-
rities, often resulting in searches, seizures, and in the case of the G8 summit in
Genoa, indefinite detainment and torture. Despite being accustomed to the repres-
sive tactics of the police, the surprise meeting with Carabinieri just outside of
Genoa presented the group with an altogether novel although unwanted experience:
this was the first time authorities wielded machine guns at them.
All of the twenty-five individuals traveling with the caravan that afternoon
were arrested and held in custody for the next three weeks.2 There they were sub-
jected to aggressive interrogations and physical abuse.3 Italian police accused the
activist-performance collective of forming a criminal organization and charged
them under a law most often reserved for the mafia. While the VolxTheaterKara-
wane was eventually released following a massive public outcry that featured
solidarity actions throughout Europe, diplomatic pressure by foreign govern-
ments, and open letters of support from such disparate sources as Amnesty Inter-
national, Nobel laureates Elfriede Jelinek and Dario Fo, and the rock group U2,4
as of the time of this writing over eight years later the dubious charges brought
against the Vienna-based group are still pending. None of the twenty-five arrested
have received their day in court, let alone seen the charges against them dropped. 
As I argue in the following paper, the lingering case of the VolxTheaterKara-
wane concretely reveals and can help us to analyze the consequences of the multi-
ple, overlapping, and violent taming practices that state authorities exercised at
the 2001 G8 Summit in Genoa, Italy. My argument makes a careful, albeit admit-
tedly artificial distinction between the descriptive discourse of criminality that
emerged from the Genoa demonstrations in the media and the discourse of crimi-
nalization that provided crucial conditions of possibility for the violent events that
ensued in Genoa. I privilege the discourse of criminalization in my analysis of the
VolxTheaterKarawane’s arrest and detainment in order to examine how the po-
lice’s handling of the Genoa demonstrations as a criminal problem that demanded
a repressive response corresponds to the general refusal of political elites to re-
cognize the movements against corporate globalization as legitimate political
interlocutors. As I explain below, my methodological decision to analyze how the
discourse of criminalization operated on a specific activist group is an effort to
study the demonstrations against the Genoa G8 Summit outside the abstract
2 While most of those traveling with the VolxTheaterKarawane that day were part of the group, four of those ar-
rested had simply joined the caravan for a ride out of Genoa. The information presented in this essay on the
VolxTheaterKarawane’s arrest and detainment in Genoa comes from interviews with group members, docu-
ments on the VolxTheaterKarawane’s website (http://no-racism.net/nobordertour [2009-10-20]), press releases
from the VolxTheaterKarawane, and secondary sources such as Raunig (2007) and Müller (2007).  
3 For a general overview of group’s detainment written by the VolxTheaterKarawane in English, see
http://no-racism.net/nobordertour/noprison/pk_20801_state_01.html [2009-10-20].
4 These letters of support and others can be found on the Caravan’s NoBorder Tour website:
http://no-racism.net/nobordertour/ [2009-10-20].
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frames that have been typically employed by the mainstream media to discuss the
Genoa protests. 
As a number of scholars, journalists, and activists have noted, the public
memory of the Genoa G8 Summit is largely one of chaos and violence, what
anthropologist Jeffrey Juris has described as, »an iconic sign of wanton destruc-
tion« (Juris 2008, 162). In his study of the Genoa demonstrations and their repre-
sentation in the media, Juris writes, »Genoa has become synonymous with protest
violence, a metonym evoking images of tear gas, burning cars, and black-clad
protestors hurling stones and Molotov cocktails at heavily militarized riot police«
(161). His analysis corresponds to other studies that highlight how evocative images
of violent confrontations between militant demonstrators and heavily armed po-
lice have adversely affected public perceptions of not only the Genoa demonstra-
tions, but the anti-corporate globalization movement as a whole (see also Graeber
2007; Perlmutter and Wagner 2004; Atton 2002). As is well-known, the violence
in Genoa led to intense public and legal scrutiny of the militant tactics of demon-
strators and the brutal behaviors of police (Caroll 2002; Klein 2002b; Allen Jr.
2001). The drive to attribute blame and prosecute those responsible for the
violence in Genoa yielded a powerful discourse of criminality (Hall et al. 1978)
that quickly enveloped the public memory of the Genoa demonstrations (Hooper
2008; Perlmutter and Wagner 2004; Hislop 2001). Like the »active forgetting of
the events« which characterizes what Kristin Ross has described as the »after-
lives« of the May 1968 protests in Paris, the demonstrations against the 2001 G8
Summit have also become »disembodied, increasingly vague in [their] contours ...
more and more a purely discursive phenomenon« (Ross 2002a, 182; see also Ross
2002b). This forgetting is not due to any »shroud of silence« around the Genoa
demonstrations (Ross 2002a, 184), but results from Genoa’s discursive promi-
nence in the media which focuses on the violence of the demonstrations. Yet res-
ponsibility for this framing certainly does not rest solely with the media. After all,
the repressive behaviors of police and the »protest aesthetics« of militant activists
(Day 2007) combined to create an atmosphere of siege and conflict that lends
itself to particular and predictable ›framings‹ in the media (Juris 2005; Graeber
2002). Yet as Stuart Hall et al. have compelling argued, the unsurprising narrative
strategies used by the media to represent protest violence invariably presents such
turbulence as a crime against society itself (Hall et al., 1978, 68). The many legal
proceedings against demonstrators and police following the 2001 G8 summit only
intensified the sense of Genoa as being the scene of multiple crimes. 
The descriptive and highly performative discourse of criminality that emerged
out of the violent images and stories from the protests has undoubtedly shaped
symbolic registers and public perceptions of the Genoa demonstrations to a
dramatic extent. Such perceptions fixate, of course, on the militant and destructive
actions of demonstrators. This focus relies on a depoliticization of the demonstra-
tions into something amorphously criminal, which inevitably leads to a forgetting
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and/or discursive perversion of the political aims, goals, and subjectivities of the
demonstrators themselves. Perhaps more importantly, this discourse of criminality
has transformed Genoa into an abstraction, or as Juris suggests, a »metonym« for
the alternative globalization movement as a whole. Abstract yet seemingly obli-
gatory references to the Genoa demonstrations in the public discourse around the
anti-corporate globalization movements carry strong performative effects. In ad-
dition to dramatically structuring readings of related protest events, this discourse
also influences public perception of the anti-corporate globalization movements
as a whole, for which Genoa has become a central referent (FAIR 2003).5
While critiquing this discourse of criminality is a necessary project, my study
focuses primarily on the role that a discourse of criminalization played in Genoa,
specifically with regards to shaping the repressive tactics used by police against de-
monstrators. I argue that in addition to the discourse of criminality that emerged in
representations of the Genoa demonstrations, there also existed a powerful dis-
course of criminalization that provided crucial conditions of possibility for the
tumult itself. As the case of the VolxTheaterKarawane illustrates, the repressive tac-
tics of police in Genoa were not anomalous, nor were their targets of application in-
discriminate. Police behavior was guided by a potent discourse of criminalization
that informed police training before the protests and which presented demonstrators
as potentially violent criminals whose assembly in Genoa required repression. 
The following study of the VolxTheaterKarawane draws primarily on inter-
views with and materials produced by members of the group. The lengthy account
of the group’s activities in the years and weeks before their arrest that I begin with
is not an attempt at offering a complete history of the VolxTheaterKarawane. By
focusing on the conditions surrounding the VolxTheaterKarawane’s arrest and de-
tainment following their participation in the protests against 2001 Genoa G-8
summit, I look to contribute to understandings of how the routine criminalization
of dissent in liberal democracies operates on and influences activist practices
themselves. Moreover, my essay also explores what the particular case of the
VolxTheaterKarawane can reveal about the embodied and discursive challenges
facing movements against neoliberalism and corporate globalization. What does
the case of the VolxTheaterKarawane reveal about the impact of this discourse of
criminalization on activist practices as well as activist bodies? And finally, what
possibilities does the case of the VolxTheaterKarawane offer for negotiating dis-
courses of criminalization and their repressive manifestations?  
5 At the same time, it should be remembered that as a number of activists, journalists, and scholars often remind
us, it is mainly activists from and demonstrations in Western Europe and North America who are even in-
cluded in this public discourse around the movements against corporate globalization. This has a number of
discursive and material effects for activists outside of Europe and North America, not the least of which is the
general lack of attention to those activists who are murdered or injured elsewhere in the world while demon-
strating for similar issues as activists in Genoa did. See, for example, Naomi Klein: Fences and Windows. The
Front Lines of the Globalization Debate, New York, 2002. 
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The VolxTheater Konzept: Vienna 1994 – 2001
»volxTheater. People, who want to make theater. Volxtheater as a collective, non-
hierarchical concept, whether on stage or in the street. Theater from below, from
the head, the stomach, the ass, the fist, from each tiny toe and from the chest!«6
The VolxTheater was founded in 1994 by members of the Ernst Kirchweger
Haus (EKH), a squatted autonomous social center in Vienna’s 10th district whose
residents included a mix of anarchists, students, artists, migrants, and refugees
from Africa and Eastern Europe. Initially, the VolxTheater Favoriten (as parti-
cipants originally called it) was an attempt by the EKH to expand its mission as a
cultural center that regularly hosted events like concerts to one that actually
produced and presented its own performances. The group drew on the vastly dif-
ferent theatrical talents and training of its members to create performance pieces
defined not so much by their production quality as the group’s production process.
As member Gini Müller noted in 2002, »From the beginning, the working process
was defined as a collective process and was accordingly long, lasting several
months and rich in conflicts« (2002). Their experiments on the stage featured
musical adaptations of works by prominent playwrights like Bertolt Brecht, Dario
Fo, Heiner Müller, and Heinrich von Kleist. Productions invariably included loose
dramaturgical interpretations of the chosen text’s themes and staging practices
which often yielded energetic, raucous, and highly tendentious performances.7
While the group’s membership would constantly change throughout its eleven-
year existence, the VolxTheater’s founding principles of non-hierarchical orga-
nization, collective collaboration, consensus decision-making, and openness to all
persons remained intact.
In addition to their stage work (almost all of which premiered in the EKH), the
VolxTheater also regularly produced public direct actions that blurred the lines
between site-specific performance and activism. The group’s concerns with Euro-
pean migration policies and detention practices largely defined their political
agenda. One of their earliest actions, »Flight from Transdanubia« took place in
May 1995 and featured the VolxTheater working together with other squats and
activist groups in Vienna to raise awareness of Austria’s deportation policies. In
the middle of Vienna’s 2nd district, for example, the VolxTheater publicly drama-
tized the plight of refugees in Austria by staging a highly theatrical exodus in
which refugees from fictional Transdanubia struggled to swim across Vienna’s
Donaukanal to the other side. In early 1996, the group began holding what they
called »racist purity checks« throughout Vienna. In one iteration of this interven-
tion, the VolxTheater set up a portable toilet in front of Vienna’s Hofburg Imperial
6 »VolxTheater Konzept,« http://no-racism.net/volxtheater/_html/vktfset.htm [2009-10-20].
7 Descriptions, pictures, videos, and sound files of each of the VolxTheater’s stage productions can be found
online at: http://no-racism.net/volxtheater/_html/vktfset.htm [2009-10-20].
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Palace. There they sought voluntary stool samples from passersby which they then
ostensibly used to confirm the racial purity of citizens.8 The group’s interest in com-
bining performance with direct action ultimately took precedence over their desire
to produce work for the theater. By 1999, after being banned from the Vienna
Schauspielhaus where they had been invited to stage a cabaret production »Austria,
a Country goes Haywire ... and the Foreigner is to Blame,« an incendiary response to
Austria’s newly formed right-wing coalition government, the VolxTheater began de-
voting its energy solely to activist projects. In these explicitly activist interventions,
however, performance would remain a central part of the group’s action strategy.
The end of the VolxTheater’s theatrical work set the stage for their first caravan
project: the so-called ›EKH Tour‹ of May 2000 in which the group visited nine
different cities throughout Austria in just nine days. The caravan was part of a larger
Austrian movement called the »Platform for a World without Racism« which had
been founded in 1999 to protest Austria’s deportation practices.9 On each stop of
the tour, the group set up camp in the middle of the city’s main square where they
played music, held pie fights, distributed political literature, hosted a public
kitchen to make food for passersby, and performed variety acts, magic tricks, and
excerpts from the VolxTheater’s stage repertoire. The success of this first tour
soon led to others, including a caravan the following October called, »The Culture
Caravan Against the Right Wing,« which became a central part of the protests that
swept through Austria in 2000 in response to the nation’s new conservative govern-
ment. In both of these early caravans, the VolxTheater experimented with street
theater and improvisational tactics all while learning how to function as a travel-
ing activist-performance collective. The lessons learned during these early cara-
vans laid the foundation for four more caravans over the next five years, including
the one that led to their arrest just outside of Genoa the following summer.
Performance and policing: The 2001 NoBorder Tour
The VolxTheaterKarawane’s arrest in Genoa brought their 2001 tour to a sudden
and surprise ending. Since June 26, the group had been traveling central and
eastern Europe on an international activist tour sponsored by the NoBorder
activist network which took aim at Europe’s heightened immigration controls,
biometric surveillance tactics, and detention practices.10 Under the slogan, »For
8 Information on the VolxTheater’s early performative direct actions can be found in texts by Raunig (2007) and
Müller 2007), as well as online at http://no-racism.net/volxtheater/_html/vktfset.htm [2009-10-20].
9 The »Platform for a World without Racism« was founded in response to the death of Nigerian refugee Marcus
Omofuma. Omofuma was killed during a deportation flight from Vienna to Sofia on May 1, 1999 when three
Austrian officers strapped him to a seat of the plane and sealed his mouth with tape, causing him to suffocate.
10 The NoBorder network was founded by antiracist and immigrant rights activists in 1998 to challenge the
emerging power structures and policies of what some call »Fortress Europe.« See http://www.noborder.org
[2009-10-20].
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freedom of movement and freedom of communication,« the VolxTheaterKara-
wane (as it was renamed at the beginning of this tour) toured Austria, Slovenia,
and Italy where they conducted street performances, set up NoBordercamps, pro-
tested deportation centers, and participated in demonstrations against the World
Economic Forum in Salzburg and the G-8 Summit in Genoa.11 Before their arrest
on July 22, the group had planned to conclude the tour in early August with a mas-
sive NoBorder Camp at the Frankfurt am Main Airport in Germany. Throughout
their entire tour, the VolxTheaterKarawane emphasized transparency and public-
ness. In addition to their colorful and highly conspicuous caravan and camps, the
group maintained an online tour diary, frequently broadcasted reports of their
actions over the Viennese independent Radio Orange, and sent out regular mobile
phone updates to supporters. The group also readily made room in the caravan for
anyone they met along the way who wanted to come along.
The NoBorder tour kicked off in Vienna on June 26, 2001 with a press confe-
rence and outdoor party. The next morning, twenty activists in cars, vans, and
small buses decorated with NoBorder banners and homemade signs set out for
Salzburg where they joined the demonstrations against the World Economic
Forum (WEF). There the VolxTheaterKarawane organized street parties, conduc-
ted info-sessions, and added their own colorful twist to the main demonstration.
Dressed as UN soldiers in blue helmets and green fatigues or in bright orange
jump suits emblazoned with the NoBorder logo, the VolxTheaterKarawane infil-
trated the heavily guarded red-zone around the WEF’s central meeting place and
constructed a massive and absurd-looking ›WEF-monster‹ made of black inner-
tubes. In what would become the first of many questionable accusations leveled
against the group that summer, Austria’s largest newspaper the Kronen Zeitung
reported on a secret weapons depot the VolxTheaterKarawane was carrying in one
of their vehicles. When the VolxTheaterKarawane responded to these allegations
by holding a party and public viewing of their »illegal weapons depot,« the Aus-
trian police arrived to investigate. The officers promptly left when all they dis-
covered was a collection of cooking utensils, juggling sticks, and as the Volx-
TheaterKarawane’s tour diary explains, local children having »great fun with our
innertubes and waterpistols« (VTK, July 3).
Following the demonstrations in Salzburg, the caravan traveled to the Slove-
nian town of Lendava, on the border of Croatia, Hungary, and Austria to join other
activists in setting up a NoBordercamp. Here the VolxTheaterKarawane gave per-
formances, held workshops on protest tactics using Boalian invisible theater tech-
niques, and distributed information about contemporary migration issues. In addi-
11 A detailed log of the VolxTheaterKarawanne’s entire 2001 caravan can be found online. The log was updated
daily during the tour until the group’s arrest on July 22. The contents of the »Caravan Diary« are in English,
German, Spanish, and Italian. See http://www.no-racism.net/nobordertour/media/2606/2606.html [2009-10-
20]. From here on, direct quotations from the online diary will be referenced by the initials VTK followed by
the entry date.
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tion to the NoBordercamp, the VolxTheaterKarawane also produced a number of
performative direct actions in Lendava. For the NoBorder Action Day on 7 July,
members of the group dressed again as UN soldiers and set up temporary border
stations on the highway along the Slovenian-Croatian border where they stopped
cars to distribute NoBorder passports and information on Europe’s migration poli-
cies to drivers. After organizing a demonstration in front of a deportation center in
Ljubljana with Slovenian activist groups »to protest the inhumane conditions
faced by those denied the freedom of migration« (VTK, July 10), the group’s next
stop in Eisenkappel, Austria once more attracted the attention of police. Follow-
ing a lengthy and thorough search of their vehicles, the police demanded the
names of everyone who would be heading to the Genoa protests. As their online
diary entry for the day indicates, these aggressive police tactics made a strong im-
pact on the group, prompting them to have »long discussions about the tour, res-
ponsibility and police repression and how these topics were influencing our
groups dynamics« (VTK, July 13). 
From here the group began their journey to Genoa to join the protests against the
G8 summit. Before even crossing into Italy, however, the VolxTheaterKarawane ex-
perienced what has become a familiar ritual in the regulation of dissent by European
governments. Beginning on July 11, 2001, the Italian government mounted a mas-
sive border control operation, which included suspending the Schengen agreement
on the free movement of people within the European Union. This exceptional mea-
sure allowed the government to conduct border checks on over 140,000 individuals
between July 11 and July 21, the final day of the summit. These checks resulted in
2,930 entry refusals (IPIC 2001b, 139). Upon learning of these strict plans, the
VolxTheaterKarawane decided to split up and cross into Italy at different border
points. While most of the group entered Italy successfully, three members were re-
fused entry because their names were on a dubious government watch list prepared
specially for the summit. When the VolxTheaterKarawane reunited in the small
town of La Spezia, about one hundred kilometers from Genoa, they were again de-
tained by local police. This time officials not only recorded their passport numbers
but also conducted a full search of their vehicles resulting in the destruction of a
number of the VolxTheaterKarawane’s theater props. Despite these encounters with
Italian police, the VolxTheaterKarwane’s tour diary reveals that heading into Genoa
the group’s spirits were high, albeit wary of what loomed ahead:
»Confronting the armageddon. Monday is the day to enter what has almost
been built up to be something equivalent to entering the twilight zone, or alcatraz
or a wicked combination of both.... After another hour or so we began the trek
toward Genoa. There was an air of excitement, concern and anticipation as we
drove upward through the beautiful mountains and Italian countryside. We stop-
ped at one point to get out of the cars and take in a gorgeous view of the beach and
mediterranean, before piling back in and continuing. I asked then ›so how far is
Genoa now?‹, with the reply of ›we’re here‹« (VTK, July 16).
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»Confronting the Armageddon«
The process of search, seize, and destroy the VolxTheaterKarawane experienced
in La Spezia would only repeat itself upon the group’s arrival in Genoa. On their
second morning in Genoa, the VolxTheaterKarawane was rudely awakened by a
police search of their vehicles and camp-site: »[W]e woke up at 8.30am when be-
tween 20-30 civil policemen (quite hard to tell) invaded the camp and searched
the cars and busses and also sent the pass-port-data to the authorities in Austria.
According to one of the policemen, the Austrian police had told them, that we
would be terrorists, trying to smuggle weapons for the G8 summit. Of course, no
weapons were found and obviously no caravanists had terrorism-e[n]tries in the
Austrian database...Still, nobody here can understand the danger of jumping balls,
tires... and orange cloths« (VTK July 18).
That afternoon the VolxTheaterKarawane began preparations for a migrant
rights march they were organizing the following day in Genoa with activists from
Italy and the rest of Europe. As part of the so-called ›Alien-Nation Block‹ on July
19, one day before the official start of the G8 summit, the VolxTheaterKarawane
led a highly theatrical demonstration in Genoa against Europe’s migration poli-
cies. The demonstration featured variety acts, street theater, skits, music, and a
crowd of over 20,000 people. During the next two days of extremely violent clashes
between protestors and police, the VolxTheaterKarawane chose not to appear in
Genoa as a group. While some joined other demonstration blocks, the rest worked
for the summit’s independent media center gathering photos, videos, and news of
what would become the most violent anti-corporate globalization demonstration
to date. 
The Genoa G8 demonstrations resulted in over 1,000 injuries, more than 200 ar-
rests, and one protestor, 23 year-old Carlos Giuliani, being shot dead by police
(Juris 2008). On the first day of the protests, nearly 80,000 demonstrators took part
in marches and an attempted siege of the summit venue. An unusually dry and terse
diary entry from the VolxTheaterKarawane reveals the shock and gravity of that
first day’s events: »Day of action against the G8-summit. One protester shot dead,
many injured with some of them seriously. For more information on the events,
please go to it.imc, uk.imc, at.imc, ch.imc and de.imc«12 (VTK, July 20).
In response to Giuliani’s death and the heavy-handed tactics employed by po-
lice, nearly 300,000 people showed up for a solidarity march the following day,
July 21 (Juris 2005). Although the demonstrations would end that evening, police
attacks and brutal raids on activist centers continued into the night and the follow-
ing days (Juris 2008, 186-188). The most notorious of these attacks was undoubt-
edly the midnight raid on sleeping activists in the Armando Diaz High School. At
the time of the raid, the school was serving as the official meeting place of the
12 The internet links referred to in the diary entry are websites of different Indymedia outlets.
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Genoa Social Forum, the umbrella organization who coordinated most of the
demonstrations in Genoa and was committed to a non-violent activist strategy.
During the attacks, police beat and arrested almost every activist inside the school
building. An incredible sixty-two out the ninety-three people had to be hospita-
lized following the raid, with three left in comas. Of the ninety-three arrested,
only one person was officially charged.13 Understandably unnerved by these
events, the VolxTheaterKarawane was thankful just to get out of Genoa (rela-
tively) unscathed the following morning on July 22.
Yet as the group waited just outside of the small town of Mocconesi (about
twenty kilometers east of Genoa) for a few members who had returned to Genoa
to collect some of the group’s theater equipment that had been left behind, the
VolxTheaterKarawane was suddenly joined by a large troop of police. Officers
detained the group for hours outside in the hot sun while they thoroughly searched
the vehicles and hastily interrogated a few members before escorting the Volx-
TheaterKarawane back to Genoa where the group was eventually charged with
forming a criminal organization. The evidence against them consisted solely of
those items confiscated by police, including black clothing such as a bra and a few
t-shirts, harmless theater props like a 50 year-old gas mask and fire juggling
equipment, and a set of cooking knives that the VolxTheaterKarawane used for
their public kitchen. Although members repeatedly tried explaining that they be-
longed to a theater group and not any criminal organization, they were detained
for over three weeks during which time they suffered through interrogations,
sleep deprivation, and beatings. One member’s description of their first night in
custody reveals the physical and psychological ordeals the VolxTheaterKarawane
was forced to endure in custody: »The things which happened at the station car-
ried on in an atmosphere of systematic terror, some being beaten badly and some
left with a feeling of guilt for being treated less bad. There were also a few police-
men distancing themselves from what was happening to us that night. Before
leaving the Carabinieri station the groups of men and women, now seperated,
were kept in a small cold cell with no blankets and windows open. Early in the
morning they had to stand with their hands up in a painful position causing
cramps, before they were handcuffed and taken away in chains, which were used
to strain the handcuffs even more. Someone complained the handcuffs were too
tight, whereby the police put them even tighter« (VTK Press Conference).14
In the media frenzy that ensued during their confinement, the head of Italy’s
anti-terrorist task force accused the group of »spiritual complicity« with the Black
Bloc, the militant activists blamed by police for the violence of the G-8 summit.
Austria’s foreign minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner and member of the right-wing
13 Another investigation determined that the two Molotov cocktails presented as the most serious evidence of the
dangerousness of the people inside the school had been planted in the school by the police themselves (Juris
2008).
14 For the full statement, see http://no-racism.net/nobordertour/noprison/pk_20801_state_01.html [2009-10-20].
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Austrian People’s Party responded to the indefinite detainment of the VolxThea-
terKarawane by expressing »her complete trust in the Italian justice system.«15
The group’s arrest generated substantial news coverage in both Italy and Austria
as well as around the world. Solidarity actions calling for the VolxTheaterKara-
wane’s release took place throughout Europe and the United States and continued
until the group’s deportation from Italy on August 16. When and if their trials ever
come, each member could face a fifteen-year prison sentence. Although convic-
tions are highly unlikely considering the dearth of evidence and absence of wrong-
doing, the question remains: how is it that an activist-performance group whose
sole collective action in Genoa consisted of organizing a colorful migrant rights
march could be charged with forming a criminal organization and subjected to
such police brutality?
The criminalization of dissent
The arrest and detainment of the VolxTheaterKarawane is only one of a number of
seemingly inscrutable actions taken by police against demonstrators in Genoa.
Despite the group’s identity as an activist-performance collective, the VolxThea-
terKarawane was cast into a role they did not fit: that of a criminal organization.
Members were subjected to unjust punishments none of the group’s activities in
Genoa warranted. When they were not fixating on the violence of protestors, Ita-
lian politicians and police officials explained to the press and the courts that much
of the police brutality in Genoa was carried out against orders or by rogue officers
(Carrol 2002; Klein 2002b). According to this rhetoric, the violent actions of po-
lice in Genoa should be understood as exceptions, or at least mistakes—certainly
not representative of any policy decisions or police leadership. In what follows, I
dispute these insidious claims that suggest the brutal and extra-legal measures
taken by police in Genoa were aberrations or responses to activist behavior. Far
from being anomalous, I claim that actions such as the arrest and detainment of
the VolxTheaterKarawane were a direct consequence of the discourse of crimina-
lization that guided the taming practices exercised by police in Genoa. Moreover,
the criminalization of dissent practiced at the 2001 G8 summit is not particular to
Genoa. Rather, it corresponds to the general strategy taken by political elites
toward the demands and subjectivities of anti-corporate globalization movements
around the world. Instead of treating them as political interlocutors, anti-corporate
globalization activists are deemed criminal problems that need to be met with
repression.
15 Ferrerro-Waldner’s refusal to defend the VolxTheaterKarawane during their detainment ignited a controversy
in Austria and prompted the VolxTheaterKarawane to target Ferrerro-Waldner in a number of their later
actions, most notably during her 2004 presidential campaign, which she lost. See the VolxTheaterKarawane’s
documentation of their feud with Ferrerro-Waldner at http://no-racism.net/benita/ [2009-10-20].
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To understand how this discourse of criminalization emerged in Genoa, one
must remember that the Genoa demonstrations were the climax to nearly a year of
harsh state repression against mass gatherings of anti-corporate globalization ac-
tivists in Europe. Beginning with the first large-scale anti-corporate globalization
protest in Europe that took place in September 2000 against the meetings of the
World Bank and the IMF in Prague where 600 protestors were injured by police,
anti-corporate globalization activists had routinely been targets of police violence.
The violence in Genoa followed a series of increasingly violent protests which in-
cluded the extremely brutal demonstrations just one month earlier in Gothenburg,
Sweden. There twenty-five thousand people protesting the meeting of the European
Union were met by a highly militarized police force who fired live ammunition at
protestors for the first time at a European globalization demonstration, leaving
one activist in a coma (Juris 2008, 54). The much publicized turbulence at these
protests engendered a powerful public discourse around the Genoa G8 summit
before it even began. This discourse legitimated a number of exceptional security
measures taken by the Italian government and heightened tensions throughout
Italy—tensions that were only intensified by a spate of bomb threats in Genoa that
shook Italy just days before the opening of the summit.16
As Donnatella della Porta et al. have compellingly argued in their rigorous
study of policing at the Genoa G8 protests, the public discourse that preceded the
Genoa demonstrations profoundly influenced the attitudes of the various Italian
police forces mobilized for the summit (2006). Suspicions, distrust, and fear of
anti-corporate globalization activists among police was only exacerbated by a
training program that instructed summit police to view protestors as potentially
violent criminals seeking to disrupt public order. Through analysis of the training
literature distributed to police before the demonstration used to »teach« officers
about the anti-corporate globalization movement, della Porta et al. conclude: »The
information strategies used for the Genoa G8 [...] led the police to an undifferen-
tiated image of the ›no globals‹ as bad demonstrators« (172). Protestors were
depicted as young, misinformed, and destructive with little direct interest in the
issues being protested (172). Such views were worsened by rumors that circulated
among police forces from dubious Italian intelligence findings suggesting de-
monstrators were prepared to take such drastic measures as holding police officers
hostage or using them as human shields (173). High pressure situations demand-
ing officers make quick decisions on how to react to demonstrators further pushed
16 Peter Hajnal provides an overview of some of the security measures taken in Genoa in preparation of the sum-
mit: »Security concerns had prompted the local hosts to designate a red maximum security zone between 18
and 22 July that was accessible only to local residents and those authorized to be in the immediate area of
summit events. Tall wire fences surrounded the red zone, and massive police guards at each gate controlled
access. Public demonstrations were not allowed in the larger yellow zone surrounding the central red zone.
The port of Genoa was closed to navigation, and the city's airport and main railway stations were also closed«
(2001). 
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police to develop a stereotype of protestors »as possible sources of difficulty and
danger« (172). As della Porta et al. argue, »These stereotypes, filtered through po-
lice knowledge, [became] a sort of guideline for the actions of individual police-
men and the force as a whole« (171). 
What della Porta et al. describe as a guideline for action constituted a discourse
of criminalization that relied on a discursive depoliticization of the protestors.
This informed and legitimated the various brutal and repressive tactics used by
police in Genoa. In the absence of any political demonstrations of similar scale in
the years directly preceding the summit, superiors instructed Italian police to treat
the demonstrations as a public-order disturbance, analogizing the protests to fami-
liar criminal disruptions they had encountered with soccer hooligans, the mafia,
or terrorists (della Porta 2006, 173).17 Della Porta et al. argue that ingrained struc-
tural tendencies within Italian police such as »a broad conception of public order
as being a higher order than civil and political rights« further contributed to the
discursive depoliticization of demonstrators (179). The discourse of criminaliza-
tion combined with poor coordination between the differing police forces present
in Genoa led to a police strategy of escalated force that all but ruled out any pri-
ority of protecting rights of dissent as police sought to ensure public order and the
smooth functioning of the summit (154). Instead protestors were approached not
as political interlocutors but as criminals worthy only of repression. The discourse
of criminalization that structured the police strategy at the demonstrations led to
brutal and even fatal situations, which every independent and international study
has concluded were worsened or even provoked by police behavior (See IPIC
2001a). During the two days of demonstrations on July 20 and July 21, police
launched over 6,200 tear gas grenades, and at least thirteen officers fired pistol
rounds at protestors, with one fatal outcome (IPIC 2001a). With this said, the case
of the VolxTheaterKarawane offers a concrete example of how this discourse of
criminalization manifested itself in the repressive tactics used by police. The ar-
rest of the VolxTheaterKarawane followed directly from the discourse of crimina-
lization that guided police behavior in Genoa. The VolxTheaterKarawane’s case
was far from an anomaly especially since the measures taken against them were
repeated against several other groups, perhaps most shockingly in the aforemen-
tioned Armando Diaz High School incident on the night of July 21. 
Although the VolxTheaterKarawane’s colorful dress and actions clearly did not
fit the profile of militant activists who typically prefer the protection of anonym-
ity to avoid arrest, they were not an indiscriminate target. In fact, the conditions of
17 Della Porta et al. go on to note that while the image of protestors by police fostered before the demonstrations
before the protests did not favor deescalation strategies, a number of organizational features of the police fur-
ther enhanced the violent response of police including the degree of militarization of the Italian state police
and carabinieri, their low accountability, as well as their politicization. Della Porta et al. write, »A high degree
of police militarization may, through the type of weaponry and training, predetermine certain types of action
and preclude others, as well as creating a climate of separateness and mistrust in relations between the police
and citizens« (174).
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their arrest followed logically from the discourse of criminalization at work in
Genoa. Yet many scholars, activists, and even police officers have argued that po-
lice in Genoa created what Jeffrey Juris has called, drawing on Giorgio Agamben,
»a zone of indistinction,« in which activists were attacked and arrested without
regard for their tactical choices (Juris 2008, 162; Agamben 1998). According to
this argument, the Genoese authorities’ inability (or in Juris’ words »refusal«) to
differentiate between »›good‹ and ›bad‹ protestors« led them to »quash dissent
altogether within a ›zone of indistinction‹« (162). Juris’ study draws a stark con-
trast between what he deems to be the indiscriminateness of police targets and the
efforts made by activists to distinguish themselves according to their tactics. (Ju-
ris 2008, 172-173).18 Yet as Juris notes, these activist attempts to demarcate them-
selves according to tactical choices proved futile as police proceeded to treat the
protestors as a single undifferentiated mob, attacking and arresting them in what
seemed to be a haphazard manner.19 While Juris’ argument emphasizes the extent
to which police suppressed all forms of dissent in Genoa, it does little to explain
the discourses that informed the repressive tactics used by of police. Instead, it
leaves unexamined the larger structures of power within which police behavior in
Genoa was enmeshed.  
The case of the VolxTheaterKarawane demonstrates that the repressive tactics
of police in Genoa were not arbitrary and their targets far from indiscriminate. In
fact, it was the VolxTheaterKarawane’s very distinctiveness from other protestors
that led police to notice them in the first place. Departing Genoa as a caravan and
stopping just outside the city limits together attracted police attention, the same as
it had throughout their entire tour. The VolxTheaterKarawane was arrested
because of, not despite, their distinctiveness from other protestors. As Gerald Rau-
nig writes, »[I]nstead of having an exonerating effect, the Caravan’s self-chosen
conspicuousness actually backfired at the moment of attack by the state apparatus:
nothing was easier for the police than to isolate a group setting out from Genoa so
visibly and so slowly« (2007, 234). The dependence of their arrest on their conspi-
cuousness followed from the discourse of criminalization that instructed police to
approach the demonstrations as a public-order disturbance. For a police force
unnerved by the turbulent events of the previous two days and trained to assess
18 As Juris explains, before the protests, the Genoa Social Forum, a coalition of more than 800 organizations
from around Italy who coordinated many of the demonstrations in Genoa, put forth a pair of action guidelines
mandating that activists not damage the city’s infrastructure or physically attack the police (Juris 2008, 169).
After extensive debate, and in the spirit of a »diversity of tactics ethic,« there emerged a tacit agreement
among diverse groups to dedicate predetermined spaces in Genoa to specific action tactics ranging from car-
nivalesque forms of protest to confrontations with police and attempted sieges of the summit venue. Within
these spatial zones, some activists sought to further differentiate themselves by demarcating their tactical
choices according to the colors worn.
19 Juris’ conclusion corresponds to the comments made by Giuseppe Bocuzzi, an officer of the seventh Bologna
mobile division in Genoa, who laments: »They [his superiors] taught us only to repress, not to prevent; the
no-global movement was presented to us as the enemy; there was no training about the various components of
the movement, no distinction between violent and peaceful groups. We were prepared for much throwing of
Molotovs, for walking through flames, for hitting the deck running« (quoted in della Porta et al., 177).
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demonstrators as »possible sources of difficulty and danger,« a large group of
activists waiting on the side of the road would of course raise suspicions (della
Porta et al. 2006, 172). This should not be taken as a criticism of the VolxTheater-
Karawane’s decision to depart Genoa in such a manner. I only mean to call atten-
tion to how the VolxTheaterKarawane’s arrest was not arbitrary, but corresponds to
the discourse of criminalization that guided police behavior in Genoa.
The VolxTheaterKarawane’s criminalization must also be understood as part
of the state’s own performative response to the protests. The huge crowds and pro-
vocative tactics of demonstrators undoubtedly challenged established structures of
authority. As should be clear, the VolxTheaterKarawane’s arrest and detainment
was not about exacting any form of justice. If it were, the group would likely have
received some sort of trial by now. Instead, the VolxTheaterKarawane’s arrest
was, to paraphrase Michel Foucault, not meant to reestablish justice but to reac-
tivate power (1995, 49). Thus, the twenty-five members of the VolxTheaterKara-
wane were sitting ducks for a police force eager to reassert their authority and
establish order. In his study of police behavior toward mass anti-corporate globa-
lization demonstrations in the United States and Europe, David Graeber details a
number of recent cases where police have gone out of their way to defame and
criminalize anti-corporate globalization activists, often using extra-legal means to
do so (2007; see also Graeber 2004). The cases Graeber cites resonate strongly
with that of the VolxTheaterKarawane and others from Genoa, including the
controversy caused by Italian police who confessed to planting the Molotov cock-
tails in the Armando Diaz High School that prompted the July 21 raid (Carrol
2002). Graeber argues that such exceptional efforts on behalf of police to »change
the script« of protests constitute a »calculated campaign of symbolic warfare«
that aims at damaging public perception of activists as well as legitimating the
harsh tactics taken against them (2007, 396). According to Graeber, heavy-handed
measures by police against even »non-violent« activists is only further evidence
of police disregard for the right of dissent that is supposedly guaranteed by liberal
democracies. Instead of protecting this political right, police are chiefly concerned
with preserving their own »right« to be in control. Graeber asserts, »If you want
to cause a policeman to be violent, the surest way is to challenge their right to de-
fine the situation« (2007, 404). Anti-corporate globalization activists and their
provocative actions challenge not only the operations of global capital and neo-
liberal governance, but structures of authority as well, which as a number of
scholars have argued, rest on the state’s monopoly of violence. »Police represent
the state,« Graeber writes, »the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of
violence within its borders; therefore, within that territory, police are by definition
incommensurable with anyone else« (2007, 401; See Weber 1964). The challenge
that anti-corporate globalization activists pose to this incommensurability, ac-
cording to Graeber, often leads police to take extreme measures to regain »their
right to define the situation.«
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Yet as Graeber makes clear, the situation he describes is not limited to the
Genoa G8 protests. In fact, the discourse of criminalization at work in Genoa cor-
responds to the general strategy taken by political elites toward the movements
against corporate globalization, characterized chiefly by the refusal to recognize
anti-corporate globalization activists as legitimate political interlocutors.20 The
criminalization of the VolxTheaterKarawane involved both a discursive and literal
shifting of the group from a political to a criminal frame. Even before they took
any action in Genoa, the VolxTheaterKarawane was positioned by police as a
problem that needed to be dealt with criminally. As the case of the VolxTheater-
Karawane clearly demonstrates, this translation of political actors into criminal
problems has profound embodied and discursive consequences for activists—con-
sequences that continue to present dire challenges to anti-corporate globalization
movements. Moreover, the discourse of criminalization mobilized against the
VolxTheaterKarawane and other activists in Genoa was not the work of errant
police officers. The brutal behavior of police in Genoa cannot be understood as
only a question of activist provocation or the poor training and coordination of
police. As della Porta et al. have argued, the repressive measures taken in Genoa
are not »technical questions.« Rather, they »reflect the quality of democratic
systems« (195). It is the discursive processes of criminalization and the correspond-
ing repressive tactics that the state routinely uses to regulate dissent which most
clearly reveal both the limits and the rationality behind neoliberal governance.
»But the caravan goes on!!!«
»Apart from the political aspects of the arrest and charges, being held in prison for
three weeks not knowing for how long or what will happen, has psychological im-
plications and this is just another way of trying to prevent people to take action and
stand up for their beliefs. But the Caravan goes on!« (VTK Press Conference).
When I first met Gini Müller in Berlin in late May of 2007, it was just a week
before the G-8 summit being held that year in the sleepy resort town of Heiligen-
damm, Germany. As a veteran of the VolxTheaterKarawane from its origins in the
mid-1990s to its disbandment in 2005, Gini was happy to answer my questions
about her experiences with the activist-performance group. With the 2007 G8
summit looming, Gini and I could not help but chat at length about the demonstra-
tions planned for Heiligendamm and the German government’s massive security
crackdown. Since I knew of Gini’s precarious legal position stemming from her
arrest six years earlier, I was not at all surprised when she expressed serious reser-
vations about joining the protests that year. 
When asked about the impact of the arrests in Genoa on the VolxTheaterKara-
wane, Gini described it as »a near disaster for the group.« Although the arrests
20 Of course, such refusals to engage are not limited to anti-corporate globalization activists. 
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brought the VolxTheaterKarawane wide international support and solidarity, the
group was for a time shattered both emotionally and physically. Their detainment
produced multiple schisms within the group. While in custody, disagreements
arose over whether members should cooperate with authorities. When it came
time for their arraignment, members were split over whether they should even re-
spond to the charges brought against them. For some, the mere acknowledgment
of the charges was out of the question; to do so would be to recognize the legi-
timacy not only of the charges, but the corrupt legal structures positioned against
them. Their legal counsel, however, warned them that to say nothing before the
judge would be tantamount to offering a confession. 
The massive publicity the VolxTheaterKarawane received following their
return to Austria only worsened the multiple rifts growing within the group. As Gini
noted to me, the media’s interest in the group made life »hell.« She recalled being
personally hounded by reporters for interviews, even being confronted at her home
on multiple occasions. This publicity had a dramatic effect on the group’s internal
dynamics. When it came to speaking with the press, struggles arose over who would
talk and what would be said. Still others expressed skepticism over the need to
speak to the mainstream media at all and questioned the motives of those who wil-
lingly stood in the limelight. As a result of these divisions, not to mention the physi-
cal, emotional, and psychological torture many endured during their indefinite de-
tainment, many members left the VolxTheaterKarawane. 
Yet the group never allowed the »Genoa-Repression« (as Gini described it in an
article commemorating the VolxTheaterKarawane’s ten year anniversary in 2004) to
stop or define them (Müller 2004). Lest one be left with the false impression that the
VolxTheaterKarawane acquiesced to the passive and powerless position they were
subjected to in Genoa, it is important to note how ardently the group refused to be a
»›tortured‹ subject« (Feldman 1991, 109). Instead of succumbing to the terror of
their detainment, the group made use of the surprising opportunities their arrest af-
forded them. They utilized the attention their case received in the press by going on
the offensive and making public the full details of their arrest and detainment in
press conferences and documents released online. In addition, their newly acquired
notoriety helped them to easily recruit new members and resources. They took full
advantage of the financial support they received from sympathetic donors as a result
of their arrests. These donations would not only support their legal struggles but also
fund future projects. The VolxTheaterKarawane even used some of these funds to
purchase an old British double decker bus that would become the centerpiece of the
group’s future caravans with the NoBorder network. Before disbanding in 2005,21
the VolxTheaterKarawane continued to create actions that sought novel and provo-
cative ways to combine performance with activism. They continued to tour Europe
and, of course, continued to attract the attention of police.
21 It is important to note that the disbandment of the VolxTheaterKarawane in 2005 was not due to their arrest or
pending legal case from Genoa. For more information on their disbandment, see Müller 2007.
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Darcy K. Leach and Sebastian Haunss
»Wichtig ist der Widerstand«: Rituals of Taming
and Tolerance in Movement Responses to the Violence Question
Introduction
Whether violence should be considered a legitimate protest tactic has been a topic
of heated debate among activists for decades. Whatever one’s position on this
question, it is clear that the rift between militant and nonviolent factions can se-
verely diminish a movement’s capacity for solidaristic action and lead to deep and
lasting animosities among activists. While scholars are beginning to theorize the
ways in which violence has become ritualized in the dance between protesters and
police in most western democracies, activists know that the movements’ ways of
responding to violent protest have also become ritualized. Whenever protesters
participate in »violent« actions recriminations fly about who »started it«, whether
or not it was justified, and whether and how disapproving parties should present
their views in the press. In an effort to discourage, de-escalate, and/or punish the
use of violence as they define it, moderate and nonviolent civil disobedience
groups engage in a variety of »taming« rituals, i. e. actions intended to subdue and
generally delegitimize other activists’ use of violence. These attempts at taming,
however, have generally not been successful at preventing the use of violent
tactics, and increasingly some movements have begun to approach this internal
dilemma in a new way: rather than the one side trying to »tame« the other, they
have constructed rituals and frames of tolerance and solidarity that allow them to
work together more effectively, despite their differences. 
The importance of this issue for many social movements raises a critical question
that has so far received almost no scholarly attention: Under what conditions are
militant and nonviolent factions able to construct common frames and rituals that
encourage tolerance and even celebrate different tactical approaches, and when do
they interact with mutual animosity, noncooperation, and obstructionism? 
To address this question, we examine the relationship between the autonomous
and nonviolence movements in Germany – two wings of the radical left whose
identities are critically shaped by their orientations to violence. Specifically, we
analyze two instances of interaction between them: one in which they worked to-
gether fairly successfully (in the actions against a nuclear waste transport in the
»Free Republic of Wendland« in March of 2001) and one where they were less
able to resolve their differences and engaged in taming behaviors, including
public denunciations and fierce in-fighting (during the actions against the G8
meetings in Heiligendamm in June 2007). 
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Violence in social movements
Relative to the amount of attention it gets in the mainstream media and in activist
discussions, the question of how movements resolve »the violence question« has
been virtually ignored by movement scholars. The majority of the work on move-
ment violence has focused on ascertaining why people choose violent tactics
(Johnson 1997, Wood 2007, Meyer 2004, Grant & Wallace 1991, Piven & Cloward
1977), under what conditions violent protest occurs (Mahanta 2002, Apter 1979,
Piven & Cloward 1977, Tilly 2003, Gillham & Marx 2000), and how effective
such tactics are compared to more conventional and/or nonviolent means (Hub-
bard 1994, Kowalewski 1987, Schumaker 1978, Klarman 1994, Piven & Cloward
1977, Gamson 1990). Another line of research has investigated police violence
(Sheptycki 2005, della Porta & Reiter 1998, McPhail & McCarthy 2005, Morris
1993, Klarman 1994). In general scholarship in this area has focused on the rela-
tionship between an undifferentiated group of protesters (»the movement«) and
the police or countermovement groups. 
A smaller number of studies have looked at inter-factional relationships within
particular movements. Of these, some have investigated the often volatile relation-
ship between militant extraparliamentary groups and more moderate reformists
(Ron 2001, Owens 2002, Hannigan 1985). Others have looked at tactical debates
within parliamentary movements, such as the split between the fundis and realos
in the German Green party (Ely 1997, Markovits & Gorski 1993, Scharf 1994,
Frankland & Schoonmaker 1992, Hulsberg 1988) or between American Black
Power and anti-war activists in 1967 (Hall 2003). Others have examined ideological
conflicts within individual extraparliamentary groups, although these groups were
all dedicated to nonviolence (Downey 1986, Epstein 1991, Polletta 2002, 2005).
Few of these conflicts addressed the question of violence directly, however, and
more importantly, the result in every case was factional splitting rather than ef-
fective coordination. 
We have found only two studies specifically investigating the relationship be-
tween militant and nonviolence factions within an extra-parliamentary movement.
Brooks (2004) argues that the »anti-globalization« movement’s preference for
participatory democracy and non-hierarchical structure (which he calls a »lack of
leadership«) makes it difficult for them to exclude or police violent protesters,
limiting the movement’s effectiveness. However, because this study was based
solely on news reports, treated the meanings of »violence« and »effectiveness« as
unproblematic, and left the activists’ reasons for their commitment to egalitaria-
nism and non-hierarchical organization unexamined, it sheds little light on their
negotiation of the violence question. On the other hand, while Kassimeris’ de-
scriptive study (2005) of the conflict between nonviolent Marxist-Leninist groups
and militant leftists in Greece in the summer of 1974 shows that the two factions
were not able to coordinate effectively, it is difficult to draw any conclusions as to
why without a comparative case. 
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In addition to the scarcity of research in this area, certain assumptions have
limited the way scholars have asked and answered questions about violence in
social movements. First, the vast majority of authors start from a normative view
of violent tactics as necessarily illegitimate, either on moral grounds or because
they are presumed to be ineffective. Second, the term »violence« is often left un-
defined, as if there were some widely shared, nonideological understanding of the
term, when in fact contestation over its meaning is often at the core of the debate
among activists. Lastly, it is often assumed that there is no rational foundation for
the use of violent tactics – that when it occurs, it is because people are being irra-
tional, undisciplined, unstrategic, overly emotional, etc. These assumptions have
led scholars (and many activists) to approach the violence question as a problem
of social control faced by organizers as they try to keep fanatical, irrational ex-
tremists from ruining their actions. 
This study takes a different approach, starting from the assumption that those
who engage in violent tactics, however defined, are not acting without reason, but
see such tactics, at least under certain conditions, as legitimate and strategically
useful. If this choice of tactics is intentional and rational, it follows that efforts to
control or suppress it that do not address the rationale for its use are likely to fail
and/or split the movement. For this reason, we argue that the question of when
and how violence is used by social movements is better understood as a problem
of coordination and negotiation, rather than one of discipline. From this per-
spective there are three basic ways in which nonviolent factions can respond to
the violence issue: 1) they can allow everyone to participate but try to »tame«
those whose tactics they define as violent, be it through persuasion, political isola-
tion, or physical suppression; 2) they can try to exclude the more militant factions
from their actions; or 3) they can decide to tolerate tactical diversity and work to
coordinate their efforts. The sociological question then becomes: under what con-
ditions do movements pursue each of these strategies? As many of the »newest«
social movements seem to be moving towards coordination rather than taming or
exclusion (Day 2005, Starr 2005), the goal of this study is to see what factors con-
tribute to the success or failure of this strategy.
Methodology
In examining our cases, we analyzed published statements made by participating
activists, archival data collected by the authors, field notes from Darcy Leach’s
participant observation during the March 2001 nuclear waste blockade (Leach
2006), and Sebastian Haunss’ direct observations of the 2007 G8 protests.
Archival data included calls to action, self-evaluations, and debates from
movement magazines or websites, as well as a sampling of news coverage of the
events in mainstream newspapers. For the Gorleben actions in March 2001 we
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gathered a total of 132 documents, including articles and official statements put
out by key groups, individual postings and commentaries in movement publica-
tions, and newspaper articles. For the G8 protests in Heiligendamm, we analyzed
122 documents taken from the websites of the larger mobilization networks, and
several brochures published before and after the protests. We also relied on em-
pirical analyses of the press coverage of the G8 protests carried out by Dieter
Rucht and his collaborators (Rucht and Teune 2008). 
For both events, we coded all references to protest forms and/or militancy and
analyzed them for variation along five general dimensions: 
1. Whether and how coordination took place during the planning process;
2. How the various parts of the movement and their action forms were framed in
the mainstream press before, during and after the event; 
3. How various action forms and the question of violence were framed within the
movement prior to the action; 
4. How the militant and nonviolence factions interacted on the ground during the
action; and
5. How the various parts of the movement evaluated the events that took place
(forms of action, effectiveness, level of coordination, etc.) after the actions
were over.
After reviewing the two cases, we will discuss four factors we found to be im-
portant in determining whether the movement tended toward taming or tolerance
in each case: 1) the degree to which acceptable forms of action and tactical co-
ordination were specifically discussed in the planning phase; 2) whether or not
there was a concrete, tactical goal in each particular action; 3) whether or not the
groups had worked together before and/or expected to work together again; and
4) the range of ideological, political, and tactical orientations among the parti-
cipating groups. 
Background
There are several important structural similarities between the two cases. Both
were multi-day events incorporating a wide variety of demonstrations, actions,
and cultural/educational activities. Both involved thousands of demonstrators
from a range of institutional affiliations, action traditions, and political orienta-
tions. In both cases, many of the activists traveled long distances to participate,
the vast majority of whom were not involved in planning the event. As both
events took place in Germany, the mobilization process in both cases also re-
flected many of the particular characteristics of German new social movements,
especially those of the far left. And lastly, both were met with intensive police re-
pression prior to and during the event, including house searches, the seizure of
mobilization materials, electronic and visual surveillance, restrictions on the right
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to demonstrate, and the deployment of tens of thousands of armed police. Aside
from these similarities, the two events emerged out of very different movement
contexts.
Heiligendamm and the alterglobalization movement 
The protest against the G8 meetings in Heiligendamm was one event in a long
line of protests against neo-liberal corporate globalization, including those against
annual meetings of the World Economic Forum in Davos since 1998, and meet-
ings of the WTO in Seattle (1999), the IMF and World Bank in Washington (2000),
Prague (2001) and Ottawa (2001), and of the G8 in Genoa (2001), Evian (2003),
and Gleneagles (2005). The Genoa and Gleneagles G8 meetings were especially
important points of reference – Genoa for the intense violence that engulfed the
protests,1 and Gleneagles for the dominance of the NGO campaign for debt can-
cellation and the marginalization of more confrontational forms of protest.
All of the preceding protests had been characterized by the often tense co-
existence of various forms of protest, including counter-summits, demonstrations,
blockades, property damage, and attempts to storm the cordoned-off »red zones«
where the meetings took place.
The anti-Castor campaign in Wendland
The German anti-nuclear movement began in the mid-1970s with massive
demonstrations and the occupations of power plant construction sites in places
like Wyhl, Brokdorf, and Wackersdorf. In the late ’70s the movement’s epicenter
moved to Gorleben, a town in the rural area of Wendland, in Lower Saxony,
where the industry proposed to build a new power plant, reprocessing plant, and
waste disposal facility.
Over the next two decades, the resistance, led by a local citizens’ initiative, the
Bürgerinitiative Umweltschutz Lüchow-Dannenberg (the »BI«), defeated all but
the disposal site, which in 1995 was approved as a »temporary« storage facility.
At that point the movement launched its »anti-Castor« campaign to blockade all
transports of nuclear waste (shipped in containers called Castors) to Gorleben.
The objective of the blockades was to turn public opinion against nuclear power
and drive up the cost of each shipment, in order to reduce their number. 
1 Genoa 2001 marked the high-point of violence at these summit meetings. Battles between protesters and po-
lice and a police raid on peaceful demonstrators sleeping in a school resulted in hundreds of injuries, many
serious, and the death of one demonstrator, Carlo Giuliani, who was shot in the head by an Italian police of-
ficer.
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Setting the stage: Planning, repression, and framing
The run-up to Heiligendamm
Mobilization for the June 2007 G8 summit took place under highly charged and
repressive conditions. Officials undertook a number of measures to reduce the
number of protesters and keep them away from the summit location. The police
strategy combined a media campaign to undermine the movement’s credibility
with various tactics to repress mobilization. Months before the summit, federal in-
telligence agencies and the German federal police (BKA) began voicing concerns
in the press about violent protests and potential terrorist attacks (Frankfurter
Rundschau 2006). Then on May 9, police conducted simultaneous raids of 40
leftist projects, apartments, and offices across the country. They were ostensibly
looking for evidence against 18 people being investigated for »membership in a
terrorist group«2, but activists saw it as an intimidation tactic meant to both assess
and undermine their mobilization efforts. That evening 5000 people in Berlin and
up to 10,000 nationally demonstrated against the raids. Another demonstration in
Hamburg on the 28th was brutally put down. But if the police had hoped to dampen
mobilization for the G8, their efforts backfired, serving instead to unite and anger
the radical left, drawing even more activists’ attention to Heiligendamm. 
Other legal and physical barriers were raised to keep protesters away from the
summit. Following the lead of other countries since the 2001 meetings in Genoa, the
German summit would be held in a remote location, at a resort hotel on the Baltic
Sea. A massive fence – 12.5 km long, 2.5 meters high, and topped with razor wire –
was built around the summit hotel to prevent demonstrators from reaching the
venue by land, reinforcing the message that the German government expected vio-
lent protests. In the final days before the summit, the government also suspended
the Schengen Agreement, allowing border police to prevent thousands from cros-
sing into Germany for the event. Finally, a general dispensation was issued suspend-
ing the right to demonstrate anywhere within 10 km of the meeting site – encom-
passing an area twice as large as that within the fence – and declaring any gathering
of three or more people within that radius an illegal demonstration. 
Planning meetings for the protests against the 2007 G8 summit started roughly
two years beforehand. Most important were three »action conferences« held in
Rostock in March 2006, November 2006, and April 2007 and several open meet-
ings of the »G8 coordinating circle« in Hannover. Participants included NGOs
(e.g. Christian development organizations, environmental groups like BUND3 and
Greenpeace, and groups for alternative trade regulations like Attac4), local ci-
2 A federal court ruling in October 2007 found these accusations baseless and declared the May raids and wire-
taps illegal (Beck 2008).
3 Bund Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (Association for Environmental Protection Germany).
4 Association pour une taxation des transactions financières pour l'aide aux citoyens (Association for the Taxa-
tion of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens).
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tizens’ initiatives, trade unions, leftist political parties (e.g. »die Linke«), and a
range of radical leftist groups, from the more formally organized Interventionist
Left (IL), to the loose network of Autonomen in Dissent! Representing a broad
range of political perspectives and tactical preferences, Yang (2008) categorizes
the participants into three general orientations toward the G8: »partners, critics,
and antagonists«. The NGOs (partners) hoped to influence the G8 and the general
public through dialogue. The Autonomen and other radical leftists (antagonists)
saw the G8 meetings as illegitimate, denounced any form of negotiation, and
approached the protests primarily as an opportunity to express their rage and op-
position. Standing between the other two, the »critics«, the largest and most
diverse group, advanced a radical critique of the G8 while still allowing for the
possibility of compromise. 
Debates about tactics, when they occurred at all, took place mainly within each
of the separate networks (Rätz 2007a). The first Rostock conference5 produced a
general schedule, consisting of a kick-off demonstration on Saturday, June 2, fol-
lowed by »Days of Action« and, finally, blockades at each of the five resort en-
trances. There would also be cultural events throughout the week, and a counter
summit mirroring the official summit meetings (Indymedia 2006). Working groups
formed to organize the various activities and would report on their progress at the
next two meetings in Rostock. Especially given the repressive political context,
one would expect the issue of violence to be an important topic for the groups or-
ganizing the demonstration and the blockades. As it turned out, however, only the
blockade group took up the question in any detail. 
Early movement documents from various groups did address the question of
militancy, but only in a vague and indirect way. In July 2005, the IL was formed, a
coalition that joined elements of the nondogmatic and (post-)autonomous left with
a faction from Attac that was more movement oriented. In their founding state-
ment, the IL called for »the mutual recognition of different forms of action and
resistance« in the spirit of »constructive cooperation« and foresaw the use of
»confrontational action forms like civil disobedience« (Interventionistische Linke
2005). In the Spring of 2006, the IL and a group called »X-tausendmal quer«
(XQ), known for their anti-Castor actions, became the driving force behind a new
coalition called »Block G8«, which was founded as a working group to organize
the mass blockades of the summit. Block G8 met 20 times between March 2006
and May 2007, and in December 2006 they reached an »action consensus«, which
became the focus of the first debate about the violence question.
Civil disobedience and militant forms of action
Block G8 brought together people from various backgrounds to plan a common
action, including groups like XQ from a tradition of nonviolent civil disobedience
5 The number of reported participants ranged from 70 (Block G8 2008) to 300 (Indymedia 2006).
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and some in the IL drawn from the autonomous movement (although many Auto-
nomen groups remained unaffiliated). After much discussion, and despite their
usually incompatible positions on acceptable action forms, Block G8 published an
»action consensus« in December 2006, stating that their objective was »to prac-
tically and effectively stop the Summit and cut it off from its infrastructure«
through various forms of blockades. To accomplish this, they promised »to over-
come the police barriers; pushing them out of the way, going around them, or can-
nily flowing through them. We will not allow ourselves to be stopped, distracted,
or to get embroiled in the police’s possible strategy of escalation … By means of
civil disobedience, we will resist by showing solidarity. We do not want to injure
anyone« (Block G8 2007).
Significantly, this concept did not commit to a purely nonviolent stance and
included the idea that other groups could carry out blockade actions using other
means as long as they kept their distance. These other groups would include some
from the autonomous movement who previously, in statements advocating »ima-
ginative and/or militant actions« (autopool 2006) or declaring that they would
»throw a definitive ›NO‹ and some other things at the G8« (PAULA 2006), had
hinted at more confrontational forms of action. Aside from one mention of fla-
ming barricades (NoLager Bremen 2007), documents from these more militant
groups remained rather abstract, almost never referring to specific tactics.6 Nonethe-
less, the Block G8 consensus was a policy of mutual acceptance and non-inter-
ference between the respective forms of action—specifically, that more militant
forms should not take place near the blockades, and nonviolent protesters should
not try to hinder autonomous groups in their activities. Block G8 activists later
argued that »avoiding an explicit statement regarding the ›violence question‹
combined with a clear non-escalating action concept« had been the key to their
success (Block G8 2008, 6).
It soon became evident, however, that not everyone endorsed this policy. At a
press conference after the second Rostock conference, Peter Wahl from Attac’s
coordinating committee unilaterally announced that »all actors, organizations,
groups that are part of this process have in no uncertain terms stated that violence
will not emanate from them« (Wahl 2006). Other spokespeople immediately cor-
rected him, insisting on the co-existence of different action forms and denying
any inherent opposition between nonviolent and violent resistance. Groups linked
to the Autonomen argued that asking everyone to renounce all forms of violence
would only aid the police in criminalizing parts of the movement and thereby
weaken it (NoLager Bremen 2007; Dissent Netzwerk 2007). 
Aside from Block G8 and Attac, discussing the question of confrontational
forms of action was not high on most groups’ agendas. The primary call for action
6 Among autonomous groups, published descriptions of actions tend to use vague language, because police
categorize explicit calls for illegal acts as »calls for violence« and use them as a pretext for arrest and/or as
evidence in legal proceedings.
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from the NGOs makes no mention of action forms (G8 Bündnis 2007). Attac itself
was split on the issue: representatives of the movement wing supported the mu-
tual acceptance of different action forms, while representatives of the NGO wing
called for strictly nonviolent protest.7 Ultimately, Attac did not support the
blockades, even though some of its members participated.
In sum, several important facts characterized the situation on the eve of the
anti-G8 protests. First, among the more action-oriented groups a general agree-
ment had been reached with respect to the blockades: diverse forms of action
would be tolerated, and people would not interfere with each others’ actions. For
their own part, Block G8 announced they would be engaging in civil disobedience
and would not attack the police or try to break through the fence into the inner
security zone. Second, despite the fact that earlier alterglobalization protests had
seen their share of street fighting, no ground rules had been set for any of the
week’s other activities aside from the blockades. It was clear that the NGOs and
the more action-oriented groups had different tactical orientations, but these had
not been addressed. NGOs and especially Attac had publicly stated their pre-
ference for peaceful protests, predicting that »apart from a few paint bombs or
stones thrown by the misdirected, no major violence would take place« during the
protests (Attac 2007b). In response, radical leftist groups reiterated their call for a
diversity of action forms, but what this would mean in practice remained unclear.
Organizers may have thought that since no one was explicitly mobilizing for a
violent confrontation, it would not be a problem, but it seems more likely that,
knowing they would not get consensus on a purely nonviolent position, the orga-
nizers simply bracketed the issue in order to keep the coalition together.
After the Castor is before the Castor
Much to the movement’s delight, after the 1997 nuclear waste transport to Gor-
leben, the Castor containers were found to be leaking radiation, and a moratorium
was called on all transports until they could be confirmed safe. Thus, while it was
not clear when or where it would happen, planning for the March 2001 transport
began immediately after the 1997 Castors had reached their destination.
While the protesters had not been able to prevent the 1997 transport the move-
ment nevertheless had much to celebrate: the shipment had cost an unprecedented
111 million DM to push through, and public opinion was moving sharply against
nuclear power (Ehmke 2001b, Süddeutsche Zeitung 2001). 
But the protests had also resulted in a bitter split within the movement. In con-
trast to the occupations in Brokdorf and Wackersdorf, which had involved brutal
battles between protesters and the police, the anti-nuclear movement in Wendland
7 Several of the founding members of Attac Germany had been involved with XQ during the 1997 debate over
violent/militant tactics. Thus, it is not surprising that, despite their own preference for nonviolence, this move-
ment faction would support the same pro-tolerance position XQ supported in the 2001 Gorleben transport.
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formed around a general consensus against interpersonal violence. Within those
bounds, however, there were strong differences over the relative merits of sabo-
tage, property damage, and civil disobedience. Nor was the absolute prohibition
against interpersonal violence ever universally accepted. These differences came
to a head during the 1997 blockades in a way that strongly influenced the move-
ment’s approach to the transport in March 2001. 
In 1997 XQ had called for a nonviolent sit-down blockade at the switch-
station, where the Castors would be moved from the train onto trucks for the last
18 km of the transport. By the time the train arrived for the transfer, 9 000 people
were sitting in the road, refusing to move. At the same time, perhaps 1 000 other
protesters – mostly Autonomen – carried out dozens of small group actions all
along the route, chaining themselves to the rails, building blockades out of
boulders, logs, and flaming hay bales, and removing whole sections of track.
Local farmers had created a blockade of 75 tractors parked tightly together on one
of the two roads from the switch station to the storage site, while hundreds of
Autonomen had dug huge cavities into the other road, leaving it impassable.
When police arrived to reclaim the road, the Autonomen moved back to the
switch station where XQ’s blockade was still being cleared. 
Tensions immediately arose between militants and nonviolence activists over
what kinds of actions were appropriate at the switch station. 
To defend the sitting blockaders and divert the police, the Autonomen threw
paint balloons at the windshields of the water canon trucks, threw rocks, and set
hay-bales on fire. This drew the ire not only of the police, but also many in XQ,
who feared the Autonomen would tarnish their image as »normal« citizens en-
gaged in nonviolent protest. Some Autonomen who tried to participate in the
sit-down blockade were asked to leave because they »looked like Chaoten«
(pejorative: chaotic ones), while others were searched for weapons or had their
kerchiefs/masks pulled from their faces. Others near the blockade reported being
yelled at, pointed out to the police, or even held for the police as they were being
chased. A bitter debate ensued, including personal attacks on all sides and public
statements by both XQ and the BI, distancing themselves from the Autonomen.
Meanwhile, the media happily differentiated between brave, peaceful demonstra-
tors and »evil Chaoten.«
As these tensions were playing out and in response to the transport morato-
rium, XQ launched a new campaign, called »X-tausendmal quer – überall« asking
people to sign a commitment to blockade the next transport, whenever and where-
ever it might take place.8 In the summer of 2000 it was announced that the Castors
8 By February 2001, XQ had gathered 4100 such signatures. The qualifier »wherever it may take place« meant
that even a transport from a German plant to one of the reprocessing plants would be blockaded. The move-
ment’s focus on Gorleben had been criticized for making it seem that the activists in Wendland only cared ab-
out keeping the waste out of their own backyard. 
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had been fixed and the next transport would go from a plant in Philippsburg to a
reprocessing plant in La Hague, France in mid-October, and the movement imme-
diately began mobilizing for another blockade. A nation-wide demonstration was
held in Gorleben in September 2000, and the BI began hosting its regular monthly
delegate meetings in Wendland, to which any group could send a delegate. At
these meetings delegates debated the issues, exchanged information, analyzed the
political and legal situation, and considered various action concepts. Whatever
tentative agreements were reached would be carried back to the various groups
for consideration. While decisions made in Wendland were not considered bind-
ing, if the BI supported them, they were usually accepted by the others. At the
same time, because the movement operated on a non-hierarchical, participatory-
democratic principle, and many of the Autonomen groups wouldn’t allow them-
selves to be dictated to in any case, decisions generally take the form of »action
concepts« that merely lay out a framework within which individual groups plan
and coordinate their actions. 
This planning process took place within a political context that had changed
dramatically since the 1997 transport. Most importantly, this transport was backed
by a »Red-Green« government that had supposedly just reached an agreement
with the nuclear industry to phase out the use of nuclear power. Most of the move-
ment saw this »exit consensus« (Ausstiegskonsens) as nothing but a weakly
veiled attempt by the Greens to save face after completely failing in their negotia-
tions. Still, the agreement made it much harder to mobilize for the blockade,
because the common perception was that the issue had been resolved. 
A second important aspect of the political situation was that the Philippsburg
transport was cancelled at the last minute, when France announced they would
accept no more waste in La Hague until Germany transported at least one ship-
ment back to Gorleben. Jürgen Trittin, a former activist who was now the Green
environmental minister and champion of the exit agreement, argued that Germany
was obligated, under international law, to take back the waste it had produced and
shipped to France in the first place, that it was Germany’s »national responsibi-
lity« to let this Gorleben transport through. Trittin’s argument convinced many to
stay home, and as sponsors of the exit agreement, the Green Party told its mem-
bers not to join in the protests. The movement worried that every transport to
Gorleben made it more likely to be approved as a permanent disposal site. It was
imperative that they expose the exit »consensus« as a fraud and show the Greens
they would not be so easily appeased. Thus the transport in March 2001 was a de-
cisive battle for both the movement and the Greens. As Jochen Stay, spokesperson
for XQ put it, »they want to test us, so let’s make sure they get a clear result!«
(Voran 2001).
The police strategy for this transport had also changed slightly. As usual 30,000
police and border patrol officers would be deployed to secure the transport,
several thousand of whom were stationed in Wendland 6-8 weeks ahead of time to
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patrol the route and to stop and search anyone who seemed »suspicious looking.«
Locals and the press called this »occupation« a »totally normal state of emer-
gency« (Gaserow & Maron 2001). But this time the police also had their own
public relations team and deployed 130 officers to serve as »conflict managers«,
reportedly to negotiate with protesters and manage potentially violent situations.
They received a very chilly reception, however. One local woman had this to say
about their campaign: »That the people in this region and along the transport route
have been subjected to unbearable psychological violence is ignored in these
visits. Night after night the racket of low-flying helicopters forces its way into our
sleep. Gas stations, businesses and snack bars are populated by armed border
patrol and police officers. On the way to kindergarten or to school the children are
met by convoys of deployment vehicles. Telephone tapping, criminalization,
searches, infiltration, police lies – all of this is our daily experience« (Huneke
2001).
While the »conflict managers« preached nonviolence, legal and illegal repres-
sion was intensified. A general dispensation issued by the regional court sus-
pended the right to demonstrate within 50 meters of the transport route, and at the
last minute, approvals that had been granted by local city councils for setting up
camps within 5 km of the route were revoked by a higher court (Boecker 2001).
XQ and the BI complained that the police and the courts were trying to crimina-
lize the movement by portraying the activists as violent, in order to justify both
the civil rights restrictions and the police’s own use of violence during the actions.
For their part, the press made it clear that they expected at least as much violence
as in 1997, but they overwhelmingly expected it to come from the police. Only
two articles in our sample referred to protesters as violent. One, which spoke of
»1000 violence-ready Autonomen«, was referring to the 1997 protests (Süddeut-
sche Zeitung 2001). The other was an interview with Markus Mohr, speaker for
the »Autonome Unruhestifter« (autonomous trouble-makers), which was conduc-
ted during the transport and included a photograph of a hooded, black-clad Auto-
nomer standing on the tracks with a raised fist, with the caption »destroy what
destroys you«. Mohr had spoken at the kick-off demonstration for the week of
protest. While characterizing Mohr’s group as one »whose actions often lead to
police interventions from which peaceful protesters also suffer«, even this article
is somewhat sympathetic, noting that while Mohr has no problem with breaking
the law, his one rule is that »people can’t be hurt« (Krupp 2001).
In sum, the political context prior to the March ’97 transport was contradictory.
On the one hand, much of the public was sympathetic to Trittin’s national res-
ponsibility argument and believed that the »exit consensus« would soon resolve
the issue anyway. At the same time, due to police violence during past transports
and the unprecedented level of repression this time, protesters were framed sym-
pathetically by the press. 
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Old consensus, new action concept
The long-standing and widely understood consensus in Wendland was that there
should be »no violence against people«, but sabotage and civil disobedience were
tolerated (Leach 2006). The only public reference to this rule around the March
2001 transport, however, came after the transport in a statement by the BI pub-
lished in the movement magazine anti-atom-aktuell. They were very disturbed by
comments in two other articles, in which Autonomen applauded instances where
protesters had offensively attacked police. The BI chided the Autonomen, noting
that »in the anti-nuclear movement there has for years been a common consensus
not to endanger people« (BI Umweltschutz Lüchow-Dannenberg 2001).
Prior to the action, however, the consensus about not endangering people was
assumed, and a specific action concept was developed and communicated in the
various calls to action. The action concept explicitly valorized the notion of a
diversity of action forms. For example, the BI’s call to action stated that »imagi-
nation is called for. Out of diversity, complementarity should emerge rather than
mutual impediment. The best place [to be] is wherever there are not a lot of
police« (BI Fall 2000). In movement publications, both before and after the trans-
port, a diversity of action forms was mentioned in 14 documents, making it the
most common descriptor of the movement’s tactical approach. As with the G8, the
range of acceptable tactics was not further specified. Since the injunction against
interpersonal violence was generally understood, however, we believe the lack of
specificity in this case indicated not a failure to address the issue, but rather the
desire to avoid being charged with inciting violence (since the police count sa-
botage as violence).
The action concept not only called for a diversity of tactics, but laid out a con-
crete three-part plan for their compatible simultaneous use. The first element, the
»track concept« (»Schienenkonzept«), stated that instead of focusing only on the
last 18km of road between the switch-station and Gorleben, this time the whole
route from Lüneburg to Gorleben would be fair game for actions – including the
56km of railroad tracks – making it much harder for the police to secure the route. 
The second aspect of the plan was the »section concept« (»Streckenkonzept«)
– that this 74 km would be divided into sections that would be assigned to specific
groups (leaving some open for unorganized groups), who could then organize
whatever kind of action they wanted in their own section. As Jochen Stay ex-
plained in a call for action directed at a broad progressive audience: »With the
division of the route into various sections, all kinds of tactical approaches can be
carried out without bothering each other. This way an optimal complementarity is
conceivable, for example if well-prepared people chain themselves to the tracks in
one place, and in that way make it possible for a larger group to get onto the tracks
in another place« (Stay 2001a).
Delegates signed up for their preferred sections in a closed-door session at a
delegate meeting in Wendland, with the understanding that no one would disclose
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anyone else’s assigned location. In the movement documents we analyzed, the
»track concept« was the second most frequently cited positive characteristic (after
a diversity of tactics) – mentioned in 11 documents – followed by references to
spatial separation between action forms (in 9 documents).
The third provision of the agreed-upon plan was that one area would be open
for all action forms, and the various groups would coordinate with each other on
site. It was announced at a meeting of the XQ coordinating group in February
2001 that the road between the crane and the disposal site in Gorleben would be
an »open space for all groups,« with the provision that all actions should be »poli-
tically conveyable«.9 After some discussion, XQ concluded that it was unclear
what »politically conveyable« would mean in practice and acknowledged the pos-
sibility that more confrontational tactics could take place right next to their non-
violent action. Still, XQ and the BI tentatively decided to carry out a joint sit-
down blockade in that space.
The open space agreement was communicated in slightly different terms in a
flyer targeting the broader radical-leftist scene: »The area between the reloading
crane and Splietau will be available as a public space for all action forms – the
cops, as pre-programmed, will be causing trouble here. At the same time, it is ex-
pected that everyone will be very careful that their own behavior must remain
compatible with the operation of other protesters. The same goes for the last kilo-
meter before the waste storage facility in Gorleben: here, too, thousands will be
trying to come together« (Castor-Info-Dienst 2001).
Although this flyer did not use the term »politically conveyable«, it clearly
communicated the requirement that more militant actions not interfere with non-
violent actions, which suggests that organized autonomous groups supported the
action plan.
On the ground: 
Taming, tolerance, and the challenge of coordination
Familiar (taming) rituals in Heiligendamm
The protests against the G8 began in Rostock on Saturday, June 2nd, with an
80,000 person kick-off demonstration. As the two routes of the demonstration
converged at the Rostock Harbor, it quickly became clear that avoiding discussion
of what forms of action would be acceptable during the demonstration had been a
serious mistake. The exact course of events has been disputed,10 but what is cer-
tain is that after most of the demonstration had already reached the end of the
route, a battle broke out between the police and roughly 500 demonstrators from
9 Leach field notes, February 17, 2001.
10 See Steven and Narr (2007) for a detailed description of the demonstration.
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the »black bloc«. Demonstrators attacked the police with poles, stones, and bott-
les, police charged into the demonstration wielding billy clubs, several rubbish
containers and one car were set on fire, water cannons were turned on the demon-
strators, and things did not calm down until early evening. 
Fueled by misinformation from the police,11 the press coverage for the next
several days focused almost exclusively on the riots, writing about a »new quality
of violence« (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2007), and the television news was
flooded with images of black-hooded rock throwers (Herrmann 2008).
Responses to the riots within the movement ran the gamut. On one side, repre-
sentatives of some moderate and left-leaning organizations resorted to the classic
taming rituals, distancing themselves from the violence and denouncing it. Peter
Wahl from Attac went so far as to announce that Attac would forcibly exclude vio-
lent protesters from future actions (Wahl 2007), though his colleague, Werner
Rätz, argued that 95 % of the Autonomen were not involved in the riots (Rätz
2007b). On the other side, the more radical groups defended the rioting. The leftist
party, WASG/Die Linke, blamed the German government for escalating the situa-
tion (Die Linke 2007). The IL saw the riots as a legitimate form of action that was
part of the movement’s broad tactical repertoire (Interventionistische Linke
2007), and an autonomous antifascist group from Frankfurt/M. noted that »The
promised diversity of action forms – that is precisely what took place in Rostock«
(Antifa[F] 2007). The most positive appraisal claimed that in Rostock »[t]hou-
sands [had] taken the initiative and … attacked at those places where capitalist
exploitation and the material impact of the global civil war are escalated daily«
(Internationale Brigaden 2007). Interestingly, aside from Attac, the DFG-VK12, (a
peace movement organization), and »erlassjahr.de« (»Jubilee«, a Christian NGO),
none of the NGOs mentioned the violent protests in their press releases. Nor did
the press seem interested in their position on this issue.
After such a violent beginning, protest activities for the remainder of the week
were remarkably peaceful. This was especially true of the blockades organized by
Block G8, where a variety of actions took place side by side without incident.
(Fairly) smooth collaboration in Wendland
Back in Wendland, the Committee for Civil Rights and Democracy, a national
watchdog organization, sent observers to monitor the March 2001 transport from
a neutral perspective. Their report evaluated the protests as follows: »The actual
level of violence was low. No violence targeting people emanated from the
demonstrators; nor did any property damage take place that endangered people.
11 After the riot, the police announced that 433 police officers had been injured. After a leftist newspaper in-
vestigated, that number was reduced to 43 left »unfit for duty,« only two of whom required ambulant treat-
ment. Similarly, damages initially claimed to be »in the millions« later turned out to be closer to 50,000.
12 Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft – Vereinigte KriegsdienstgegnerInnen (German Peace Society – United War
Resisters).
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The police—virtually omnipresent, even when they outnumbered the demonstra-
tors—employed more personal violence: from water canons to truncheon attacks
to using painful holds when carrying people away, right through to making
arrests« (Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie 2001, 16).
While much of the violence was clearly perpetrated by the police, a few
activists’ reports indicate that on at least one occasion, they engaged in interperso-
nal violence as well. One account states that »[t]hese militant actions, sometimes
also attacking police, mostly happened at relatively stupid points … [neverthe-
less, they] showed that there are still people who are ready to do that, and that
they have a little more in mind than blocking this transport« (anti-atom-aktuell
2001). The BI considered these attacks a violation of the consensus and called for
the matter to be discussed (BI 2001). If such a discussion took place, however, it
was not made public.
From available chronologies, we found reports of five incidences of interper-
sonal violence during the transport. Three of these cases were reportedly unpro-
voked attacks by the police, using billy clubs to clear protesters from a particular
area. One of these took place without warning against a peaceful XQ blockade of
750 people; another was against 300 people who were on their way to a registered
demonstration. The other two incidents involved protesters actively engaging in
some sort of interpersonal violence against the police. The most serious was at the
switching station in Dannenberg, during a spontaneous demonstration of about
12,000 people on the night the Castors were transferred onto the truck. It is not
clear whether the police or the demonstrators initiated this confrontation, but it is
clear that protesters were active participants. Two similarities are worth noting
between this situation and the anti-G8 riot in Rostock: both were mass demonstra-
tions in which there was no immediate practical objective, and in both cases the
demonstrations had been surrounded by the police when violence broke out.
While the amount and intensity of activist violence in Wendland was clearly
lower than it was during the Rostock demonstration, we know that there were at
least two violations of the »no violence against people« rule. As we will see,
however, in contrast to the G8, these infractions did not trigger an intensive inter-
nal debate. Nor did they result in public distancing or cause a schism within the
movement.
The aftermath: Taming, tolerance and the question of dirty laundry
Fallout from the G8 protests
The third wave of debates about violence/militancy around the G8 protests started
about two weeks after they were over. By this point the hypercharged atmosphere
after the Rostock demonstration had largely dissipated. 10,000 people had breached
the no-protest zone and successfully blocked all land entrances to the summit
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hotel for 48 hours. During the blockade, despite repeated provocation (including a
water canon attack in which one protester lost an eye), the protesters had re-
mained nonviolent, and the public image of the G8 protests was now one of
peaceful protest rather than rioting. 
Werner Rätz and Monty Schädel of Attac were now the only ones from the
NGO contingent still participating in the debate. Both still condemned the vio-
lence of the demonstrators but not without blaming the police for escalating it
(Rätz 2007c, Schädel 2007). The 33 other documents bearing on this wave of the
debate came from various radical leftists and Attac’s movement wing. Not sur-
prisingly, in these documents the nonviolence groups praised the successful
blockades, and groups from the autonomous movement continued to defend the
riots but also complained that the movement had missed opportunities for more
militant action after June 2nd. Some groups also criticized the Block G8 blockades.
The autonomous network PAULA wrote that the moderate character of the blo-
ckades implied their »implicit adoption of a criminalizing perspective on militant
forms of resistance« (PAULA 2007). Others found the blockades »as entertaining
as conformist« (ums Ganze! 2007). At the same time, this sector evaluated the
violence at the demonstration more positively. One autonomous activist saw the
rioting as the action that most clearly showed the nonconciliatory character of the
protests; they were »an expression of our antagonism« (Anton 2007). Another
autonomous group interpreted the violence as unmistakably expressing a »radical
criticism of the ruling order«, but also complained that the violence question had
not been addressed before the demonstration (United Colors of Resistance 2007).
While some kept to the party line, however, there were also indications that
many who had participated in the blockades had come to truly embrace the princi-
ple of »mutual acceptance of different action forms« and had become more
tolerant of the other side. One Block G8 activist (and former spokesperson for
XQ) stressed how they had decided not to call the blockades nonviolent, so that
those using other protest forms would feel more welcome (Frauke 2008). Some
autonomous groups from Block G8 even called the blockades a radicalizing expe-
rience in which many activists came to reject the state monopoly on violence
(Avanti 2008), or said they had come to appreciate the potential of civil dis-
obedience (Antifaschistische Linke Berlin 2008). The groups in Block G8 were
also more critical of the riot. Christoph Kleine of the IL called for an overdue
debate on the functions and forms of violence (Kleine 2007) and autonomous
activists from the Netherlands reported that many in their evaluation meeting had
questioned the appropriateness of the black bloc’s actions (AktivistInnen aus NL
2007).
Business as usual in Wendland: After the Castor is before the Castor
Jochen Stay’s comment on the actions in Philippsburg in October 2000 aptly sum-
marizes the lesson the movement had learned from the Gorleben transport in
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1997: »It’s just important that the various approaches have their own free space.
Then it definitely works« (Stay 2000). This lesson was applied during the March
2001 transport, and while some activists did engage in interpersonal violence,
there was no public distancing in the mainstream press afterwards, and very little
comment on it within the movement. In fact, the general consensus once the trans-
port had gone through was that the two factions had worked surprisingly well
together. Some Autonomen attributed this to what they interpreted as XQ’s having
embraced a more practical and less ideologically rigid stance on nonviolence, as
in this interview with »Grete« and »Charlie« in the anti-atom-aktuell documenta-
tion of the March transport: »Grete: You can tell that this time the various resis-
tance concepts integrated with each other very well ... It’s in general a very impor-
tant political point that these small [Autonomen] groups are no longer letting
themselves be limited and are choosing their action forms themselves ... On the
other hand is the fact that the certified nonviolent activists from XQ have them-
selves expanded the concept of nonviolence. Pushing police out of the way to get
onto the tracks is becoming more commonly understood as within the realm of
nonviolent action.
Charlie: ... The split between the nonviolent and the not so nonviolent activists
didn’t really happen in the praxis this time. During actions it still happened once
or twice, where self-proclaimed nonviolent activists pulled others’ masks off their
heads. Still, the schisms and the fights between the fractions have decreased and
working together has gotten better« (anti-atom-aktuell 2001).
The »Stiftung Unruhe« also had good things to say about the level of coopera-
tion on site, which they attributed to the »track concept«:
»From the strategic perspective of blockading, we consider the track concept a
success. Lively and determined XQ people, engaged activists from environmental
groups and concerns, unorganized anti-Castor activists, direct action groups, and
a few hundred masked Autonomen cavorted happily on the tracks. Partly in an un-
coordinated ›next to each other‹ kind of way, partly it was skillfully synchronized
or in agreement« (Stiftung Unruhe 2001).
Conclusions: »Ob friedlich oder militant, wichtig ist der Widerstand«?
Conclusions from the G8 protests 
The dominant frame regarding violence before the G8 summit was clearly the
acceptance of multiple forms of protest. Numerous statements emphasized that
the protests would not be divided by the »violence question«; they stressed the
»strength and diversity« of the protests, »diversity of the forms of action«, and the
»mutual acceptance of action forms«. Aside from Attac, which was split on the
issue, movement actors generally supported this line of reasoning. Most of the
NGOs, however, treated violence as a non-issue. In fact, they were noticeably
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silent on the question, both before and during the protests, preferring instead to
keep their focus on issues of poverty, debt, and climate change.
This frame is reflected in the general consensus that emerged from the three
action conferences in Rostock and the meetings in Hannover, that a multiplicity of
action forms would be embraced as long as they did not interfere with each other.
The practical implications of this, however, were only discussed in the Block G8
network, who reached an agreement that violent and/or more confrontational
forms of protests should not take place at the central points of the blockade. The
Block G8 consensus held even after the violence on June 2nd, and no group from
this network publicly condemned the rioting.
On the other hand, the larger coalition that mobilized for the June 2nd de-
monstration did not discuss specific action forms or how they would react to pro-
testers’ violence, should it happen, a fact made clear when representatives from
Attac and the IL made openly contradictory statements in a press conference ab-
out the organizers’ position on violence. Not surprisingly, these differences be-
came even more apparent after the demonstration escalated. Attac’s unilaterally
declaring a non-existent non-violent consensus can be seen as an attempt to tame
the militants that backfired. In fact, the larger coalition’s implicit strategy of
bracketing the violence question in the hopes of uniting around a minimal »anti-
G8« consensus undercut the possibility of responding in a unified and effective
way when violence did break out.
Conclusions from Gorleben
Whereas at the G8 there was no clear consensus about tactics outside of the block-
ades, the Wendland consensus against interpersonal violence was widely known
and accepted. Some Autonomen, however, felt that using violence to defend
against police attacks fell within the consensus, and, as the following statement
suggests, at least some felt that under certain circumstances, offensively attacking
police is strategically warranted and legitimate. In any case, they reserved the
right to make that determination themselves, regardless of what the delegates may
have decided beforehand: »There were also attacks on cops. But of course this is
also a part of the resistance and has a role within it. It’s not about saying ›the cops
say that’s violence but it really wasn’t!‹ Rather it’s that we find that in certain
situations it is also correct to behave that way« (Tolle Kür 2001).
Even though there were incidents of both defensive and offensive violence
against police during the March 2001 transport, there was very little internal dis-
cussion about it or policing of that boundary. This is undoubtedly partly because
neither side wanted to re-open old wounds from 1997. In fact, with both sides so
sensitive to criticism from the other, there may well have been a general calcu-
lation that harping on the few infractions would do more internal damage than
leaving it alone would cost them in public credibility or political effectiveness.
The movement’s own conclusions are perhaps best articulated in this reflection on
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the March 2001 transport, published in the nonviolence movement’s most widely
read newspaper, graswurzelrevolution: »Without a broad mass movement, how-
ever—which we were able to mobilize this time, despite all the red-green nay
saying—an effective resistance is unthinkable. Only through the coordinated
efforts of all available forces, be they Autonomen sabotage actions, massive sit-
down blockades, people nonviolently chaining themselves to the tracks, or even the
Robin Wood people cementing themselves under the tracks, is it possible to achieve
the kind of impact that sends a signal beyond Wendland that this is about more than
an anti-castor movement. The immediate abandonment of nuclear power can only
be accomplished with the whole breadth of the movement« (Markus 2001).
This sentiment was echoed in slightly different form by autonomous groups.
All in all, the emphasis on tolerance—captured in the old Wendland slogan that
»whether peaceful or militant, what’s important is resistance« (ob friedlich oder
militant, wichtig ist der Widerstand)—was perhaps the most prevalent value
voiced by anti-nuclear groups across the spectrum, both before and after the
March 2001 transport. 
Factors affecting tendency toward tolerance or taming
Comparing the two cases, four factors significantly influenced whether the inter-
actions between nonviolent and militant factions in these movements were
characterized by taming or tolerance. The degree to which the issue of violence
was directly addressed in the planning phase, whether or not there was a concrete,
tactical objective for each particular action, and whether or not there was an
expectation of continued collaboration were the most important factors. The range
of the participating groups’ ideological, political, and tactical orientations was
also important, but to a lesser degree.
Face-to-Face Efforts to Reach Consensus on Tactics—We initially felt that one
critical factor would be whether all relevant actors were included in face-to-face
planning sessions. Our analysis suggests, however, that the more important issue
is whether or not the topic is explicitly addressed in these meetings and an effort is
made to come to a clear consensus about what forms of action will be allowed
during specific protest events. Clearly some of the groups most heavily involved
in the rioting in Rostock were not involved in the planning meetings, either be-
cause they came from abroad or because they did not want to cooperate with the
more moderate groups. But many of the black bloc activists had been involved in
the planning. At the same time, the protests in Wendland followed a strategy of
tolerance, even though not everyone took part in the planning meetings. The
problem at the G8 was not that those who broke the consensus had not been at
the table, but rather that there was no consensus to break, because no effort had
been made to generate one for the June 2nd demonstration. In contrast, the Block
G8 coalition had explicitly addressed the issue and forged a consensus for the
blockades. 
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This suggests that if the goal is successful movement-wide collaboration, it is
better to explicitly discuss tactical preferences, coordination, and compatibility
(and to talk about how to respond if violence does occur) than to sidestep the
question in the hopes of avoiding a split. Factional splits over tactics may be more
likely to result from unsuccessful taming rituals than from directly addressing the
issue beforehand. Both in the Block G8 coalition and in Wendland, the question
was respectfully discussed, with the goal of finding a consensus that left room for
various tactics to coexist without hindering each other, and in both cases the result
was successful collaboration, even when violence did occur. 
Having a concrete objective—In both instances of successful collaboration, the
action had a concrete objective, whether it was to blockade the entrances to the
G8 meeting or to delay the Gorleben transport for as long as possible. And in both
instances where violence caused some level of internal friction, it took place
during a mass demonstration where there was no clear, tangible objective, i. e. in
the kick-off march in Rostock and the spontaneous demonstration in Dannenberg.
This is most likely because it is harder to tolerate militant action forms when there
is no immediate instrumental benefit to be gained.
Experience of Working Together and Expectation of Future Collaboration—
Our analysis suggests that the most important factor in determining whether
taming or tolerance takes place is whether the central actors have worked together
before and/or expect to work together in the future. This helps to explain not only
the difference between the G8 and Wendland actions, but also between the June 2
demonstration and the blockades during the G8. 
The fact that the Block G8 coalition was able to reach an action consensus had
much to do with the fact that many members of the coalition had worked together
before, in Wendland and elsewhere, and could reasonably expect to work together
again. Their intent was not only to prepare for the protests in Heiligendamm, but to
lay the groundwork for a longer-term collaboration. This intention is strongly re-
flected in Block G8’s self-evaluation published after the protests, although the non-
violence groups emphasize this commitment more than the autonomous groups. 
The pattern is even more pronounced in Wendland. The primary reason for
their commitment to tolerating a diverse range of action forms was that the same
actors had had such a negative experience with the taming approach in 1997. The
whole coalition of actors there has been working together to resist the various
planned projects in Gorleben for more than 30 years, and over that time, they have
learned how to work together more effectively—coming to understand what
offends and alienates the others and what it takes to keep them coming back.
Because of the high frequency of Castor transports, they can also expect to be
working together in an on-going way into the future, which motivates them to act
in a way that will not endanger future collaboration.
In contrast, the broader coalition of groups who organized the June 2nd de-
monstration had not worked together before and was less action-oriented than
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either the Block G8 coalition or the groups in Wendland. And while most of them
consider themselves part of the larger alter-globalization movement, the G8
protests were largely seen as a one-time event, and it was not likely that the same
constellation of actors would have occasion to organize future events together.
Range of Actors—One factor which we thought would be important is the
range of political perspectives represented by the various groups in each event.
The range of actors appeared to be broader for the G8 events than in Wendland.
On closer inspection, however, the difference seemed both less clear and less
significant than we expected. 
There was, in fact, an exceptionally wide range of actors involved in the G8
protests. Preferences for certain forms of action differed accordingly, ranging
from some NGOs who doubted that even peaceful demonstrations would have
any meaningful effect, to the other extreme of some Autonomen and anarchist
groups who saw violent confrontation with the police as the only meaningful form
of action. It also seems to be true that the difficulty in reconciling these extremes
led to a de facto strategy of spatial separation—the so-called »choreography of re-
sistance«—which aimed at keeping protesters with different action preferences
physically apart. This strategy clearly failed when all actors necessarily had to
come together in the same space for the June 2nd demonstration in Rostock. It is
also true that the Block G8 coalition included a much narrower spectrum, which
made it easier to integrate the different actors into a plan that physically separated
civil disobedience from more confrontational forms of action, but still embraced
both in a common strategy to disrupt the summit infrastructure. This consensus of
tolerance held even after the violence at the opening demonstration, and members
of Block G8 did not participate in the taming rituals of some of the NGOs.
However, it is not clear whether the difference in the range of actors is the de-
termining factor in these events. For one thing, it is difficult to tell whether the
range in Wendland was really any narrower than in the G8 coalition. The overall
number of groups is certainly smaller, but their ideological range—which in-
cludes a large contingent of farmers who on some issues are fairly conservative—
may be even broader. While our data do not allow us to make any definitive
claims in this regard, the action-orientation of the actors may be more important
than the range of political ideologies. For example, the NGOs involved in the
Wendland campaign (e.g. Greenpeace and Robin Wood) were more action oriented
than many of the NGOs in the anti-G8 coalition, and thus fit more easily into the
Streckenkonzept. 
Based on the cases examined here, another factor which may be even more
relevant than either the range of political ideologies or the action orientations of
the various actors may be the degree to which key actors are internally united in
their approach. The one organization in the G8 coalition that was especially upset
and vocal about the violence on June 2nd was Attac, largely because they were
internally split over the question themselves, and the two factions within the orga-
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nization—one more movement oriented and the other more lobbying oriented—
had publicly taken contradictory positions. 
In sum, we found that the most important factor determining whether the
movement tended toward tolerance or taming was the degree of on-going collabo-
ration. Both the experience of working together in the past and the expectation of
future collaboration generate a strong urge to choose a strategy of tolerating dif-
ferent action forms. More generally, our two cases suggest that a strategy of
tolerance and cooperation works, and that taming rituals do not. Not only do
attempts to control or tame violent protesters seem to aggravate relationships
within the movement, resulting in factionalization and weakened mobilization
capacity; it also does not tend to effectively stop militant activists from using con-
frontational tactics. When we say cooperation »works« we do not mean that it
stops violence, since activists who use these tactics generally do it intentionally
and there is often a wing of the movement that sees it as both politically legitimate
and strategically useful. Rather, we mean that movements are able to coordinate
more successfully, foster solidarity, and avoid schisms when they can find ways to
make multiple tactics complement each other. That said, it is interesting that of
our two cases, the one that was the least violent was also the one that was the most
overtly tolerant of confrontational action forms. Ironically, it may well be that
tolerance is the most effective taming strategy.
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Nick Montgomery
Beyond Civil Disobedience and Counter-hegemony:
Legitimacy, Strategy and Tactics in the 2010 Anti-Olympics
Movement
In 2008, massive protests disrupted the Olympic torch relay, particularly in London,
Paris, and San Francisco. The protests received worldwide coverage, and were cele-
brated by many as a success, insofar as they embarrassed Chinese officials by poli-
ticizing China’s human rights record and its occupation of Tibet (Economy 2008).
The widespread media coverage of worldwide protests against the Beijing Olym-
pics might make more recent anti-Olympics protests in Canada seem like a failure.
Beginning on February 10th, 2010, anti-Olympics activists converged to protest and
disrupt the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, Canada (Olympics Resistance Net-
work 2010). These demonstrations were the culmination of a series of actions that
disrupted the Olympics ceremonies and organizing efforts. The 2010 protests re-
ceived far less media attention than their counterparts during the Beijing Olympics,
and it is much less obvious (to many people) why the 2010 Olympics are even being
resisted. Why would anyone protest the Olympics in Canada?  Who are these protes-
ters, and what do they want? What are they advocating, and what are they against?
These questions tend to be asked about protests in general, providing answers
about the politics of protests. However, the purpose of this paper is not to answer
these questions, but to problematize them, in hopes of uncovering other forms of
politics at work in anti-Olympics activism in Vancouver. This paper takes these
questions as a central problem; not as a problem to be solved, but rather as one
whose solution is often already given by the way we ask the question.
These questions—Who are they? What do they want? What are their objec-
tives? What are they protesting?—are the common-sense questions asked about
protest in the media and in academia. In order to understand protests, they need to
be made intelligible; one needs to locate coherent aims, objectives, and claims.
This knowledge enables judgment about whether the aims are realistic, legitimate,
feasible, and so on. It also enables judgment about the success or failure of the
protest or ›the movement‹ more generally. Did they achieve their objectives? Did
they receive media attention? Did governments and other political institutions
listen and respond to their demands? I will suggest that if these questions are ap-
proached uncritically, we will miss some of the most creative and significant cur-
rents of contemporary social movements and protest.
In the case of anti-Olympics protest in Victoria, protesters have been variously
portrayed as vague, infantile, immoral, selfish, stupid, and violent (Dronsfield
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2009). Rather than confront these claims, I want to ask what allows them to func-
tion. What makes it possible (and maybe even inevitable) for protesters to be
condemned, dismissed, or infantilized? I will suggest that these tendencies are
built into the structure of protest itself, and the types of questions that are asked
about it. This paper seeks to destabilize these questions by tracing out some of
their assumptions, and situating them within broader historical tendencies. I will
argue that these questions reproduce assumptions about politics that have their
roots in liberal notions of civil disobedience and Marxist imperatives of counter-
hegemony, and that these assumptions create serious difficulty for thinking
creatively about the politics of (and beyond) protest. These discourses help to
produce a narrow form of politics that is centered on the state as the locus of po-
litics.
However, I will also argue that anti-Olympics activists have avoided capitulat-
ing to this form of politics. Although they make use of these dominant discourses,
contemporary anti-Olympic practices also point to alternative forms of politics
that destabilize sovereignty and open up new political possibilities. If we continue
to ask the same old questions of protests and protesters (Who are they? What do
they want? How do they propose to get it?), we will miss these alternative politics
at work. New questions are called for, questions that call into question traditional
forms of politics, as well as enabling an understanding of the way new activist
practices destabilize these traditional forms and point to new ones. This paper
ends by seeking out different sites of anti-Olympics activism where politics works
differently. I will focus on two events—the Victoria Anarchist Bookfair and the
Networks of Dissent Teach-in—which open alternative possibilities for politics. It
is argued that these spaces engage in what Deleuze and Guattari call »minoritarian
politics« which is fundamentally different from the logics of hegemony and civil
disobedience.
Contextualizing anti-Olympics activism
The politics of anti-Olympics activism that I am interested in has little to do with
the Olympic games as such, and more to do with the neoliberal economic restruc-
turing, increasing surveillance, environmental destruction, and continuing coloni-
alism that make the Olympic games possible. Much of the activism around anti-
Olympics organizing can be understood as an attempt to expose these conditions
of possibility, pointing to massive public and private expenditures on security,
infrastructure, and advertising (Shaw 2008). In this sense anti-Olympics resis-
tance can be situated within the history of politicizations and contestations of neo-
liberalism, and the forms of politics that have emerged as part of the anti-globa-
lization movement. For many, this history began with the anti-WTO protests in
1999, where protesters impeded and eventually blocked World Trade Organiza-
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tion meetings in Seattle (Newman 2007, 166-199).1 Others have traced this legacy
back to 1988, when thousands converged on Berlin to protest International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) meetings (Starr 2003). Others have traced these forms of politics
to May ‘68 in France and the emergence of the ›new social movements‹ (Grindon
2004).
Claims about the meaning and significance of these forms of political action
are equally varied. Some have hailed this as a world historical moment of trans-
national solidarity (Shiva 1999) while others have questioned the efficacy of the
anti-WTO protest tactics (Day 2005, 3). Similar questions could be raised about
the efficacy of anti-Olympics demonstrations: do activists really think they will
be able to stop, impede, or even reform the Olympics? What’s the point of resis-
ting an event that seems to receive worldwide support? These questions gesture
towards the (perceived) need to make anti-Olympics resistance intelligible or
understandable so that it can be evaluated in terms of efficacy, legitimacy, or
success.
Liberal discourses of civil disobedience
I will suggest that attempt to make protests intelligible in this way has its roots in
the discourses of liberalism and Marxism, and they rely on particular conceptions
of politics. After briefly reviewing liberal theories of protest and civil dis-
obedience, I will discuss the ways anti-Olympics organizers are making use of
these discourses.
As a discipline, political science has been advanced as a theory of the state, and
thus places the state at center of politics (Magnusson 1996, 49-73). The state tends
to be understood as the locus of authority, and thus the most significant site of po-
litical change. In the context of protest, this means that political claims tend to be
understood in relation to the state, with the state acting as the central agent of
change. The state and capitalism exist in a reciprocal relationship with the abstract
individual, »that self-contained, distinct, and autonomous person, who exists only
in the imagination of liberal theorists« (Magnusson 1996, 56). I want to point to
liberal discourses of civil disobedience as a particularly significant site for the
reproduction of the liberal state and its autonomous citizen-subjects.
Conceptions of civil disobedience are always engaged, implicitly or explicitly,
with the proper limits of civil disobedience, where disobedience becomes ›un-
civil‹. A paradigmatic example of civil disobedience is John Rawls’ (1991) at-
tempt to justify civil disobedience as a legitimate ›last resort‹ when other political
avenues have been foreclosed. As Rawls explains,
1 The Seattle demonstrations of 1999 are the paradigmatic point of reference for discussions about the anti-
globalization movement, even when they are not taken as an explicit origin of the movement.
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»The problem of civil disobedience … arises only within a more or less just
democratic state for those citizens who recognize and accept the legitimacy of the
constitution. The difficulty is one of a conflict of duties. At what point does the duty
to comply with the laws enacted by a legislative majority … cease to be binding in
view of the right to defend one’s liberties and the duty to oppose injustice?« (103).
In this line of thought, the problem is how to determine whether protesters
have the interests of the public at heart, and whether their actions reflect the
conscientious politics of concerned citizens. In other words, the point of protest or
civil disobedience is to enable the public to take note of injustices, so that they can
urge the state to correct them: within this discourse, protest aims at state reform.
Rawls explains that more militant actions of disobedience—where citizens aim at
revolution or refuse to take responsibility for their actions—would be deemed
illegitimate by this definition (107). However, the function of civil disobedience
is not merely to sort out the difference between good citizens and bad militants: it
reproduces the citizen. For Rawls, civil disobedience is a practice of the citizen
who is willing to accept responsibility for his or her actions (107 f.). And who de-
cides if a particular act of civil disobedience is legitimate? Not the liberal state or
its representatives, but the polity of citizens. »The citizen is autonomous yet he is
held responsible for what he does … to act autonomously and responsibly a
citizen must look to the political principles that underlie and guide the interpreta-
tion of the constitution« (120).
What does Rawlsian civil disobedience have to do with anti-Olympics protest?
Rawls is useful here not because activists are reading his definitions of civil dis-
obedience and obeying them, but because his theory of disobedience relies on
much more fundamental notions of liberal common sense. The citizen-subject
Rawls reproduces is deeply embedded in discourses of protest. This means that
implicit assumptions of civil disobedience often condition judgments about pro-
test: are they taking responsibility for their actions? Are they revealing an
injustice to be addressed by the electorate? Are they providing well-reasoned
arguments for their actions? Furthermore, debates about non-violent civil dis-
obedience pervade activist debates and practices (Sharp 1973). As such, discourses
of civil disobedience produce norms and imperatives governing the conduct of
protesters themselves. The subjects of protest are produced by this discourse, and
these subjects often rely on it for their actions to be intelligible. In this context,
approaching civil disobedience critically means not simply tracing the way in
which it delegitimizes militant action or legitimates State repression of militants.
What also needs to be grasped is the way it is productive of the citizen-subject of
civil disobedience. In this sense, the need for non-violence, rationality, state
reform, and reasonableness enable forms of self-discipline rather than simply
legitimizing State repression against more militant forms of action.
The subject of protest must orient herself to the state or other loci of political
authority so that they can be responded to. One must avoid violence so that one’s
MS 88_PREVENT_K_alles  18.11.2010  11:15 Uhr  Seite 102
103
actions are intelligible to the State, or to civil society, which may act as an inter-
mediary in the achievement of State reform. These logics suggest that civil dis-
obedience is a discourse of governmentality, where protesters govern their own
conduct, and the conduct of others, in ways that make them and their demands
more amenable to traditional political channels.2 As Nikolas Rose (2006) ex-
plains, governmentality emerged not as a substantive doctrine of how subjects
should be governed, but »as a search for a technology of government that can
address the recurrent complaint that authorities are governing too much« (84).
Civil disobedience can be understood as part of this search, as an attempt to
find the proper form of conduct for the liberal citizen who wishes to address the
excesses of his or her state. Freedom is not opposed to government as such, but is
rather the condition of possibility of the rational, responsible, autonomous subject
who opposes himself to a law in a certain situation, with the aim of ameliorating
technologies of government. Rather than asking how protest is repressed or policed
›from above‹ by the state or other authorities, we might ask how civil disobedience
encourages protestors police themselves.
The need to be reasonable, rational, coherent, well-behaved, pacifist, and res-
ponsible operates as forms of control, exercised by protesters on themselves and
others. At the same time, it would be wrong to think of self-disciplinary protest as
an uncontested practice; it has been the site of a number of struggles and resis-
tances. For example, Ward Churchill has attempted to revise histories of the civil
rights movement and Indian independence to disrupt narratives that privilege non-
violent, pacifist tendencies and marginalize violent resistance (Churchill 2007).
›Resisting‹ these discourses, as Churchill recognizes, is not simply about trans-
gressing its norms and valorizing violence or irrationality, for this merely
reproduces the dichotomies of violent/non-violent, rational/irrational. Anti-Olym-
pics organizing points to some ways in which these discourses might be critically
engaged while mitigating the forms of discipline they encourage.
Activists have made use of these liberal discourses of protest, framing their
claims and struggles in terms of civil rights and free speech. For example, efforts
by police to question anti-Olympics activists have been framed as harassment and
an undue violation of civil liberties. In the words of one activist: »The police are
not in a position to start a dialogue about free speech and the Olympics. They’ve
already proven that their job is to restrict free speech. The place to start is by
holding public meetings about Olympic security instead of visiting organizers’
houses. We doubt that they will—talking to the VISU [Vancouver Integrated
Security Unit] about Charter rights is like talking to a brick wall« (Olympics Re-
sistance Victoria 2009).
Activists are thus attempting to position the police as a force opposed to free
speech by inviting police to share their concerns at public gatherings. By posi-
2 ›Governmentality‹ is a term developed by Michel Foucault, formulated in his 1978 lectures (Foucault 2007).
Nikolas Rose (2006) has produced a helpful survey of the literature on the concept of governmentality.
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tioning their own concerns as ›public‹ and positioning the police as enemies of a
public discussion and democratic dissent, anti-Olympics activists make use of
liberal discourses that enable and protect free speech and freedom of assembly.
Olympics organizers have made use of this discourse as well, suggesting that
»there will always be critics of our project,« claiming that they »only hope that
any criticisms are constructive and truthful and demonstrations are safe and non-
violent« (Bell 2009). Truthfulness, constructiveness, and non-violence are
reiterated as the conditions of a legitimate and effective politics.
As I have suggested above, liberal discourses of civil disobedience are part of a
discursive regime that functions to police protesters, not (only) through repressive
force, but by creating norms that enable them to police themselves. Anti-Olympics
activists have made use of these discourses tactically, but they have also resisted
them as regimes of self-control. For example, at a roundtable discussion between
anti-Olympics organizers in 2009, one audience member asked about non-
violence, urging others to be peaceful during demonstrations. In turn, panelists res-
ponded by criticizing the call for non-violence, pointing to the ongoing violence
of colonialism, racism, and the criminalization of homelessness and linked these
phenomena to the Olympics and its effects on local communities. However, they
did not simply invert the call for non-violence with a call for violence; instead,
they gestured towards the need for a diversity of tactics, rather than an either/or
choice between violence and non-violence. This exchange can be understood as a
critical politicization of violence. Whereas liberal concepts of non-violence limit
the question of violence to political subjects, the panelists politicized the struc-
tural and historical violence of the state and its role in maintaining colonial rela-
tions. Redefined in this way, violence ceases to be a simple choice made by a
citizen about his or her tactics; it becomes a feature of everyday life, one that
tends to be obscured in the call for non-violence.
Liberal discourses of non-violence, civil disobedience, and protest are a signi-
ficant site of struggle in anti-Olympics organizing. My sketch of these discourses
has been schematic and much more could be said about the history of struggles
and transformations that have taken place in the constitution of discourses of civil
disobedience. Although these discourses can end up regulating conduct and nor-
malization, anti-Olympics organizers are navigating these discourses tactically,
understanding them as sites of struggle rather than stable rules that should govern
conduct. The same can be said of Marxist discourses of hegemony and strategy,
which I discuss below. Although it is possible to understand anti-Olympics
activism as a counter-hegemonic project, there are also elements of anti-Olympics
organizing that exceed the limits of a counter-hegemonic strategy, and point
beyond the logic of hegemony to more subtle and creative political practices.
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Hegemony and counter-hegemony in protest
Gramsci’s political thought has been celebrated as an alternative to both liberal re-
formism and mechanistic Marxism through his focus on the way dominant groups
are able to maintain consent and control (Carroll 1997). For Gramsci, the concept
of ›hegemony‹ was an attempt to understand the ways in which the bourgeoisie
was able to present itself (and its interests) as universal, »capable of absorbing the
entire society, assimilating it to its own cultural and economic level« (Gramsci
1971, 236). Gramsci showed how the state was not simply a ›night watchman‹,
whose functions are limited to safeguarding public order and respect for the laws;
the State also has a hegemonic function, in its »production of the will to conform«
(261).
There are significant differences in the ways in which hegemony has been
taken up as a form of analysis; however, there are important shared tendencies as
well (Carroll 1994). As Stuart Hall (1996, 417) suggests, hegemony tends to be
intertwined with the question of »what strategies and forms of political action/
organization could unite concretely different kinds of struggle?« In other words,
hegemony tends to be attached to the question of counter-hegemony, and the pro-
spects for challenging the hegemonic order. Counter-hegemony forms a tentative
answer to the question of Marxist strategy, holding out the possibility of a basis of
unity for the diversity of struggles for social justice. Counter-hegemony takes us
from the question of responsible citizenship to the question of effective strategy.
However, I will suggest that ›effective strategy‹ also produces norms of conduct
and discipline. As with civil disobedience, this does not mean ›rejecting‹ this dis-
course but asking what forms of control it exercises and how it is engaged in anti-
Olympics struggles.
With the concept of hegemony, it is possible to see that ›the Olympics‹ are not
somehow essentially connected to global cooperation and sportsmanship, or to
environmental destruction and colonialism, but rather that these connections are
contingent and the way the Olympics is articulated.
The articulation of the Olympics—as a harmonious, unifying and inspiring
event—is a hegemonic project that must be continually produced and maintained.
Insofar as this articulation is successful, the Olympics signifies itself as a univer-
sal symbol of harmony, in line all interests: it’s good for everyone.
The Olympics maintains its hegemony (and the consent of local residents, the
Canadian public, and its global viewership) by articulating the Olympics as a
symbol of sportsmanship, international cooperation, and athletic excellence. As a
sporting event, the Olympics appears depoliticized, and therefore not a subject of
contestation. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Vancouver Or-
ganizing Committee (VANOC) have also used more national, regional, and local
narratives to frame the Olympics in a positive light. VANOC and other Olympic
organizers have teamed up with corporations to create sophisticated marketing
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campaigns, clothing brands, and a media apparatus that links the Olympics to
Canadian multiculturalism, economic development, and sustainability (VANOC
2009a; 2009b; 2009c).
Against these narratives of harmonious economic, racial, and environmental
coexistence, anti-Olympics organizers undertook detailed research, engaged in
media campaigns and direct actions to disrupt Olympics proceedings. Over the
last two years, activists from across North America have carried out a series of
direct actions to disrupt Olympic celebrations and ceremonies (no2010.com
2010). These actions have varied in their scope and purpose; however, all have
served to disrupt the smooth functioning of the Olympics discourse, which
depends on the depoliticization of the Olympics and its articulation as a two-week
celebration of athleticism. Anti-Olympics efforts effect a disarticulation of the
Olympics discourse, fracturing and problematizing its coherence.
In addition to these practices of disarticulation, activists have also engaged in
their own project of (re)articulation, in the attempt to hegemonize a discourse that
signifies the Olympics as a destructive force linked to corporate greed and
fascism. This counter-hegemonic project is most evident in terms of the research
and propaganda generated by anti-Olympics organizers, which includes a range of
material from short pamphlets and posters to detailed documents on the history of
the Olympics and the local impacts of the 2010 Olympics (2010 Watch 2009; zig
zag 2009). These projects produce counter-narratives to the dominant narratives
of harmony and sportsmanship. As zig zag (2009) writes, »while cutting social
services, healthcare, education, etc., the BC Liberal government is at the same
time providing billions of dollars to construction companies & other Olympic-
related industries. The capitalists are making millions, while the poor are literally
dying in the urban & reservation ghettos.«
Although they emphasize different issues and depend on different assumptions,
the vast majority of these articles position the Olympics (and police, corporations,
and Olympics organizers) as ›enemies‹ and anti-Olympics resisters as defenders
of the environment, indigenous peoples, public space, and local economies. In the
language of Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) theory of hegemony, this is a process of
articulation where the Olympics organizers are positioned on the ›outside‹, and
diverse interests and identities (indigenous, homeless, ecological, municipal, etc)
are articulated on the ›inside‹, with their opposition to the Olympics as a basis of
unity and identification.
Although anti-Olympic efforts to produce the Olympics as a common enemy
can be understood as a counter-hegemonic strategy, the lack of a set of coherent
demands, alternatives, or claims is a serious weakness from the perspective of
hegemony. It is often thought that the Left needs to articulate a common position
so that it is not »condemned to marginality« (Laclau 1985, 189). This discourse is
not limited to academic texts. Like the liberal discourse of civil disobedience I
outlined above, the discourse of hegemony permeates both intellectual and ac-
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tivist strategies and common-sense thinking about social change (Day 2005, 66-
88). In order for a successful counter-hegemonic project to be carried out, »[o]ne
needs to know for what one is fighting, what kind of society one wants to estab-
lish« (Laclau 1985, xix). From here, demands can be put forward which advance
society in this direction, and protests and other political practices can be evaluated
by how successful they are at articulating these demands and advancing this
broader vision.
Demands and claims tend to form a central part in the analysis of hegemony,
because they provide a means of locating longer-term objectives, aims and tra-
jectories of protest movements. Ernesto Laclau (2005, 73) has gone so far as to
insist that demands should form the central unit of analysis of social movements.
We can recognize some familiar questions that are presupposed by the analytic of
hegemony: What do they want? What are their long-term goals? What is their
strategy? Here, coherence and unity become a priority in the attempt to win the
struggle for hegemony against the Olympics and its corporate and government
partners. However, this discourse and the imperatives it generates also produce
their own norms and common sense, which governs conduct. For example, a suc-
cessful struggle for hegemony means winning over a majority, creating wide-
spread opposition to the Olympics. Good strategy, in this sense, means producing
unified opposition to the Olympics and convincing the majority of Canadians that
the Olympics is bad for Canada.
The need for a coherent opposition can be understood as a conduct-governing
regime similar to the liberal discourse discussed above.  In other words, the re-
quirement for a coherent program produces a new set of norms that enables forms
of discipline and control. Like ›violence‹ in the liberal discourse above, the specter
of ›incoherence‹ or ›vagueness‹ functions within the hegemonic discourse as a
danger that must be warded off, requiring the (self-)discipline of subjects and
practices that do not cohere with the counter-hegemonic strategy. Like the dis-
course of civil disobedience, the discourse of hegemony and the need for coherent
demands has been engaged and resisted in a number of ways (Day 2004; Robin-
son 2005).
One of the most powerful examples of this resistance is Richard Day’s (2005)
critique of hegemony in Gramsci is Dead. Day suggests that the discourse of he-
gemony has resulted in the privileging of what he calls »the politics of demand«
which relies on and reproduces external structures (such as the state) for the satis-
faction of these demands (80-84). Day points to a form of politics that is not con-
fined to the state, but nonetheless reproduces relationships that mimic the citizen-
state relationship. The politics of demand perpetuates a feeling of lack and the
desire for emancipation through an appeal to an outside: to ›the people‹ or ›the
state‹ or even ›the Olympics committee‹. In other words, by making ›demands‹
the central mode of politics, the politics of demand reproduces its dependence on
corporations, governments, and other institutions. Whether advanced angrily,
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through reasoned public debate, or through lobbying, demands reproduce the aut-
horities they engage with, placing activists in an infantilized relationship to them.
The politics of demand is reproduced in the typical questions asked about pro-
test: Who are they? What do they want? How do they propose to get it? However,
anti-Olympics activism occupies an ambiguous relation to the logic of hegemony
and the politics of demand. We have seen that anti-Olympics activism can be con-
ceived as a counter-hegemonic struggle, and it is possible to locate demands
issued by anti-Olympics activists that seem to play into the logic of hegemony.
For example, some of the rhetoric at the recent protests centered on government
spending, suggesting that money could be better spent on social services and low-
income housing. Expressed in this way, opposition to the Olympics can be under-
stood as a counter-hegemonic agenda focused on redistribution or institutional
changes in the State.
Similarly, some activists have condensed the position of the anti-Olympics
movement to opposition to the Olympics as such. In the words of Ivan Doumenc,
»Vancouver is starting a new global movement, one that will continue in London
and all other Olympic-plagued cities after that. A movement that says: we don’t
want the Olympics corporate franchise anymore, anywhere. We just want it
abolished, period« (Doumenc 2010).
From this perspective, the anti-Olympics movement is tied to a program of
abolishing the Olympics. Although this is certainly a radical demand from the per-
spective of those invested in the Olympics, it also confers a particular telos on the
anti-Olympics movement itself, with a coherent objective that can be heard and
responded to by authorities.
However, anti-Olympics organizing also disrupts and points beyond the poli-
tics of demand in a number of ways. For example, anti-Olympics propaganda
often situates Canada, the Olympics committee and its corporate partners within
global capitalism, rather than issuing demands that could be articulated to
reforms: »If the 2010 Winter Olympics goes unchallenged, BC & Canada will
indeed gain positive international exposure. This, in turn, will create greater inter-
national investment & corporate invasion, a process already underway & affect-
ing many areas & communities. If opposition occurs, however, it can contribute to
economic uncertainty, deter some investment, and limit the impact of 2010 on
some communities & regions« (zig zag 2009).
This conception of disruption points towards a politics of resistance rather than
a politics of demand and reform. Instead of relying on a counter-hegemonic
strategy that would be evaluated in terms of its capacity to influence majorities
and transform broader structures, the strategy of resistance above points to the ca-
pacities of local communities in resisting the impacts of the Olympics and miti-
gating their harmful effects. This analysis reveals that although anti-Olympics
organizers are using modes of political organizing that could be understood as
counter-hegemonic—the attempt to resignify the Olympics as a destructive insti-
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tution, for example—the efficacy of this politics does not depend on the he-
gemony of their position. Tactics of resistance and disruption can succeed in li-
miting the effects of the Olympics whether or not ›the public‹ supports them. At
the same time, one might question the significance of the politics of resistance in
the longer-term, especially in the context of the Olympics. This form of politics
pits grassroots activists against a massive security apparatus that is increasingly
designed to constitute, locate, and eliminate guerilla tactics as acts of terrorism
(Grindlay 2009).
A longstanding criticism of the politics of resistance has been its lack of cons-
tructive alternatives (Boggs 1986, 19; Gill 1995; Carroll 1994; Carroll 2009). As I
have mentioned above, from a hegemonic perspective, the disarticulation and dis-
ruption of the Olympics and the discourses on which it relies misses the crucial
task of re-articulation, in which counter-hegemonic movements find the capacity
to advance their own objectives and aims for society.
In the final section of my analysis, I will suggest that anti-Olympics organizers
are engaged in the project of advancing alternatives, but not according to the logic
of hegemony. In order to understand the logic and significance of alternatives, we
need to move from an analysis of propaganda and demands to concrete practices
and events. In other words, it is where coherence and unity seem to be most
›lacking‹ that the most significant alternatives are emerging.
From hegemonic to minoritarian
If we look for alternatives advanced hegemonically, we will be drawn to a search
for programs, positions, or plans for what society should look like, how politics
should be conducted, or how people should organize themselves. In contrast, I
will suggest that the alternatives advanced by anti-Olympics organizers are frag-
mentary and experimental, rather than coherent and unified. The alternatives pro-
duced through anti-Olympics organizing are closer to what Deleuze and Guattari
(1987, 469 ff.) have called a »minoritarian politics«, which can’t be measured or
understood by its capacity to enter and be heard by molar structures like the state,
corporations or Olympics committees. This logic resonates with Day’s (2005)
alternative to the politics of demand, which he calls »the politics of the act«.
Whereas the politics of demand reproduces dependent relationships by relying on
institutions like the state, the politics of the act side-steps these structures and en-
gages directly in political action. Direct action figures prominently here, as a form
of political action that refuses mediation through bureaucracies, parties, or other
forms of organization. However, this different political logic is not an opposition
between ›demands‹ and ›acts‹ or between ›speaking‹ and ›action‹. Rather than a
simple opposition to ›speaking‹, we should understand the politics of the act as a
politicization of the disciplinary logics that take coherence, unity, and demands as
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unproblematic political goals: »it means surprising both oneself—and the struc-
ture—by inventing responses that preclude the necessity of the demand and
thereby break out of the loop« (Day 2005, 89).
I have tried to show how these disciplinary logics are built into the discourse of
counter-hegemony, through which anti-Olympics activism is understood as insuf-
ficiently coherent, and lacking a long-term program for the reorganization of
society. That which is being disciplined is the multiplicity of voices, tactics, and
movements that make up ›the‹ anti-Olympics movement.
This multiplicity can always be ignored, overcoded or subsumed under the
logic of hegemony or civil disobedience. This is what happens when common-
sensical questions are asked about tactics that do not fit with the logic of protest.
If actions are not intelligible as attempts to express dissent, they are illegitimate,
pointless, or even unintelligible. This seems to be what happened in the recent
debates surrounding black bloc tactics, where activists smashed windows of the
Hudson’s Bay Company during a demonstration on February 13th (CBC 2010).
David Eby, executive director of the BC Civil Liberties association, condemned
the black bloc tactics: »I don’t see that there’s any place for those kinds of actions
if we’re going to be encouraging free speech. If you want to speak your point of
view in favor of or opposed to the Olympics, there should be space for that. You
shouldn’t expect someone to put a chair through your front window« (Carlito
2010).
In an interview from the same news article, Mark Leier insists that the actions
of the black bloc were legitimate because they attracted media attention, framing
the tactics as part of »a long tradition of people creating disruptions to draw atten-
tion to their causes.« What is significant about this debate is not the divergence of
opinions about the legitimacy of these actions, but their convergence on the im-
perative of expressing dissent. In other words, the condition of possibility of
judgement about (il)legitimacy turns on whether these actions can be understood
as civil disobedience and the expression of dissent. If black bloc tactics succeed in
drawing attention to issues and remedying injustices, their actions can be under-
stood as (legitimate) civil disobedience.
Similar discussions have occurred on the terrain of hegemony. In this context,
the black bloc tactics are judged in the context of whether they contribute to (or
detract from) public opposition to the Olympics. For example, the logic of hegem-
ony subtends Mark Sweetman’s claim that »years of hard work that organizers
had put into opposing the capitalist and colonial Olympic Games shatter in the
eyes of the public with the first broken window« (Sweetman 2010). Similarly,
prominent intellectual-activist Judy Rebick has condemned them because they
reverse the gains made by hegemonic politics, which had »persuaded the majority
in BC that the Games are not good for the province« (Rebick 2010). No longer
couched in terms of legitimacy, the logic of hegemony appears even more forceful
because it is about ›effectiveness‹ of tactics. This is about strategy, not legitimacy.
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However, what needs to be critically engaged is the grounding of effectiveness in
a totalizing logic of hegemony. What gives these statements their force is the
common-sense logic of hegemony: the focus of anti-Olympics protest must be to
send a clear message to be heard by ›the public‹ or ›the majority in BC‹. The logic
of hegemony creates a form of discipline that is all the more subtle because it lays
claim to the ground of strategic necessity instead of moral legitimacy.  However, I
have already suggested that there are alternative discourses and practices at work
in anti-Olympics activism, which offer glimpses at an alternative politics.
In what follows, I want to point to new political sensibilities and modes of or-
ganizing that attend to this multiplicity, rather than subsuming it under the logic of
counter-hegemony or civil disobedience. There have been a number of attempts to
name and explain these emergent forms of political practice (Tormey 2006; Day
2004; Newman 2007; Graeber 319), but rather than compare these attempts, I will
draw on those that seem to be the most relevant in the context of anti-Olympics
organizing. Day calls this emerging form of politics the »logic of affinity«: »Living
affinity-based relationships means not only hooking up with those with whom we
share values, but actively warding off and working against those whose practices
perpetuate division, domination and exploitation … This is the crux of the task of
building the coming communities: we must develop—and live according to—
shared ethico-political commitments that allow us to achieve enough solidarity to
effectively create sustainable alternatives to the neoliberal order« (2005, 186).
The logic of affinity operates in a way that is antithetical to traditional forms of
protest, which rely on and reproduce the authorities they place demands upon.
How can a multiplicity—an inherently incoherent assemblage of desires, move-
ments, and flows—produce a coherent set of demands or a unified counter-
hegemonic front? A multiplicity can always be represented or articulated as a
coherent front; however, insofar as this articulation is successful, the multiplicity
is covered over. The logic of affinity speaks to a different possibility, one that is
always in tension with the logic of hegemony.
Anti-Olympics activism exists in an ambiguous relationship with these com-
peting logics. The logic of affinity is reflected in a document written by anti-
Olympics organizers: »Due to the diversity of social sectors & concerns, any anti-
Olympic movement must include respect & tolerance for a diversity of tactics as a
basic principle« (zig zag 2009).
The affirmation of a diversity of tactics is not simply a form of pluralism as a
new strategy, but gestures towards a new political logic that side steps the ques-
tion of strategy, emphasizing instead a multiplicity of tactics that has no universal
measure of effectiveness. 
In order to see this alternative politics at work in a more sustained way, we
need to move from spaces of protest to other spaces of anti-Olympics activism. I
will consider two such events involving anti-Olympics organizing. The logic of
affinity is particularly evident in No 2010 Victoria’s ›Networks of Dissent‹ Teach-
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in, which brought together non-governmental organizations, students, and ac-
tivists working on issues of homelessness, poverty, sex-work, decolonization,
healthcare and harm reduction (No 2010 Victoria 2009). Individuals and groups
working and organizing in each of these areas held workshops where they dis-
cussed the impact of the Olympics, and suggested connections to other issues.
A similar political current can be detected in the more recent Victoria Anarchist
Bookfair, in which anti-Olympics resistance was a major theme. Like the Teach-in,
the Bookfair featured a number of workshops and discussions about the impacts
of the Olympics and ongoing organizing efforts (VABF 2009). Both events were
non-hegemonic in the sense that they did not tend toward the carving out of uni-
fied positions. Instead, they created spaces where political problems could be
formulated, rather than proceeding with a search for a coherent program.
The important elements of these events may become clearer if we attempt to
ask questions that are typically asked about protest: Who are they? What do they
want? What are their objectives? What are they advocating, what are they against?
In the context of the Teach-In and the Bookfair, none of these questions can be
answered without considerable difficulty, because these events lack the typical
contours of homogenous, delimitable groups with unified objectives. Indeed,
these events will be found lacking in terms of a unified identity, goal, aim, plat-
form or objective. From the perspective of hegemony, this lack signifies a weak-
ness, for an effective counter-hegemonic strategy requires the articulation of clear
objectives or alternatives. An alternative hegemonic reading might subordinate
these events to the logic of hegemonic struggle by seeing them as forms of move-
ment-building that are significant insofar as they can attract more people to the
cause. Against these readings, I will suggest that these political spaces are sig-
nificant in their own right, perhaps more significant than the counter-hegemonic
struggle of anti-Olympics organizers, for they point to alternative forms of politi-
cal engagement that point beyond the logics of civil disobedience and hegemony.
These events can be understood as minoritarian political spaces. As Deleuze
and Guattari explain, »the power of the minorities is not measured by their capa-
city to enter and make themselves felt within the majority system… but to bring
to bear the force of non-denumerable sets, however small they may be, against the
denumerable sets« (471).
The language of »denumerable sets« is complex, but for our purposes, these
›sets‹ can be understood as forces that are not stable, coherent or unified. From a
hegemonic perspective, these forces can only be understood as lacking coherence
or unity: they seem ineffectual and fragmented because they fail to articulate de-
mands or a coherent alternative capable of producing a counter-hegemonic force.
In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari insist that they have their own political efficacy,
which is precisely the fact that they formulate problems differently than major
institutions. Minoritarian politics points to the places »when people demand to
formulate their problems themselves, and to determine at least the particular con-
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ditions under which they can receive a more general solution« (471). In this sense,
we can understand anti-Olympics organizing as a form of minoritarian politics
through its approach to the Olympics as a problem to be analyzed collectively. Its
force consists in non-unitary, heterogeneous forms collective critique and the way
in which this analysis connects and politicizes forms of everyday life.
The Teach-in and the Bookfair are excellent examples of this force, where
collective problems can be formulated, which will have diverse and multiple res-
ponses. How are these modes of organizing different from the logic of hegemony?
Counter-hegemonic action requires the articulation of a common enemy (which
could be as specific as the Olympics committee or as broad as ›capitalism‹), plac-
ing the counter-hegemonic movement on the inside and the enemy on the outside.
A minoritarian politics operates differently. Rather than tending towards the oppo-
sitional framework of positioning oneself ›against‹ problems like capitalism and
colonialism, minoritarian politics deepens the ways in which these problems are
understood, and multiplies sites of resistance and struggle. In many cases, this
implicates everyday life in colonialism and capitalism. It is important to point out
that there are no guarantees the minoritarian politics will be more effective from a
strategic perspective. On the contrary, a deepening analysis of problems like capi-
talism—which permeates our everyday lives in countless ways—can lead to poli-
tical paralysis and uncertainty about strategies and tactics.
However, I would suggest that minoritarian politics and its deepening of
problems has the effect of paralyzing a particular form of politics, rather than
politics as such. If forms of oppression and domination are understood as net-
worked, local, and multiple, it becomes increasingly difficult to produce a coherent,
unified alternative to something as decentralized and complex as colonialism.
This does not preclude political responses altogether, but rather points back to the
logic of affinity and the possibility of decentralized, heterogeneous political res-
ponses with no basis of unity.
My contention is not that hegemony cannot account for these spaces, but that
the hegemonic analytic overcodes multiplicity and minoritarian political logics,
subsuming them under a totalizing concept of strategy or effectiveness. In these
spaces, ›the Olympics‹ was not simply maintained as an overarching problem that
should organize or guide strategic thinking (counter-hegemony); instead, the
Olympics functioned more as a heuristic device through which to understand the
economic, social and political processes that are at work in local communities,
and the connections between them. This is echoed in a statement from the No
2010 Victoria website: »More than a single rallying point of contention, we view
the 2010 Olympics as the prism through which we can address ongoing systemic
issues in Victoria, including poverty, ecocide, industrial capitalism, etc« (No 2010
Victoria 2009). Here, it is possible to understand the Olympics not (only) as a
common front against which to unite (according the logic of counter-hegemonic
practice) but as a phenomenon that is made possible by a diffuse network of dis-
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courses and practices, and as an opportunity for collective analysis, critique and
solidarity-building within and across organizations and communities. This is
precisely what happened at the Networks of Dissent Teach-in. A workshop run by
PEERS (Prostitutes Empowerment Education and Recovery Society) traced out
the ways in which the Olympics had heightened processes of gentrification and
police repression, exacerbating the situation faced by sex-workers and their allies
in Victoria and Vancouver. Similar workshops were presented on homelessness,
occupied indigenous territories, and environmental destruction. In this context,
the Olympics could be understood as a process that intensified ongoing processes of
colonialism, securitization, gentrification, patriarchy, and corporate restructuring. It
became clear that these processes had multiple, overlapping sites of articulation and
resistance, and were clearly irreducible to the Olympics as such.
Events like the Teach-in and the Bookfair lack the insides and outsides of tradi-
tional modes of political engagement. There are certainly varying levels of com-
mitment and responsibility; however, there is no simple means by which to repre-
sent ›the group‹ that attended these gatherings. The significance of events like
these is not simply that there are no clear insides and outsides, but that this diffe-
rence has specific implications for political practice. It precludes practices like
traditional liberal protest, which require a clear program, objective or demand that
can be issued and heard by an ›outside‹ (be it a sovereign, a corporation or ›the
public‹).
The political significance of these events is that they demonstrate the possibility
of constituting political spaces that do not subordinate themselves to the search
for a coherent strategy, platform, or goal. In doing so, they demonstrate the con-
tingent nature of traditional political practices like protest, gesturing to other
forms of politics.
The challenge then becomes to think about these political projects—and their
effects and transformations—without subsuming them under the logic of hege-
mony. What effects do they have? One step in this direction can be made through
the concept of ›prefiguration‹, which speaks to the possibility of creating alter-
natives relations and modes of organizing in the present. For example, the Teach-
in and the Bookfair prefigure alternatives to capitalism, patriarchy, and hierarchy
through their non-hierarchical organization, free food, and childcare. In this sense,
these events bring the ›outside‹ of neoliberalism, capitalism and patriarchy ›in‹,
recognizing that these practices and power relationships structure our everyday
lives. They create alternative relations directly, rather than relying on ›centers‹ of
power like the state. This is not to say that these spaces are free from domination
or forms of (self-)discipline. Prefiguration only provides a means to think about
political practices as experimental and tentative. I do not mean to suggest that
these spaces or practices are free from power relations or forms of discipline. The
claim here is not so much that anti-Olympics organizing is ›good‹ or that it is free
from dominant power relations, but rather that elements of it are different from
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traditional forms of political practice that remain confined within liberal or stra-
tegic discourses. This is not merely a difference in aims, objectives and programs,
but a different approach to politics which problematizes coherent aims, objectives
and programs. Appreciating these modes of politics requires asking different ques-
tions than those posed by liberalism and the logic of hegemony. If the same ques-
tions are posed, these forms of organization will only be found lacking: lacking
legitimacy, structure, cohesion or direction. I have tried to suggest that this ›lack‹
must be reconceived as a positive difference that enables different capacities.
Anti-Olympics resistance is an interesting struggle because it engages in these
discourses and disrupts dominant relations of power while also producing minori-
tarian political spaces where complexity and difference are deepened rather than
erased. Anti-Olympics activists have constituted themselves as liberal subjects
engaged in a struggle for free speech; however, this discourse has also been re-
sisted and refused. Anti-Olympics struggle can be understood as a counter-hege-
monic struggle in which organizers have attempted to position the Olympics as
the enemy of ›the public‹. Some of their demands are intelligible, effective poli-
tics from liberal and hegemonic perspectives; however, others appear naïve, vague
or contradictory.
These moments of apparent vagueness point beyond hegemony and liberalism to
non-reformist, non-hegemonic currents that follow a different political logic, one
that is erased or covered over by the hegemony of Marxism and liberalism. If these
discourses are reproduced uncritically, the same questions will be asked of political
protest: What are their objectives? What are they asking for? Who are they speaking
to? Minoritarian politics is covered over by these questions, found lacking and in-
coherent, in part because the subjects of minoritarian politics are often not asking
for anything at all; they are producing, politicizing, and experimenting.
The minoritarian spaces of anti-Olympics organizing—in particular the Teach-
in and the Bookfair—point beyond protest to other forms of organizing that form
a complex array of insides and outsides, rather than a clear subject of protest and
an authority capable of hearing and responding. These spaces deepen problems
rather than reducing them to sound bites. They also prefigure alternatives by crea-
ting spaces where relations of power operate differently, through non-hierarchical
relationships, participatory workshops, and free food and childcare. Rather than
spaces of lack, these are spaces of irreducible multiplicity, and their political force
consists in the refusal to reduce this multiplicity to a single position or agenda.
The politics of these minoritarian spaces is obscured by liberal and Marxist dis-
courses of protest. However, the point is not to dismiss liberal and Marxist dis-
courses and point towards minoritarian politics as the way forward. I want to sug-
gest that counter-hegemony and civil disobedience—as fields of political struggle
in activism and academia—need to be decentered without being abandoned. This
is because they continue to structure important relations of power, and dismissing
them as ›bad‹ merely obfuscates their hegemonic effects. These struggles—and
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the political stakes that inhere in them—are obscured by uncritical acceptance as
well as complete dismissal of these discourses.
The politics of the act and the politics of demand (or the politics of minority/
majority) exist in perpetual tension with one another. However, these logics
should be understood as a simple opposition or an either/or choice. Following
Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 474-500), I would suggest that these dualisms should
be understood as constantly interpenetrating, capturing, and combating each
other.3 The notion of minoritarian politics provides a means of examining the
ways in which subtle forms of domination and discipline are politicized, including
those that inhere in the logic of hegemony. At the same time, minoritarian politics
can always be subsumed within the logic of hegemony, both in activist organizing
and in political analysis. The most significant challenge is to uncover the mani-
fold relations between these logics rather than criticize one and celebrate the
other. This paper can be understood as part of this project, in its attempt to sort out
the ways in which movements operate within, across, and beyond civil dis-
obedience and counter-hegemony, and the ways in which these dominant logics
cover over minoritarian politics.
3 Deleuze and Guattari’s dualisms are often misinterpreted as terms that are separate from each other, with the
smooth, the rhizomatic, the molecular, and the war machine celebrated over and against the striated, the arbo-
rescent, the molar and the state. However, much of their analysis in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus is
dedicated to showing the way in which these dualisms are constantly capturing, infiltrating, and giving rise to
one another.
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